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ABSTRACT
Development of the regime is related to the bargaining relationship
between the British Government and the oil companies, tracing its influence
(together with domestic and international considerations) on the decision
making process which shaped the regime's character from 1934 onwards, and
comparing British experience with a model of the Oil Company-Government
(1)
relationship derived from Hossain. Both onshore in 1934, and offshore in the 
middle Sixties, certainty of ownership and access to the resources for 
exploitation, is shown to have been a precondition for investment. This was 
resolved in 1934 by taking these resources into Crown ownership, and in the 
middle Sixties through the negotiation of an internationally agreed U.K. 
Sector of the North Sea. Negotiations for the establishment of that Sector 
are considered, explaining why a Regional regime was not adopted for the 
North Sea. The subsequent resolution of cross boundary unitization by 
Britain and Norway is also considered. In the 1964 offshore regime, company 
possession of scarce technology is demonstrated to have secured the industry 
generally favourable terms (the weakness of the Government being reinforced 
by the rapid development policy) yet the position of British Gas as monopsony 
purchaser, obtained gas at well below market prices. In 1973 the Public 
Accounts Committee criticised the regime in its application to the then 
recently discovered northern oilfields. The state of development of those 
oilfields, and changes in the international oil industry are shown to have 
made these criticisms premature in 1973, though by 1975 when regime changes 
did occur, both those conditions had considerably matured. The bipartisan 
approach to policy was breached in 1975 with the formation of B.N.O.C., after
Cont'd...
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which the Hossain model is inappropriate, since policy progressively diverged 
on ideological lines, which will be demonstrated both through the subsequent 
history of the Corporation, and other regime changes introduced by the 
Conservatives after 1979. A final conclusion observes that the Hossain model 
may yet have some current relevance, as a consequence of the massive 
investments needed to extend U.K. self sufficiency up to the next Century.
(1) Hossain, Kamal. Law and policy in petroleum development: changing
relations between transnationals and governments.
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Introduction The aim of this thesis is to show those factors, both domestic 
and international, which influenced the decision making process shaping the 
character of the U.K. National Regime for Oil and Gas from 1934 onwards. It 
will be demonstrated that amongst the most important of these factors was the 
bargaining relationship between the British Government and the oil companies.
The work of Keohane and Nye^^^ provides a useful starting 
point for this task. Keohane and Nye established a framework for the analysis 
of World politics through a blending of elements from the "realist" and 
"global" interdependence positions. A set of distinct and complementary 
models were provided, so that alternative explanations were available for 
application in differing cases. Though the "realist" position (otherwise 
known as the "State centric" position) was appropriate for the treatment of 
some cases, Keohane and Nye developed a new explanation of interdependence, 
which they suggested was appropriate for the treatment of a large and 
increasing number of cases. They called their new explanation "complex 
interdependence". By contrast with the "realist" position, which stressed 
the prime importance of State power as expressed in economic and military 
terms, and the "global interdependence" position, which tended to the view 
that everything was dependent upon everything else, "complex interdependence" 
while taking account of both the domestic and international dimensions of an 
issue, stressed that the management of many international situations will 
frequently involve not only Governments, but also international 
organisations, multinational companies and other organisations.
It was in the context of "complex interdependence" that Keohane and Nye 
emphasised the importance of those sets of rules, laws and regulations, under
75H40D
(ii)
which States are able to enjoy the benefits of international commerce, 
communications and investment, while at the same time appearing to maintain 
State power to the full within their territories. These arrangements 
constitute international (or regional) regimes, which may be established 
between States, or between States and other transnational actors. There are 
also national regimes which consist of those sets of rules, laws and 
regulations established by individual States with respect to issue areas 
within their own territories. In the shaping of such national regimes.
States will often need to take account not only of domestic considerations, 
such as their relationships with organisations operating purely within their 
national territory, but also with wider and international considerations, 
such as their relations with other countries, and transnational actors such 
as multinational companies. Following the work of Keohane and Nye, there has 
been a steady growth of interest in transnationalism, particularly within the 
area of international b u s i n e s s , together with a progressive integration 
of domestic and international concerns within vital issue a r e a s .
The purpose of regimes is managerial, and the management of the oil and 
gas resources of the North Sea has taken place under an international regime 
based on national sectors established by T r e a t y . within these national 
sectors. North Sea States have developed national regimes to manage their oil 
and gas resources. Of these national regimes, that of the U.K. is unique, in 
that its origins can be traced back to 1934, when arrangements to manage 
onshore oil and gas operations were established through the Petroleum 
(Production) Act, 1934. Thus it affords, within the general context of 
regime management, an opportunity to study the particular relationship 
between the British Government and an important group of transnational
(iii)
actors, the Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) over a period of nearly 
50 years. This may be seen as a power relationship. Power is a concept 
which has always presented problems for the political scientist. The 
conventional definition of power, is the ability of an actor, at a cost 
acceptable to himself, to make another actor act in accordance with his 
wishes. Under "complex interdependence" the power resources available to the 
various actors, exist on multiple dimensions. The power resources available 
to a particular actor will not usually be congruent on all these dimensions. 
This situation creates the possibility for linkage between issues, and 
results in a power structure which is mediated through a bargaining process, 
so that outcomes on an issue will not always be those which seem likely at 
the outset of this process. Actors must employ their power resources in such 
a manner as to avoid undesirable or unacceptable consequences. For example, 
in the North Sea, the British Government enjoys the exclusive power to tax 
oil and gas operations within its own Sector, yet it cannot simply regard 
this source of revenue as a tap to be turned on whenever it requires 
additional income, but must take account of other considerations. Thus at 
the time of writing (early 1984), the tax regime has recently been modified 
to some degree in favour of oil companies operating in the North Sea, so as 
to encourage the exploration and investment needed to extend the use of our 
oil and gas resources into the next Century.
The development of the U.K. National Regime for Oil and Gas is to be 
studied from 1934 to 1981, though reference will be made to later events, 
where these throw light on the impact of earlier decisions. The end of 1981 
has been chosen as a closing date for this study for the following reason.
By the end of that year it was clear that the Conservative Government, not
(iv)
withstanding earlier hesitations, was finally resolved to reduce the level 
of the State's involvement in the North Sea, through measures such as the 
partial privatisation of B.N.O.C.'s Upstream activities. The process of 
change initiated at that time, which has included a liberalisation of the tax 
regime in favour of the oil companies (1983), is still in train at the time 
of writing (e.g. the formation of Enterprise Oil), so that while changes 
within the British Sector of the North Sea and the international oil industry 
are clearly having an important impact on relations between the British 
Government and the oil companies, for the extent of that impact to be fully 
assessed, evaluation must wait till a later date. When that time comes, the 
most important of these recent developments will probably be seen to have 
been a sustained lower level of global energy demand and crude oil 
p r i c e s , (5) together with a continuing diminution of the role of the 
Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) in the international oil industry.
Such a situation, shaping the companies' perceptions both of their future 
profits and the economic viability of new projects, may well have been a 
significant factor in that modification of North Sea tax regime in a 
direction favourable to the companies, which was mentioned earlier.
As with any process of c h a n g e , d e v e l o p m e n t s  over so long a period 
as that between 1934 and 1981, necessarily involves a relationship between 
power and decision making. It will be shown that many of the constraints and 
opportunities in the decision making process, arose from the relative power 
of the oil companies and the U.K. Government in their bargaining 
relationship, together with the impact of the Government's other policy 
objectives, principally strategic in 1934, and largely economic from 1964 
onwards.
(v)
The power of the oil companies was fundamentally weakened by the oil 
crisis of 1973 and the consequences of the Arab oil embargo, which brought 
about a major shift of wealth from the oil consuming to the oil producing 
countries. State power was everywhere increased within the oil industry, 
most notably within the oil producing countries, but as will be shown, to 
some degree within the oil consuming countries. As a consequence. National 
Oil Companies secured an increased share of the international oil business. 
As a response to this situation, the Western oil consuming countries, 
collaborated in the I.E.A. (International Energy Agency) of the O.E.C.D., on 
a number of measures, including the building of emergency stocks. The oil 
companies joined in this enterprise, since in the event of a future 
emergency, this would absolve them from some of the dangers inherent in 
sharing available supplies among their customers, which had presented such 
problems to them in 1973. These developments produced a particular 
difficulty for the U.K. which was both one of the Western oil consuming
countries, but also an oil producer. This ambivalence was noted by
Shackleton in 1977^^^ since when it has become more pronounced as Britain 
has moved towards, and then achieved, oil self sufficiency. A number of 
occasions will be identified when a degree of nationalism has played its part
in determining the nature of British arrangements for the management of oil
and gas resources. This suggests that the possibility of using those 
resources as a source of leverage in relationships with our European 
neighbours, may have been undervalued^®’
Notwithstanding the watershed effect of the events of 1973, and the 
influence of other factors, it is intended to show that the major factor 
shaping the character of the U.K. National Regime for Oil and Gas, has been
(vi)
the development of the relationship between the oil companies and the British
Government. H a r t s h o r n ^ a n d  Penrose^^^^ both made in depth general
studies of the Oil Company Government relationship, prior to the events of 
1973. More recently, Hbssain^^^) hgg presented a very clear picture of how 
this relationship develops in a Third World context, based on his experience 
of Bangladesh. He seeks to identify the point at which power shifts from an 
oil company to a host Government. This occurs, he says, when adequate skills
for ongoing management have been transferred to local personnel, and a
significant deposit has been both located and developed. By then, the oil 
company has been trapped in an investment, from which it hopes to obtain a 
return, and from which it is both difficult and costly to withdraw. Much of 
this analysis is broadly applicable in a Western country, and it is hoped to 
show that this was substantially the case in the U.K. between 1934 and 1978.
The Hossain model certainly held good till around 1975, by which time 
some significant deposits of oil had been located in the northern North Sea, 
and their development was well advanced. At that point, the Labour 
Government were able to modify the terms of the Oil Company Government 
relationship by taking a more direct interest in North Sea oil and gas 
through the agency of a newly created National Oil Company, B.N.O.C. Till 
then, the nature of the regime had been predominantly constrained by the need 
to maintain the ongoing involvement of the oil companies. Thereafter, while 
this concern remained an important factor, that debate which can appear in a 
democratic society, both between and within Parties, on the best form of 
organisation for industry and the proper balance between the Private and 
Public Sectors in a mixed economy, was able to exert some influence on the 
shape of arrangements for the management of our oil and gas resources. From
(vii)
1975 onwards, the Conservative and Labour Parties progressively diverged from 
the bipartisan approach to North Sea affairs which had existed prior to that 
date.
For these reasons, the Hossain model (which ignores ideological 
differences over economic management) is inappropriate for the consideration 
of events from 1979 onwards, when the Conservative Party took office with an 
ideology supportive of the virtues of free enterprise, and a complementary 
economic policy, which gave the control of inflation top priority, and thus 
achieved a sharp break with those principles under which successive Labour 
and Conservative Governments had managed the U.K. economy since 1945. In 
these circumstances, the new Government planned partially to privatise the 
Upstream (exploration and production) activities of B.N.O.C. The factors 
which at first restrained it from this policy, the conditions which brought 
about a reversion to the original intention, and the impact of these changes, 
cannot be explained by reference to the model derived from Hossain.
Moreover, as will be shown below, the Hossain model suggests a permanent 
shift of power to the Government side in the Oil Company Government 
relationship once significant production has been achieved. However, in 
conditions of World depression, with a consequent depressed demand for crude 
oil, by late 1981 the U.K. Government was about to change the tax regime to 
favour the oil companies, in order to secure the really massive investment 
needed to extend the use of our oil resources into the next Century.
Notwithstanding these reservations, the model derived from Hossain 
remains a valuable tool for the analysis of the U.K. National Regime for Oil 
and Gas till the post 1975 period. The simple model derived from Hossain may
(viii)
be set out in four stages as follows:
Stage 1 Encouraging Investment If it is to gain the interest of an oil
company to investigate the existence of oil and gas resources, and 
if successful to carry forward a programme for their exploitation, 
then the State must first establish certainty of title to the 
subsoil and subseabed resources in its territory. This is a 
necessary condition for obtaining such investment, for without 
it ownership may subsequently be challenged. A Petroleum Law must 
be enacted which provides the prospective investor with a wide 
discretion on how he may run his business. The Government 'take' 
must be low, and generous provision made so that the company may 
offset its investment expenditure against tax. Such provision 
should not be worse than that of other countries competing for 
similar investment. A good return on capital invested must be 
allowed, having regard to the fact that most wells drilled may 
prove to be dry holes (i.e. without evidence of oil or gas), or 
not commercially viable. Lead times from the making of a 
significant find through its development to a fully producing field 
may be as long as 10 years. The State, in order to secure the 
necessary investment, may actually consult the companies with which 
it intends to enter into a relationship, in order to find but what 
conditions are needed to obtain their involvement. Thus the rules 
of the game may be formally decided by the State, but in practice. 
State power is highly permeable. The investment sought is one 
which consists not only of finance, but also of scarce technical 
skills.
(ix)
Stage 2 Decision to Invest The company investigates the country and the 
prospect through an economic, technical and political risk 
investigation or assessment. The likely existence of significant 
resources, and the possibility of their profitable development 
are both assessed. At this point, the decision to invest is 
taken. Power then rests very much with the investing company.
It would still be able to terminate its investment, should either 
economic, technical or political conditions turn against it.
Stage 3 Exploration and Development Exploration wells are drilled, and 
after a period of such activity, a significant, or commercial 
prospect is identified. The development phase now begins. By 
means of an extended process of development (which is highly costly) 
the prospect is now worked up to full production. The further the 
company becomes involved, and the more successful its efforts, then 
the greater becomes its investment, and the greater its need to 
protect that investment. It becomes progressively more costly to 
disinvest. During this stage, it remains the case that there is a
considerable overlap of interests between the company and the
Government. The company wishes to move ahead quickly to recoup its
investment. The government has the same aim, in order to secure
macro-economic benefits, speed technology transfer, train its 
nationals, and aid its balance of payments through import 
substitution. The company, for its part, uses locally recruited 
staff so as to reduce the costs of employing high cost expatriates.
(x)
stage 4 Production With full production, all things being equal, power 
begins to shift to the government. At this point. State power 
becomes far less permeable. The government will now tend to change 
the rules of the game. They will be encouraged to increase their 
'take', and to set up a National Oil Company, initially to 
participate in the Upstream (exploration and production) aspects of 
the business, and thereafter to move progressively into the 
Downstream phase of the business, consisting of refining, marketing, 
transportation and petrochemicals. With the initial intention of 
protecting its original investment, and latterly to secure its 
supply of crude oil, the company will go along with this process, 
and indeed participate in its implementation.
This sets the general context for the study. The following, are more 
specific details on how it will proceed.
PART 1 ESTABLISHING THE REGIME. This will consist of two chapters. It will 
be shown that decisions by which the U.K. Government took measures to 
establish the onshore regime in 1934, were made under the pressure of other 
priorities, primarily those relating to defence, but also requirements of 
economic recovery. Similarly, in 1964, the decisions which led to the 
creation of an offshore counterpart, were made under the impact of the need 
to provide a stimulus to the national economy. Downs has demonstrated 
how decisions made under the pressure of other priorities may influence 
decision making: options are reduced under the pressure of deadlines; 
important matters may be neglected; information used as a basis for decisions 
will be more limited; greater risks are taken.
(xi)
Chapter 1, Creating the U.K. National Regime for Oil and Gas. 1934-1964, 
will first deal with the creation of the onshore regime in 1934. Reference 
will be made to earlier attempts to deal with the problem of establishing a 
framework for an oil and gas industry within the U.K., and these will be 
shown to have foundered through their failure to tackle the twin difficulties 
of settling the issue of who owned the U.K.'s oil and gas deposits, and the 
provision of access to those resources across private property. The early 
attempts to grasp these difficulties, were impractical, and it will be 
demonstrated that any practical measures to deal with them were not 
politically acceptable, because they would have infringed deeply held views 
on the absolute superiority of the free market economy, and the 
inalienability of private property rights. Such beliefs still predominated 
in the 1934 Parliament, but the danger of approaching war became an 
overriding consideration. Information from recently arrived German experts 
suggested that worthwhile resources might well exist, and that being the 
case, the Government judged that they had to be exploited. Indeed, in 1934, 
apart from a small section of the Conservative Party which opposed the 
necessary measures, the Government had general support from all Parties 
in the House for vesting the ownership of oil and gas in the Crown, and the 
provision of access to the drilling sites, subject to certain conditions.
Once these necessary conditions were achieved, the terms under which the 
companies would operate were exceedingly liberal (e.g. a very low royalty, 
and Mining (i.e. Production) Licences of 50 years duration). Evidence will 
be given to show that the Government probably received advice from within the 
oil industry on the terms and conditions set out in the relative Board of 
Trade Regulations. While the rules of the game were heavily weighted in
(xii)
favour of the companies, an innovative licensing system, called the 
Administrative Allocation System (which was operated by Civil Servants on the 
basis of vaguely formulated criteria) enabled the Government to maintain a 
balance between British and Foreign capital. Thus while the rules of the 
game favoured the successful companies, the Government retained some power to 
determine who was actually to play the game. The successful applicants were 
happy enough, since they saved money which might otherwise have been spent on 
bidding for acreage. To indicate the virtues of the system in British 
circumstances, it will be compared with the U.S. system, and the Roumanian 
system as it operated in the prewar years. The view that this system was 
retained in 1964, because it brought benefits through bureaucratic 
satisfactions to the Civil Service, in line with the theory of Niskanen, 
is briefly discounted.
In 1964, the 1934 arrangements will be shown to have been substantially 
extended offshore, because (i) they were generally appropriate, and (ii) they 
were readily available. Whatever the views of the Parties on the ideal form 
of ownership for industry, and the balance between public and private 
ownership in a mixed economy, there was a bipartisan perception of the 
weakness of the economy, and a shared belief that rapid development would 
bring much needed macroeconomic benefits. At the outset, interest was 
centred on the southern North Sea, where significant gas resources were 
strongly believed to exist in strata extending from recent Dutch finds.
Rapid development was therefore considered the best policy by both the Labour 
and Conservative Parties, with no significant body of dissent, and it will be 
demonstrated that this had an important impact on the character of the 
decisions taken. In order to encourage the oil companies to invest in the
(xiii)
British Sector in preference to other parts of the North Sea, British 
arrangements had to be in place before those of other States competing for 
the same resources of scarce capital and specialist technology. It will be 
shown that in the middle 1960's the general view of the activities of 
Multinationals held by most informed opinion in the U.K., was positive and 
uncritical. Given this attitude, which naturally extended to the 
Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs), and the dominance of U.S. companies in 
the oil supplies business, from which those Multinationals obtained their 
specialist equipment, what followed was a serious failure of policy, namely 
the absence in the early years of any real and sustained effort to create a 
U.K. based offshore supplies industry. As the length of the development 
phase to bring the southern gasfields into production was relatively short, 
this reinforced the tendency of the oil companies to order equipment and 
specialised services through established sources of supply, with whom they 
had a satisfactory and ongoing relationship.
It will be made clear, that Norway waited till she could assess the 
conditions Britain had on offer to the oil industry, before formulating her 
own. She then made her own conditions broadly similar. However, since the 
nature of both her economy and her society favoured slow development, she 
made her acreage available at a slower rate than Great Britain. As a result, 
at the outset of her relationship with the oil companies, Norway had a 
somewhat stronger hand to play than that possessed by Great Britain. By 
contrast, Britain's policy of rapid development, which derived from the need 
to stimulate a quite different type of economy, necessarily weakened the 
British Government's hand at the outset of its relationship with the oil 
companies, at just that point when the Government hand in any Oil
(xiv)
Company-Government relationship is at its weakest. Noreng^^^) makes a 
valuable comparison of the relationships between the Norwegian and British 
Governments and the oil companies.
In Chapter 2, The North Sea Delimitation Treaties; the Cross Boundary 
Agreements, it is shown that the question of the ownership of Britain's North 
Sea 'territory' had to be settled (just like the ownership of the onshore 
deposits) as a necessary condition, before the companies could be expected to 
make the necessary investment. In settling the principal boundary in the 
North Sea, that between herself and Norway, Britain secured an early 
settlement on the basis of the Median Line Principle. No attempt was made to 
secure extra territory at Norway's expense by disputing her view that the 
Norwegian Trough was no more than an interruption in the Continental Shelf.
In this, Britain combined good economic sense with fairness in her dealings 
with a valued friend and a N.A.T.O, ally. Had there been a disputed 
boundary, no capital would have been ventured in the disputed territory.
The reasons for settlement along National Sector lines are explained. 
Britain and Norway, with the lion's share of the North Sea between them were 
well satisfied, as were Denmark and the Netherlands, two small countries, who 
through the application of the Median Line principle, received substantial 
shares relative to their size and economic importance. However, this 
principle was applied in conjunction with the Principle of Adjacency, and the 
effect of this latter principle had an adverse effect on the West German 
share in view of her concave coastline. Though economically strong. West 
Germany was still politically weak, as a recently defeated country. When 
West Germany disputed the share she had received, the prior settlement of the
(xv)
Britain-Norway boundary meant that vdien her Sector was renegotiated, this was 
not only done without reference to any recognised principle, but purely at 
the expense of Denmark and the Netherlands. France and Belgium had minute 
shares, though the French had some prospects on their large Atlantic 
coastline. Because Britain and Denmark were not members of the E.E.C. at the 
same time of the negotiations and Norway never did join, it will be shown 
that the opportunities for Community countries to apply leverage in favour of 
a Regional Regime were so restricted that such an outcome was never a serious 
prospect.
Since the exact location of the resources to be exploited was unknown, 
this helped to bring about an early settlement, as there were no disputes 
over the ownership of known deposits. However, it was known that the 
resources to be exploited were likely to be very large, and this, when 
combined with the previous factor, favoured a settlement along National 
Sector lines. Once a settlement along these lines had been achieved, it will 
be shown how this determined that any cross boundary arrangements would be 
according to an extension of the national principle, through complementary 
and mutually exclusive duties for States exploiting a common deposit. The 
settlement along National Sector lines could quite reasonably be viewed as 
being in accord with the "realist" or "State centric" view of world politics.
PART 2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGIME opens with Chapter 3, The Question of Regime 
Change; the U.K. National Regime for Oil and Gas, 1964-1975. This deals with 
a period when the formal aspects of the regime, such as its legal framework, 
remained unchanged, even though towards the end of the period, the power of 
the oil companies in their relationship with the U.K. Government was
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significantly reduced. The basis of the gas regime will be explained, 
showing that while the cost plus pricing and the role of the nationalised gas 
industry as the sole or monopsony purchaser of North Sea gas was questioned 
both by the producing companies and in some academic quarters, on the grounds 
that it did not provide a price sufficient to stimulate the exploration 
needed to secure long term gas supplies, no such questions were asked either 
by or within the two main political parties. The claims of academic and 
company critics of the gas regime will be evaluated. While both Parties were 
satisfied with the existing situation where the companies were compensated 
for the low unit price they received for gas through a high rate of 
production, following from the rapid development of the southern gasfields, 
by the time of the 1970-1974 Heath Government, a more serious divergence was 
beginning to appear between the oil companies and the U.K. Government on the 
distribution of benefits between them, in connection with the exploitation of
the newly discovered oil resources in the northern North Sea.
The evidence of this divergence will be shown by reference to the 
opinions expressed in the Public Accounts Committee, Session 1972-1973. The
Committee took its evidence prior to the 1973 oil crisis. However, it will 
be demonstrated that the position of the Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCS) 
had already been substantially weakened internationally before that event.
At the time when the Committee took its evidence, the considerable benefits 
obtained by other oil producing States, led to the view expressed in its 
Findings that Britain was relatively deprived by comparison. This 
deprivation was considered to follow from a failure by the British Government 
to adjust the rules of the game in its relationship with the oil companies, 
with sufficient speed to accord with this new reality. The events of the
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1973 oil crisis certainly gave a fresh impetus to change, but it will be 
suggested that when changes in the U.K. National Regime for Oil and Gas were 
introduced in 1975, these changes owed more to the fact that by then the 
majority of the largest northern oilfields had been discovered, and their 
development phase was well in train. The changes made in 1975, will be 
briefly set out, and it will be shown that with one exception they were 
accepted on a bipartisan basis.
The one major change of 1975 which was not accepted on a bipartisan 
basis, was the creation of the British National Oil Corporation (B.N.O.C.). 
This will be covered in Chapter 4, State Participation: The Establishment and 
Subsequent Development of the British National Oil Corporation (B.N.O.C.), 
which covers the development of the Corporation up to and including the 
Thatcher Government's first and aborted attempt to modify the role of 
B.N.O.C. through a measure of privatisation, when first they took Office in 
May, 1979.
The differences between Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) and National 
Oil Companies (NOCs) are set out, and on the basis of the work of 
Leslie Grayson^^®^ it will be explained why circumstances after the 1973 
oil crisis led to a substantial growth in both the number and significance of 
National Oil Companies (NOCs), showing why this was so not only in the oil 
producing countries, but also in the oil consuming countries. The background 
to the establishment of B.N.O.C. is explained largely on the basis of the 
work of Krapels.(l^) The events of 1973 convinced the Heath Government 
that it lacked adequate information about the oil industry and sufficient 
control over North Sea oil operations. Both Shell and BP, with international
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responsibilities for many customers, had refused to discriminate in favour of 
supplying the U.K. unless the British Government were prepared to issue them 
with a direct order, stating which of their other customers they were to 
discriminate against. BP was a company in which a controlling interest had 
been held by the U.K. Government since 1914, yet it had operated consistently 
under the convention that it was an entirely independent company, and thus it 
had become so. Labour experience of the attitude of the company during the 
Iranian crisis will be shown to have contributed to a particular distrust of 
BP on their part. Now that both the state of development of North Sea 
resources, and the fundamental changes taking place in the world oil 
industry, combined to make the time right for an increase of Government 
control over the North Sea, ideological differences between the two Parties 
on the proper means for organising industry asserted themselves, on the issue 
of how this was to be achieved. While the Conservatives favoured such an 
increase in control through a regulatory body such as the Alberta Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission, Labour proposed to form a National Oil Company to 
secure this objective, and after they obtained power in 1974, such an 
organisation was created in 1975, in the shape of the British National Oil 
Corporation (B.N.O.C.).
The influence of Tom Balogh on the formulation of Labour's policy of 
setting up B.N.O.C. is outlined, and Labour's justification for setting up 
the Corporation is contrasted with the opposing arguments of the 
Conservatives. It will be shown that while power had shifted considerably to 
the Government side in the Oil Company-Government relationship, full 
nationalisation was not a serious possibility, and the proposed Conservative 
regulation seemed too weak. The manner in which B.N.O.C. "negotiated"
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Participation in existing leases through the threat of exclusion from future 
licensing rounds is described. The constitution of the B.N.O.C. Board will 
be explained, showing that it was formed free of company membership and 
influence, so that the company view was excluded from decisions, and a 
perfect control was maintained over information, obtained through the 
Corporation's membership of Operating Committees, even where it had no 
interest in the acreage. The manner in which the Department of Energy and 
the Corporation worked in close harmony, so that changes introduced to 
benefit the Corporation were held up till B.N.O.C. was ready to take 
advantage of them, with a consequent delay in work in the North Sea, is 
described.
To secure a measure of future independence the Corporation negotiated 
the Britoil Loan in the U.S. on the security of its participation crude, and 
then used the money obtained to pay off higher cost money borrowed from the 
National Oil Account. Thus it will be shown that when the Conservatives came 
to power, the loan still had a short period to run, so that fear of 
undermining the Corporation's crude oil base, leading to repayment, was a 
consideration in deterring the Government's first plan for partial 
privatisation. Of greater importance in this respect was the influence of 
Lord Kearton, who suggested that like successful private enterprise, a 
successful public enterprise needs a 'stream of profits' to secure its 
continuing success. In B.N.O.C.'s case, this 'stream of profits' would be 
impaired by selling off part of the Corporation's asset base, in the form of 
North Sea acreage.
(xx)
Chapter 5, Conservative North Sea Policy, 1979-1981, and the Impact of 
Economic Policy, as demonstrated through Two Case Studies, the Gas Gathering 
Line Case Study, and the Clyde Field Development Delay Case Study, uses these 
Case Studies of two decisions, to highlight the significant factors which lay 
behind Conservative North Sea policy during a period when the policies of the 
two Parties had become most divergent. To identify the various factors 
involved, the decision of the Government to revert to its earlier policy of 
partial privatisation of B.N.O.C.'s Upstream (exploration and production) is 
considered. As a prelude to the whole, the assumptions behind Conservative 
economic policy are first set out. This policy diverged from those economic 
priorities which had been used by both Labour and Conservative Governments 
since 1945 as a basis for management of the U.K. economy, and adopted a 
strategy which made the control of inflation the principal policy objective 
in a policy which was closely complementary with the Party's free enterprise 
ideology, which favoured a reduction of the public enterprise role within the 
mixed economy. The timing of decisions was effected by the progressive 
eclipse of those elements within the Conservative Party which opposed the new 
approach. The need to maintain a high level of company commitment to the 
North Sea meant that by the end of 1981, in order to secure the high level of 
investment needed to extend the use of Britain's North Sea oil and gas into 
the next century, changes in the tax regime were in train designed to 
encourage the companies to that end.
(xxi)
REFERENCES
(1) Keohane, Robert 0. and Nye, Joseph S. Power and interdependence.
Boston, Mass, Little Brown, 1977.
(2) Grieves, Forest L. ed.. Transnationalism in world politics and business
New York, Pergamon Press, 1979.
(3) Strange, Susan and Tooze, Roger, eds.. The International politics of
surplus capacity: competition 
and market shares. London,
Allen & Unwin, 1981.
(4) Mason, C.M. ed., The effective management of resources: the
international politics of the North Sea.
London, Frances Pinter, 1977.
(5) Pearce, Joan, ed., The third oil shock: the effects of lower prices.
London, Boston and Henley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1983.
(6) Castles, F.G., Murray, D.J., Pollitt, C.J., Potter, D.C. eds. ,
Decisions, organisations and society.
Hammondsworth, Middx, Penguin books, 1976.
(7) Shackleton, M. Britain and oil: a case study. Milton Keynes,
Open University, 1977.
(8) Lucas, Nigel. Energy, the U.K. and the European Community.
London, PSI and RIIA, 1982.
(9) Turner, Louis U.K. interests and the International Energy Agency.
London, PSI and RIIA, 1982.
(10) Hartshorn, J.E. Oil companies and governments: an account of the
(xxii)
international oil industry in its international 
environment. 2nd ed. London, Faber and Faber, 1967.
(11) Penrose, E.T. The large international firm in the developing countries:
the international petroleum industry.
London, Allen & Unwin, 1968.
(12) Hossain, Kamal Law and policy in petroleum development: changing
relations between transnationals and governments.
London, Frances Pinter, 1979.
(13) Downs, Anthony Inside bureaucracy. Boston, Mass., Little Brown, 1967.
(14) Niskanen, W.A. Bureaucrat-servant or master? London, I.E.A., 1967.
(15) Noreng, Oystein The oil industry and government strategy in the
North Sea. London, Groom Helm, 1980.
(16) Grayson, Leslie E. National oil companies. Chichester, Wiley, 1981.
(17) Krapels, Edward N. British oil policy and the British National Oil
Corporation. Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt, 
printing office, 1977.
1-1
PART 1 ESTABLISHING THE REGIME 
Chapter 1 Creating the U.K. National Regime for Oil and Gas, 1934-1964
1.1 The Onshore Regime, 1934 In retrospect, the importance of the onshore 
regime of 1934 does not lay in the modest production of oil and gas which 
resulted, but in the foundation it provided for the commercially very 
significant offshore regime of 1964, which will be considered in Para 1.2.
The measures enacted in the Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934 and the 
Regulations (1935) under which Government licensees operated, arose directly 
from the bargaining relationship established at the time between the British 
Government and the oil companies. From 1934, up to the present, the various 
pressures and influences, domestic and international, operating on both the 
British Government and the oil companies, have been reflected in the decision 
making process which has shaped the U.K. National Regime for Oil and Gas.
Thus it is necessary to establish, at the outset, those factors which exerted 
an influence on the decision of the National Government to create the 
conditions required to stimulate an oil search, and in so doing, to initiate 
a bargaining relationship between themselves and the oil industry. Setting 
up the onshore regime in 1934 involved the solution of two problems which had 
thus far inhibited any search for oil and gas within the U.K., on the part of 
any reputable oil company. Reasons will be advanced to show that in 1934, 
while strands of both economic and defence policy were involved in the 
decision to resolve these two problems, it was considerations of defence 
policy which predominated.
The nature of bargaining relationship established between the British 
Government and the oil companies in 1934 will be established, and in so doing
75H407
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it will be shown that the first two Stages in the Model derived from Hossain 
were operative. The Administrative Allocation Licensing System, a novel 
system for the allocation of licenses will be shown to have brought benefits 
to both the oil companies and the British Government. These mutual benefits, 
and the appropriateness of the system to British conditions will be 
highlighted by its comparison with the U.S. method of auction or lease 
bidding, and the system of allocation as it developed in Roumanie up to the 
mid 1930's. The reasons for the retention of the system in 1964 will be 
dealt with in Para 1.2, when considering the offshore regime developed at 
that time.
To assist these various objectives, the two problems inhibiting an oil 
search prior to 1934, the solutions adopted to these problems in that year, 
and the reasons why they were not solved earlier, will be set out in Para 
1.11. This forms a basis for considering the decision which set up the 
onshore regime of 1934 in Para 1.12, and the resulting relationship between 
the British Government and the oil companies in Para 1.13. The 
Administrative Allocation Licensing System will then be treated in Para 1.14.
I'll Two Problems Inhibiting an Oil Search The first of these problems 
resulted from the existence of oil and gas in fluid form in reservoirs, 
combined with the fact that in the U.K. there are thousands of landowners, 
the overwhelming majority of whom are small landowners. Thus to drill on 
most sites meant that any consequent production would draw oil and gas from 
beneath the land of surrounding landowners, and so infringe their rights.
This could lead to legal disputes over the ownership of any such production. 
The second problem related to the fact that oil operations require the laying 
of access roads and pipelines, and negotiating access rights with possibly
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many landowners, was a thoroughly daunting task. These difficulties, 
especially when combined with the fact that Britain was an unproved oil 
province, were sufficient to discourage investment by any reputable oil 
company in a search for oil and gas.
The problem of ownership was resolved in 1934, by vesting oil and gas 
rights in the Crown. The access problem was resolved, by granting all 
holders of either a Board of Trade Exploration Licence, or a Board of Trade 
Mining (i.e. Production) Lincence, with guaranteed rights of access, subject 
to special controls for the protection of the environment, and to compensate 
landowners for loss and disturbance.
A plan to deal with the two problems inhibiting an oil search in Britain, 
while maintaining the rights of private property, had been proposed by the 
Duke of Northumberland, and considered when the Petroleum (Production) Bill 
was before Parliament in 1917. The extent of oil and gas reservoirs was to 
be determined by the Geological Survey, and a Fund to compensate landowners 
was to be set up on the basis of a production levy. U.S. experience had 
already shown that reservoir delineation required a drilling programme. If 
there was no oil and gas production, then the production levy would be 
inoperative, and there would be no Fund to compensate landowners for loss and
disturbance. If there was a limited oil and gas production, the Fund would
probably be insufficient to meet all the charges placed upon it. Both 
measures were rejected by Parliament due to their evident impracticality. 
Huxley describes how the provision for a production levy was removed
from the Bill in August, 1917.
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Despite the absence of legislation which would have encouraged the 
search for oil and gas in peacetime, the Lloyd George Coalition did carry out 
an efficient exploration programme in the U.K. during the 1st World War, 
using as their agents S. Pearson & Co. Ltd., an experienced oil company with 
important interests in the Mexican oil industry. This work was carried out 
under the extraordinary powers derived from the Defence of the Realm Act. As 
the conclusion of hostilities approached, the Government moved swiftly to 
underpin their exploration activities by normal legislative means, so that 
what remained of the Petroleum (Production) Bill became law as the Petroleum 
(Production) Act, 1918, in the same month as the Armistice. This measure was 
of interest, as it included a general licensing system run by the Ministry of 
Munitions. However, though adequate as a stopgap means to support the 
Government's exploration programme, it totally failed to address the twin 
problems of ownership and access, and so was completely ineffectual as a 
means of stimulating an oil search under normal conditions.
In 1921, the Lloyd George exploration programme was wound up, 
as part of a general retrenchment, and because it was difficult to justify 
such extraordinary Government activity in peacetime. (Footnote*).
In 1922, Bonar Law, Lloyd George's Conservative successor, while 
admitting that conditions were not right to stimulate an oil search in Great 
Britain, expressed the view that altering conditions in a favourable 
direction, was not the proper function of a British Government in normal 
times. Normalcy, in the sense that the term was used by politicians in the 
Twenties, meant in effect, peace abroad combined with an idealised view of 
pre-war business conditions.
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Footnote* The preferential tax treatment of indigeneous oils introduced in 
1918, was also ended in 1921, and not reintroduced till 1928. The measure 
was of particular value to the Scottish shale oil industry, which existed 
from 1873 to 1962. The shale oil industry treated very large quantities of 
shale in retorts to produce relatively small amounts of oil. The industry 
was rarely economic on its own account during the latter part of its 
existence. It existed with a declining workforce on the stimulus derived 
from the growth of the motor car and the intermittent provision of special tax 
support from the Government. When the Government's protective measures were 
finally ended in 1962, since they were judged incompatible with EFTA 
membership, BP's Scottish Oils Ltd., which ran the operatic^ceased business, 
and the industry came to an end.
1.12 The Decision to set up the 1934 Onshore Regime The historian 
David Thomson likened the National Government to a cautious firm of 
family solicitors, MacDonald, Baldwin & Co., presiding over the affairs of 
Great Britain Ltd., in very difficult times. Both men were conciliators, who 
had more in common with each other than they did with the more extreme 
members of their own Parties. Mowat explains that the wartime pacifism 
of MacDonald had given a false view of his politics. He was anxious to make 
himself and the Labour Party acceptable to the Middle Classes, possibly as a 
response to his early experience of rejection. The few men he brought with 
him in 1931, when he broke with the Labour Party to form the National 
Government, held very orthodox economic views. Indeed, Snowden, as 
Marquand relates, shortly proved this by resigning, together with the
Samuelite Liberals, in opposition to the Protectionist measures entailed by 
the Ottawa Agreements (1931), and thus in this respect showed himself to be a
1-6
Gladstonian Liberal. Baldwin for his part, had the greatest difficulty in 
restraining Churchill from being excessively provocative during the General 
Strike of 1926. Mowat notes Stephen King Hall's observation, that despite 
their background, these two men brought in more Socialism than any previous 
British Government. By this, Stephen King Hall did not mean that they 
carried out the formal measures of the Labour Party's Programme, but that 
they involved the Government to a far greater extent than ever before, in the 
running of the economy.
The National Government were not Keynesians, but they were pragmatists. 
Faced with a serious economic crisis, which was the reason why it had been 
considered necessary to form an all Party Administration in 1931, they 
decided to deal with this crisis in the best way they knew how. That it, by 
a system of tax reliefs and subsidies to stimulate industry. The system they 
evolved was called 'managed capitalism' and under this system a whole series 
of 'new' industries, such as electrical engineering, publishing, rayon and 
vehicle manufacturing were developed. While the impact of this policy is a 
matter of some dispute, it is the view of certain economists that these 'new' 
industries made a substantial contribution to the economic recovery of 
Britain in the middle Thirties, (5,6) by means of which the National 
Government were seen to fulfil the 'doctor's' mandate of 1931.
If it is remembered that Nationalisation was not adopted as an 
industrial strategy in Britain till 1945, when the Labour Party came to power 
for the first time with an overall majority, then the measures introduced by 
the National Government to resolve the two problems which were inhibiting an 
oil search, will be seen to have been very radical indeed for the mdidle 
Thirties. These measures were justified on pragmatic grounds. The statement
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by the Marquess of Londonderry to the House of Lords in 1934, in support of 
these meausres is truly remarkable.
The Marquess reminded the House that he had always favoured the 
maintenance of private property. However, he had examined the measures 
proposed, and he had concluded they were essential to stimulate an oil 
search. No other measures would achieve this end, which were necessary both 
for economic reasons, and for reasons of national defence. The Crown already 
held a monopoly on gold, and received royalties on undersea coal. To extend 
the principle to petroleum seemed natural. This was a very effective 
statement, and doubly so since it was made by an Air Minister who was not 
only regarded as one of the least effective members of the Government, but 
whose background was that of a Conservative, an aristocrat, and perhaps most 
remarkably, a coalowner. It was the Coalowning Lobby which principally 
opposed the measures. Led by the Duke of Devonshire, they saw any support of 
oil and gas, and in particular those measures to stimulate the search for 
oil, as a threat to their own industry. At the same time they feared that 
once oil and gas resources had been taken into Crown ownership, this would 
provide a powerful precedent for the subsequent nationalisation of coal.
In November 1936, sometime after the Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934 
was law, Winston Churchill in debate, described the years from 1931 to 1935, 
as the 'locust years' or years of wasted opportunities. These were the years 
when the fabric of international confidence was first shaken by the rise of 
Dictatorship, and the progress of aggression. Churchill charged that the 
Government had failed to rearm the nation and face this challenge. In answer, 
Stanley Baldwin made his often misunderstood 'appalling anxiety' speech.
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Referring to the political reality of 1933/34, he argued that despite the 
Government's immense majority, the electorate would not have accepted a 
rearmament programme at that time. The situation to which Baldwin referred 
was as follows.
The Oxford Union Debate of 1933 had resolved 'that this House would not 
fight for King and Country' and in October of the same year a large 
Government majority was overturned at East Fulham, by a Labour Candidate of 
avowedly pacifist tendencies. The Peace Pledge Union was then exerting a 
powerful influence on public opinion, and the Labour Party was still led by 
the pacifist George Lansbury. To espouse formal rearmament at that time was 
not in Baldwin's view an acceptable political risk. Duff Cooper 
observed, that even in 1935, he had to change a reference to Rearmament 
in the Army Estimates to Re-Equipment, so sensitive were his Cabinet 
colleagues on the issue.
The strategic importance of oil had already been well established before
(8)
1934. At the conclusion of the Great War, Lord Curzon had observed 
that the Allies 'floated to victory on a wave of oil'. The importance of the 
various products which could be obtained from oil for the prosecution of a 
successful War effort, had also been demonstrated in that conflict. One of 
the essential requirements for shell production was toluene, a product of 
oil. While Britain was a major industrial nation, the 1st World War 
demonstrated at its outset many technological weaknesses, which lay behind 
the country's apparent naval and military strength. No adequate toluene 
plant existed in the U.K., and it will be recalled that the crisis over shell 
production was a major factor in bringing down the Asquith Government, and 
replacing him with a Coalition now led by Lloyd George. So worried had the
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Dutch authorities become over the prospect of a British defeat, that on one 
occasion only they endangered their neutrality. One of the two toluene 
plants in the Netherlands, owned by the Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (part of 
the Royal Dutch/Shell) was dismantled, and shipped across the North Sea, 
after feeding German Intelligence false information on the timing and route 
for the move. Louis Turner relates an occasion which underlines
the importance of petrol in the War effort. On December 15th, 1917
Clemenceau appealed in these terms to President Wilson:
" the Allies must not let France lack the petrol which is as necessary
as blood in the battles of tomorrow".
With a background of experience such as this, it is scarcely surprising 
that the British Government in the Middle Thirties, should seek to put its 
house in order with respect to fuel preparedness. Of course, in this 
connection it was hoped that the British Fleet would be able to control the 
seas across which crude oil was brought from abroad, but this did not mean 
that any measures could be neglected which might be taken within Britain.
The Germans by contrast, would expect to suffer from a blockade, and might 
therefore be restricted to domestic sources, and such supplies s their armies 
could either seize or dominate within Europe.
From the British Government’s standpoint, measures of economic and 
technical preparedness, which might coincidentally contribute to economic 
recovery, were less visible to the public than formal rearmament, and thus 
could prudently go ahead. That they did indeed go ahead will shortly be 
deomonstrated, but a summary of European activities designed to secure fuel 
preparedness for war, laying particular emphasis on Germany, will be given
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first, to underline why the British Government reacted as it did to prepare 
itself in like fashion.
During the early 1930*s regular reports appeared in the Petroleum Times, 
such as that noted, which indicated that France and Italy, were
undertaking autarchic measures to extend the State interest in the oil 
industry, particularly in refining. In Italy, this involved an extention of 
the role of IRI an organisation set up after the Risorgimento to
stimulate the growth of industry in the then new but relatively
underdeveloped country. At this time, there was no indication in the Italian
case that such moves might in part be directed to preparing the country for 
aggressive action, such as that which took place against Abyssinia. The 
development of AGIP as a State oil company (1926), was seen more as an 
attempt to make Italy free from the influence of the Multinational Oil 
Companies (MNOCs), who controlled the major part of the international oil 
business. During 1933, regular Petroleum Times reports from Germany 
suggested little that was unusual. Indeed through most of that year, there 
was little evidence suggesting any activity comparable with that in France 
and Italy. Then at the end of the year, the evidence of the impact of the 
Nazi regime became clear, and the strident tone of official German Plans and 
claims communicated itself to the Petroleum Times reports. The lignite 
industry was reorganised, and then used as a basis for an extensive programme 
of coal hydrogenation to produce oil. The processes developed at that time,
are even today the basis for those used at the South African Coal from Oil
Plant at Sasolburgh, with the same objective of reducing that country's 
dependence on imported crude oil. Hydrogenation was not economic compared 
with products refined from crude oil. For the writers in the Petroleum 
Times, the implication of the German oil from coal programme was clear. They
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concluded that the Germans were preparing for war. Other evidence tended to 
reinforce this judgement, as there was a considerable increase in the 
production of the Hanover oilfield, substantial increases in refinery 
capacity, and increased production of motor gasoline. The coming to power of 
the Nazis in Germany, however, led to a flow of emigres with technical know 
how to the U.K., and amongst these were some with oil industry experience, 
such as for example, the former head of the Prussian State Mines Department. 
Such people focussed attention on the prospects for developing domestic 
British oil production.
In a response to German measures, Britain responded as follows. In an 
attempt to improve performance, tetraethyllead was added to the R.A.F.'s 
aviation gasoline, and in order to meet its requirements for high grade 
aviation lubricating oil, the Duosol process was introduced into the U.K.
(13, 14) Up (.Q this time, the required products had surprisingly been 
imported from the U.S.S.R. A subsidy was introduced for oil produced from 
British coal. A plant was opened by I.C.I. at Billingham which produced 
benzol through hydrogenation, and continued to do so till 1946, when the 
Labour Government removed the subsidy at the conclusion of hostilities, and 
the plant was closed. Of course, in addition to the defence considerations, 
this subsidy also provided support for the depressed coal industry.
Dr. Lander of the Fuel Research Station, developed a low temperature 
carbonisation process to produce oil from coal. This process was employed 
commercially and was known as the Cannock process. Those who favoured a 
still greater use of oil produced from coal, such as the coalowners, and 
Colonel F.A. Bristow, of Low Temperature Carbonisation Ltd., were 
dissappointed. Britain after all had her Fleet to control the seas and
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secure imports of crude oil. By 1934 however, it was stated in connection 
with the Air Estimates, that one Home Defence Squadron would fly on oil 
produced from British coal. In 1935, the Committee of Imperial Defence 
surveyed wartime fuel needs (^5) ^^d in the following year the Petroleum 
Press Service (  ^ reviewed these needs on the basis of the official work.
Needs were assessed as threefold, consisting of (1) the needs of the U.K., 
civilian and military (2) the needs of the Dominions and Colonies, and (3) 
the need for dispersed stocks to be held worldwide, for the support of the 
Armed Forces overseas, particularly the Fleet. In this context, all the 
domestic measures described could only have a marginal impact. However, in 
the preparation for war, even such marginal measures acquire a significance 
beyond their ordinary economic importance. Such indeed was the case with the 
small production which might result from any British oilfields. Yet in the 
15 years since the Petroleum (Production) Act, 1918, only 7 licences had been 
issued, and only 3 of these were still operative in 1933, one for the Duke of 
Devonshire's well at Hardstoft in Derbyshire, one for two wells which had 
been drilled at Three Bridges in Sussex, and another for drilling at 
Heathfield in the same County, in which case no drilling had taken
place.(17)
range of measures taken in connection with stimulating the economy, 
using the strategy of 'managed capitalism' fell far short (in terms of State 
intervention) of the form of public ownership adopted when the onshore regime 
oil and gas was set up in 1934. It seems reasonable to assume from the 
evidence therefore, that if only economic policy considerations had been 
involved, the two problems inhibiting an oil search in Great Britain would 
have remained unresolved in 1934. Strategic concerns tipped the balance, so
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that the prospect of conflict, and the need to be seen to respond to the 
German measures, provided a justification for radical action.
1.13 The Oil Company Government Relationship In bringing in the Petroleum 
(Production) Act, 1934, it can be shown that the National Government were 
positively seeking to create the conditions needed for the oil companies to 
engage in an oil search, and that moreover, a 'behind the scenes' bargaining 
process took place between those companies and the Government under which 
these conditions were established. This bargaining process established an 
ongoing Oil Company Government relationship in the U.K.
In April 1934, the Marquess of Londonderry followed up his initial 
statement to the House of Lords, mentioned in the previous paragraph, by 
proceeding to demonstrate that the oil companies would not invest in an oil 
search unless the Government's proposals went through. He quoted first from 
a letter received from a major oil company by the President of the Board of 
Trade (the Simonite Liberal W.G. Runciman);
"On several occasions during the past four years this company has been 
invited by various private interests to carry out exploratory work with 
a view to testing the oil bearing potentialities of certain localities 
in the U.K. While we are anxious to do all in our power to prove the 
existence of petroleum in commercial quantities in this country, we have 
hitherto not felt ourselves justified in acquiring surface and mineral 
rights from the numerous surface owners...."
The Marquess then quoted from the editorial in the Petroleum Times, dated 
31/3/34 to indicate that no other qualified concern would undertake an oil 
search given the existing state of the law:
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"the British Government has at last taken what appears to be the 
sensible step in cutting the Gordian knot which has deterred oil 
exploration in the past...ownership of oil will be vested in the Crown, 
and measures taken to remove the insuperable lease and royalty 
difficulties which have hampered oil search."
This statement clearly establishes that the British Government were seeking 
to establish the conditions necessary if the oil companies were to invest in 
an oil search. The next task is to demonstrate the behind the scenes 
bargaining process between the Government and the oil industry.
The Government received support from both the labour Party and that part 
of the Liberal Party outside the Government, led by Sir Arthur Sinclair, in 
passing its proposals through Parliament. Opposition to the measures was 
limited to a small group of Conservative Peers and MPs led by the Duke of 
Devonshire, who owned the only producing well in Great Britain, that at 
Hardstoft in Derbyshire, which had been discovered by S. Pearson and Sons 
Ltd., in October 1919 as part of the Lloyd George exploration
programme. When the application of the Defence of the Realm Act lapsed, the 
Chatsworth Estates entered into legal action to prove the Duke's ownership of 
the production, and the matter was only resolved by an out of Court 
settlement. Lord Cowdray on behalf of S. Pearson & Sons Ltd., subsequently 
entered into tortuous and unsuccessful negotiations for further drilling 
rights from the Chatsworth Estates. Thus paradoxically, the experience of 
Lord Cowdray in trying to negotiate with the principal opponent of the new 
legislation tended to prove the need to resolve the problems of ownership and 
access which that legislation was designed to resolve. The Duke and his
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supporters made much of the expertise which he supposedly derived from his 
ownership of the Hardstoft well. The Duke claimed that the 'waxy' quality of 
the crude produced at Hardstoft was due to bad handling of the well by 
S. Pearson and Co. Ltd., after its discovery. This claim was quite unjust. 
The well had only a very small production. The figures available are not too 
reliable. A figure of 30 tons a year was given in 1934, and Huxley quotes an 
admittedly unreliable figure of 218 tonnes for the year 1939, based on BP 
data.
The basis of the Duke of Devonshire's opposition to the measures lay in 
the fact that he was a coalowner, and thus opposed to any plans which were 
supportive of oil and gas, and detrimental to coal, since they assisted a 
competitive fuel. There was a fear that if one set of natural resources, oil 
and gas, were taken into Crown ownership, this would provide a precedent for 
the similar treatment or coal, through Nationalisation. It was claimed that 
the Government's proposals were Socialism, and thus unnacceptable, yet at the 
same time the Group who surrounded the Duke of Devonshire were calling for 
further 'Socialist' measures, in the shape of more subsidies to encourage the 
production of oil from British coal. It was charged by the Duke's supporters 
that vested interests (presumably the oil companies) were behind the 
Government's proposals. The Marquess of Londonderry answered this charge by 
pointing out that in order for there to be a vested interest in natural 
resources, those natural resources had to be shown to exist. Since no such 
natural resources were so far known to exist, there could be no vested 
interest.
In the Commons, W.G. Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, defended
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the Government s proposals. Lord Hartington pressed Runciman hard on the 
question of where the Government had obtained its advice in formulating the 
proposals. Walter Runciman answered this attack by specifically naming a 
whole series of technical societies, from which the Government had not 
received any advice. Significantly absent from the list of societies named 
by Runciman as not being the source from which it had obtained its advice, 
was the Institution of Petroleum Technologists (later the Institute of 
Petroleum), a centre of expertise funded by the oil industry, which might be 
expected to be friendly to the oil companies. Under further questioning 
Runciman was forced to deny that any advice had been obtained from this 
source. The Duke of Devonshire's supporters suggested that a return to the 
Duke of Northumberland's proposals of 1917 would suffice to stimulate an oil 
search, and in this they gained the support of the geologist E.H. Cunningham 
Craig (19) whose views however reveal his political opposition to any 
extension of the State's role in industry, rather than any grasp of the 
technological and legal realities to be faced in stimulating a search for oil 
in the middle Thirties. It remained as true at that time as it had in 1917, 
that in the last resort the presence of oil and gas could only be proved 
through drilling. The 1930's saw the growth of new geophysical methods which 
enabled a picture to be built up of the subsurface strata from surface 
observations. Yet these observations, while they might suggest that 
conditions were favourable for locating oil and gas, could not determine its 
presence with certainty. That had to be put to the final test of drilling. 
Thus the suggestion that the limits of reservoirs could be determined by the 
Geological Survey was as invalid in 1934 as it had been at the earlier date.
Evidence of a behind the scenes bargaining process between the oil
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companies and the Government produced by the Duke of Devonshire and his 
supporters, has been shown above to have been little more than a strong 
suspicion. Moreover, given that this group had a special interest in 
discrediting the Government's proposals, their evidence must be suspect on 
this account. However, during 1935, evidence arose from a more reliable 
source, to suggest a behind the scenes bargaining relationship had been 
established between the oil companies and the Government. In mid year, the 
Petroleum Department of the Board of Trade issued the Regulations under which 
the Government's licencees were to operate, and the Petroleum Times (20* 21) 
observed that both the passing of the Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934 and 
the creation of the 1935 Regulations had been an exercise of considerable 
urgency. It noted that the expertise available at the Petroleum Department 
was limited. Given all these circumstances, the Petroleum Times considered a 
very good job had been made of designing the Regulations, and quoted the view 
expressed by Professor V.C. Illing of Imperial College, to the effect that 
the Regulations had been most skillfully prepared, in support of its own 
opinion. Professor Illing, as a young graduate, had been involved in 
establishing the Oil Technology Course at the Royal School of Mines in 1913, 
and both he and his academic colleagues were experts on oil technology and 
geology. They all had practical experience in overseas oil operations, to 
further which end Illing had set up the firm of V.C. Illing & Partners.
Outside the oil companies, Illing and his colleagues were the obvious 
recognised source of expertise. It would have been quite reasonable for the 
Government to have approached these men for advice in formulating the 1935 
Regulations, yet by implication (since Illing himself praised the manner in 
which the Regulations had been prepared), the Government did not avail 
themselves of this opportunity. This suggests that given the limited
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expertise available to the Petroleum Department, the Government probably 
obtained assistance either directly from the oil companies or through the 
Institution of Petroleum Technologists. (Footnote*)
Footnote* A discussion with J.D, Hobson, a former pupil and colleague of 
V.C. Illing, and a present member of V.C. Illing & Partners tends to support 
this view. Hobson explained that he had known V.C. Illing for 40 years, from 
1928 when he became one of his students, till his death in 1969. Hobson had 
been a colleague of Illing for some years at Imperial College, and a member 
of V.C. Illing & Partners from 1950. Firstly, he pointed out that Illing was 
an excellent businessman. Setting up V.C. Illing & Partners was a very 
shrewd business move, and Illing had done very well on the Stock Exchange, 
particularly he believed in rubber shares. Illing was a very able man 
outside his own specialities. When the Government had failed to ask his 
advice in 1934/35, this definitely rankled with Illing, and he tended to 
remember this on those occasions, when the Government had later to make use 
of his talents, as for example when he went to Washington on their behalf 
during the war. More particularly was this the case in the late 1940's when 
Illing acted as a negotiator on behalf of the Foreign Office, in the 
settlement of the Mexican Oil Dispute, which had resulted from the Mexican 
nationalisation of the oil companies' interests in 1938. Illing, who was 
never a company man, but had contacts in Mexico through his consultancy work, 
was well suited to this task.
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However, while the Regulations were skillfully designed from the 
technical standpoint, the conditions under which the companies had to operate 
were hardly onerous. The Board of Trade which had the power to determine the 
level of royalty, or any other payment to be made, in 1935 fixed the royalty 
to be paid on crude oil at 4/- per ton, the royalty on gas at 2d per 1,000 
cubic feet. The Regulations were designed to make sure that companies 
carried out operations according to sound oilfield practice. Applicants for 
a licence had to show that they possessed both technical competence and 
proper financial resources. Proper records of all operations had to be 
maintained, and kept available for regular monitoring by the authorities. 
Health safety and welfare provisions safeguarded the workers involved in 
operations. Attention had to be paid to the proper disposal of waste, and 
the safeguarding of the countryside. Safeguards were introduced into the 
Regulations to make sure that rights over any discoveries could not fall 
under foreign control. Most of these points involved safeguards that 
reputable oil companies would wish to maintain in their own interests.
Beyond the considerations mentioned above, the terms were generally 
designed to prove attractive to licensees, as can be shown with reference to 
the treatment of foreign capital, and the length of years, together with the 
extent of territory covered in the Exploration and Mining (i.e. Production) 
Licences.
Firstly, as regards the treatment of foreign capital, foreign based 
companies had to employ at least 50% British personnel, and one Director of 
their British subsidiary had to be British. Any well managed concern would 
be happy to meet these conditions in 1934, from a mixture of prudence and 
sound economic common sense. Employment of nationals of a host country.
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wherever possible, was prudent as a safeguard against any nationalist 
backlash, and as a demonstration of a contribution to local employment 
prospects. It also made good sense for the company, as it was less costly to 
employ local personnel, compared with high cost expatriates. Viewed in these 
terms, the requirements for foreign based firms to employ British nationals, 
contained in the 1935 Regulations was not onerous, but it served the need of 
appearing to defend British interest against foreigners, in those rather more 
jingoistic times.
Secondly, considering the two varieties of Licence. The Exploration 
Licence was limited to 6 years duration, and covered some 200 square miles. 
This was designed to stimulate rapid exploration. On conversion to a Mining 
(i.e. Production) Licence, the Licence was restricted to half the original 
area, though as Noreng (22) explains with reference to the use of this 
provision at a later provision, the company was usually able to negotiate 
retention of the most favourable part of the territory covered in the 
original Exploration Licence. Of particular importance in the context of the 
Oil Company-Government relationship, was the duration of the Mining Licence. 
This lasted for 50 years with an option available to the Licensee company, to 
extend this period for a further 25 years• Thus, having taken subsoil rights 
into State ownership, in order to solve the problems of access and ownership, 
quite remarkably these rights were disposed of on exceedingly generous terms 
to the oil companies. While the duration of a Mining (i.e. Production)
Licence encouraged the oil companies to engage in the search for oil and gas, 
indicating that Stage 2 of the model derived from Hossain was in operation, 
in later years, critics were to point to this provision as a serious weakness 
in the regime, especially as no arrangements were included in the Regulations
1-21
for any renegotiation of terms before the expiry of the lease.
The results of the Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934 and the 1935 
Regulations in terms of oil and gas production were very modest, as shown by 
a survey published by the Institute of Petroleum in 1965 (23) years
1934—1965, which identifies two peaks in oil production, one in wartime in 
1942 (in excess of 100,000 tons of crude oil) and a second in 1964 (in excess 
of 130,000 tons of crude oil). A more detailed analysis of the period of 
1939-1981 by Huxley confirms the picture presented by the Institute of 
Petroleum, and highlights how the level of onshore effort fluctuated relative 
to two factors. The first of these factors was the steady advance in 
exploration techniques and drilling technology, which provided an ongoing 
stimulus for fresh effort, and the second factor was the price of crude oil 
imports relative to the cost of British production. Huxley also gives 
figures for natural gas production. (24) (Footnote*).
In 1934, a further incentive to onshore oil exploration was provided by the 
tax relief on motor fuels produced from indigeneous oils. It was hoped this 
tax relief would offset the drilling and capital costs associated with the 
search for oil, and at the same time make British produced oil competitive
foreign imports. Certainly, this support sustained onshore exploration 
effort in the earlier years.
Footnote* The first success of the onshore regime was the discovery of the 
small Midlothian Field by the Anglo American Oil Co. Ltd., (an Esso 
subsidiary) while some months later BP discovered gas at Cousland.
Thereafter, the following oil and gas acumulations were discovered in 
mainland Great Britain up to 1964: 1939 (Eakring; Eskdale, Formby); 1941
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(Dukes Wood, Kelham Hills);; 1943 (Kelham, Nocton); 1953 (Plunger); 1955 
(Egmanton); 1956 (Ironville); 1957 (Calow, Trumfleet); 1958 (Bothamshall, 
Corrinham); 1959 (Gainsborough, Kimmeridge); 1960 (Apleyhead, South
Leverton); 1961 (Glentworth); 1962 Torbsey); 1963 (Beckingham, Wareham).
1.14 The Administrative Allocation Licensing System This system, which was 
introduced in 1934 and retained in 1964. The reasons for its retention at 
that time will be explained in Para 1.2. The system involves Licensing 
Rounds, in which the Government announce the territory which is to be 
allocated, and invite applications from prospective licensees. In each 
Licensing round, the normal approach has been to state vaguely worded 
criteria, against which the Civil Service must judge the appropriateness of 
applications, and allocate territory accordingly. The best way to appreciate 
the benefits accruing to both the oil companies and the Government from this 
arrangement, is to contrast the consequences of this system of allocation 
with the methods of licence allocation used elsewhere in 1934, in Roumanie 
and the U.S.A.
In the United States, the system known as auction bidding, or lease 
bidding operated. In that country, subsoil rights in oil and gas were
privately owned, and were disposed of through an auction, so that the highest 
bid secured the lease. It has been explained by Odell (in the context of the 
post 1964 offshore experience) ^26) that this system could have secured the 
British Government a high income. In the British context, controls on the 
manner of exploiting a lease might still have been imposed on the successful 
bidder. In the U.S.A. there were of course large unproven areas, but it was 
also the country in 1934 with the most highly developed oil industry. By
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contrast, in Britain at the same time there was no significant exploration 
and production activity, and the British Government's aim was to stimulate an 
oil search and not to secure revenue. If a private owner of subsoil rights 
m  the U.S.A., leased his land for the purposes of oil and gas exploration, 
he had no other objective than to make money. Administrative Allocation was 
designed to suit the oil companies, and to encourage them to apply or what 
was after all unproven territory. The companies argued that the money saved 
through their not having to bid for territory in Britain was then available 
to help them cover their exploration costs.
The system used in Roumanie, regime described in great detail by 
Maurice Pearton ^27) another model which demonstrates the
appropriateness of the Administrative Allocation Licencing System to British 
conditions in 1934. The country had an underdeveloped economy and was 
heavily dependent for its prosperity on its grain and oil exports. Since its 
establishment in the 19th Century, and more so since the formation of Greater 
Rumania in 1918, it was reliant for its survival on the maintenance of good 
financial and diplomatic relations with other European States. Yet the 
autarchic principles of the German economist Friederich List, and the slogan 
Roumania for the Roumanians', dominated the management of oil resources, 
with consequences which conflicted with the achievement of these financial 
and economic objectives. Up till the 1930's both the Government and the 
Bureaucracy in Roumania were dominated by the National Liberal Party which 
operated on these autarchic principles, and even though the dynastic problems 
between the wars destroyed the Party's dominance, commitment to the autarchic 
approach to economic management was retained.
Under the Roumanian system of licence allocation, which derived from
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this approach to economic management, territory was first allocated for 
licensing according to whether it was oil bearing or largely unproven. Then 
it was distributed amongst four categories: (1) State reserve (2) areas
allocated only to Roumanian companies (3) areas allocated to companies 
already in business in the Roumanian oil industry, and (4) new foreign 
capital. This is a highly simplified version of a complex system, the aim of 
which was to nationalise the oil industry. It should be explained that the 
Roumanian use of the word nationalise meant to place the industry 
progressively in Roumanian hands, so as to provide jobs for the Roumanian 
technical elite. It was not the same as Nationalisation in the British 
sense. Not only was Roumania ’ s system highly complex, it was also highly 
discriminatory. Roumania could employ this method only as long as she had 
oil which other countries wanted. During times of depression, when demand 
for oil fell off, Roumania suffered economically due to the offense this 
system gave to those countries and financial interests whose goodwill she 
needed as a guarantee of her very existence. Britain, in 1934, with no oil 
and gas, could never operate such a system.
The Administrative Allocation System, as operated in 1934 (i.e. with all 
major interests receiving a fair share of the allocation), was a highly 
flexible system, in so far as the principles of allocation were loosely 
drawn, and the possibility of discrimination always remained in Government 
hands should circumstances change. At a later stage it will be shown how 
this capability for discrimination was used in 1964, in order to maintain a 
fair balance between British and foreign capital in the North Sea, while 
later still it will be shown, how from 1975 onwards. Labour used such
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discrimination as a lever by excluding or threatening to exclude from a fresh 
Licencing Round, those companies which refused to negotiate a State interest 
in existing Licences, Yet in 1934, as also in 1964, the overlap of interests 
between the oil companies and the British Government was so great, that the 
system as operated proved mutually beneficial.
1.2 The Offshore Regime, 1964 In August 1959, a Shell/Esso team located a
large natural gas reservoir at Slochteren in the Groningen Province of the
Netherlands. The Slochteren Field was connected with geological formations
stretching right across the North Sea. As a result of the Slochteren
discovery, widespread investigations began to estimate the North Sea's oil
and gas potential. A belief was soon manifest that a major oil and gas
province might lay beneath the North Sea, and in particular, that substantial
quantities of gas might be available in the more accessible, shallower and
less inclement waters of the southern North Sea, even though it was accepted
that to attempt the recovery of this gas would mean operating at the
frontiers of offshore technology. Investigations culminated in 1963 in a
magnetometer survey of the North Sea, stretching from Aberdeen to the
/oft)
Southern tip of Norway, and then south to the Straits of Dover. ' This
survey was sponsored by the 10 largest European oil companies.
All this activity created pressure on the interested European 
Governments, to solve two questions, which were parallel with the two 
problems which the British Government had faced alone when establishing the 
onshore regime in 1934. Firstly, it was necessary to establish who owned the 
oil and gas which might lay beneath the North Sea. This question is reserved 
for Chapter 2 which covers the setting up of an international regime for the
1-26
North Sea, based upon a system of national sectors. The second question 
related to the issue of what were to be the conditions under which those 
national sectors, once delineated, were to be exploited. The approach of the 
British Government to this second question was determined (as was their 
negotiation of sector delimination) by the bipartisan rapid development 
policy supported by both the Labour and Conservative policy. It will be 
shown how this rapid development policy came to be viewed as essential by 
both Parties. The factors involved in deciding an appropriate development 
policy for the U.K., will be highlighted by showing how the entirely opposite 
conditions of Norway's economy and society, caused the Government of that 
country to opt for a policy of slow development, based on the assumption that 
the oil would increase in value if left in the ground. Then it will be 
demonstrated how Britain's rapid development policy shaped the Oil Company 
Government relationship, and much of the character of the 1964 offshore 
regime. The reasoning behind the rapid development decision will be covered 
in Para. 1.21., and then contrasted with the Norwegian approach in Para 1.22, 
thus providing a basis for considering the shape of the 1964 offshore regime 
in Para 1.23.
1.21 The Rapid Development Policy Decision In the early 1960's the growth 
rate of the U.K. economy was slower when compared with that of our European 
neighbours. In 1960, U.K. per capita income ranked second only to that of 
Luxembourg, comparing the U.K. with the original six members of the E.E.C.
By 1976, the process of relative decline had so advanced that we then ranked 
7th in the Nine. By 1964, it was already clear that much of Britain's 
economy consisted of declining industries, and though technical change was 
often feasible within these declining industries, much of the embodied
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technical change proved inneffectual due to restrictive practices and Trade 
Union insistence on the overmanning of machines. Newer industries, such as 
the Upstream (exploration and production) side of the oil industry, were 
viewed as less likely to be encumbered with a legacy of restrictive 
practices. In the previous year (1963), the MacMillan Government had been 
rebuffed by De Gaulle in their attempt to take Britain into the E.E.C. The 
hoped for benefits of E.E.C. entry which would give a stimulus to the U.K. 
economy were not dissimilar from those benefits which it was hoped would 
derive from the development of an offshore oil and gas industry. It was 
believed that rapid development offshore would stimulate technical change, 
create employment opportunities, and provide the basis of a new British oil 
technology industry founded on traditional engineering skills. New 
opportunities would be provided for the shipbuilding industry. These changes 
would have a multiplier effect, which would spread benefits into the wider 
economy, and thus have a positive influence on our growth rate.
The mid 1960's in particular were characterised by alternating period of 
'stop' and 'go'. Periods of 'go' involved an overheating of the economy, and 
resulted in what by later standards would be regarded as a modest increase in 
inflation, but which for the time seemed exceptional. Available resources 
within the domestic economy became largely employed. Raw materials imports 
to make good this deficiency then created pressure on the balance of 
payments. In order to contain the resulting drain on the balance of 
payments, a period of 'stop' was imposed by the Government, involving some 
form of wage control. The balance of payments problems interacted upon 
exchange rates, then fixed according to the Bretton Woods System, and
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defended by Government action. A formal devaluation, as Harold Wilson 
learnt, was often the occasion for speculators to gain at the expense of the 
economy, while for its part under the threat of leaks, authority had to 
persist with denials of any intention to devalue right up to the event 
itself. A very important component in the balance of payments was the cost 
of imported oil.
The costs to the balance of payments associated with imported crude oil 
was the result of changes in the U.K. fuel economy since 1945. At the end of 
the War, our fuel economy was still substantially based upon British produced 
coal. A steady increase in coal production took place throughout the post
war period till 1 9 5 5 . However, as the demand for fuel increased, crude
oil, which was cheap, envi^nmentally acceptable and readily transportable, 
began to take an increasing share of the U.K.'s energy requirements. The 
temporary interruption of oil supplies brought about by the Suez Crisis 
(1956), caused little more than a pause in the changeover from coal to oil. 
Little consideration was given to the question of security of supplies in the 
middle Fifties, notwithstanding the admittedly interested warnings of
E.F. Schumacher and Lord Robens, on behalf of the Coal Board. In the U.K.,
the power of the Unions restricted the rate of contraction of the coal 
industry, so that by 1964 solid fuel production still stood at the relatively 
high level of 198 million tonnes of coal equivalent. However, by the early 
Sixties, the relief which might accrue to the balance of payments from an 
indigeneous source of oil and gas, provided a reinforcement to the 
macreconomic arguments in favour of a rapid development policy.
While these two economic reasons provided the principal cause for the 
adoption of a bipartisan rapid development policy, two other considerations
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helped to shape the decision of the U.K. Government. Security of supply, was 
one of these two considerations, and was judged to be of far lower importance 
than the economic considerations already mentioned. Treverton (30) 
explained that there was still a very low appreciation of the importance of 
the security of supply issue amongst the Western Nations in the mid I960’s. 
The second of these two other considerations was the need to defend the 
position of Shell and BP, a part British and wholely British Multinational 
respectively (3^) against any claims for a greater level of participation 
in their domestic oil industries made by oil producing States, in particular 
those in the Middle East. A U.K. regime in the North Sea could not establish 
any precedent for an extension of the involvement of these States in the oil 
industry within their own borders. In practice, the first serious challenge 
to the position of the Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) in the Middle 
East, occurred in 1967. Fadil Al-Chalabi(32) describes how in that year, 
Libya took advantage of the fact that some 20 companies were engaged in 
operations within her territory, some totally dependent on Libyan output, so 
as to confront them in detail. A 30^ U.S. price increase was obtained, 
together with an improved tax yield, and most important, the acceptance of 
the principle of annual price increases. These now seemingly modest changes 
brought about a chain of modifications in the conditions under which Western 
oil companies were to operate in the Middle East, which were ratified in the 
Tehran Agreement (1971) and a series of associated sub regional agreements. 
This resulted in a 15% increase in the ’take’ of the Host Governments, and 
considerably undermined the position of the companies in the Middle East, 
somewhat before the events of the 1973 oil crisis. Thus the two 
considerations given the least weight in opting for a rapid development
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policy for the North Sea and formulating an appropriate regime to manage the 
task, were to acquire added significance shortly after 1964. The 
difficulties arising from a decline in the power of the Multinational Oil 
Companies (MNOCs) in the producing countries were foreseen at that time, but 
the time scale was wrong, and both the companies, and U.K. Government 
believed that these difficulties lay some 10 years in the future, rather than 
just ahead of them. In 1964, it seemed important to bring about gas 
production as rapidly as possible, and in this context the need to maximise 
Government income was viewed as less important.
1.22 The Norwegian Approach To highlight the reasons for those 
characteristics of the U.K. regime to be considered in Para 1.23, it is 
useful to contrast the political and economic objectives of the U.K. 
Government with those of their Norwegian counterpart. Norway opted for a 
policy of slow development, or -leaving the oil in the ground' as a result of 
her quite different needs. The differences between the two countries which 
resulted to their differing approaches to the development of oil and gas are 
as follows :
Norway
A very large land area, with a 
very small population, and a 
homogeneous society.
Great Britain
A smaller land area, with a large 
population and class divisions 
in society.
An economy based on three related 
industries: agriculture, fishing
and shipbuilding.
A diverse economy and a fully 
developed industrial society, 





Adequate supplies of clean 
indigeneous fuel: hydroelectricity.
This industry run by the State 
company Norske Hydro. No coal 
industry.
No balance of payments problem 
associated with a heavy dependence 
on imported crude oil.
Social Democratic Governments back 
to the 1st World War. Established 
tradition of State intervention 
in industry.
Strong but democratically based 
nationalist tradition intent on 
defending national interests.
Based upon long experience of 
foreign domination, firstly under 
Denmark, and then under Sweden 
till 1905.
No security of supply problem
Great Britain
and difficulties in achieving 
structural change
Energy economy undergoing change, with 
a rundown of the coal industry in 
favour of environmentally acceptable 
liquid fuel.
Balance of payments problems 
aggravated by the costs of crude oil 
imports.
First majority Labour Government took 
Office in 1945.
An equally democratic society, but 
with no experience of foreign 
domination, and a strong need to 
secure the investment of foreign 
capital.
Security of supply problem, but 
danger still not fully perceived
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Norway Great Britain
No Norwegian based oil multi- Shell (British and Dutch) and BP
nationals (British).
Energy consumption of 20 million Energy consumption of 300 million
tons of coal equivalent per annum. tons of coal equivalent per annum.
With a far lower energy requirement, which was already largely covered 
by her environmentally acceptable hydroelectricity, and with none of the 
problems associated with the need to changeover her energy economy from coal 
to oil, Norway had no overriding need to employ substantially larger amounts 
of oil and gas domestically. While her balance of payments position would be 
improved by exports of oil and gas, she had no great need for this oil and 
gas as a means of substituting an indigeneous energy source for the cost of 
crude oil imports. Neither had she any serious security of supply problem. 
There was no need to stimulate the development of new industries particularly 
for the purpose of overcoming difficulties associated with structural change. 
Moreover, as the small Norwegian labour force was already fully employed, 
over rapid development would have effect of bidding up wages and inducing 
inflation, while draining labour away from the traditional industries such as 
fishing and agriculture. Indeed, rapid development might bring with it the 
dangers of pollution which could damage the fishing industry. For these 
reasons, the development of the new oil and gas industry was firmly 
controlled within the framework of Norway's regional policy.
A Petroleum Committee, appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry, 
reported that the formal terms offered by Norway to the oil industry, had to 
be at least as good as those offered by Great Britain, otherwise investment
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would be driven into the U.K. Sector. However, it was decided to offer less 
acreage at less frequent intervals than Great Britain. Thus the Norwegian 
1st Round (1965) covered a smaller area than the British 1st Round (1964), 
and it was 1969, before the Norwegians embarked on their second Round of 
Licencing. In their respective 1st Rounds, the Norwegians offered 78 blocks 
and the British 340 blocks, and a British block was roughly twice the size of 
its Norwegian counterpart.
The Norwegian policy of slow development was based on a very shrewd 
financial assessment. The Norwegians correctly judged that the price of 
crude oil would increase so quickly that the benefit derived from leaving 
their oil in the ground would exceed the profit to be obtained from investing 
the proceeds of its sale at current prices into their economy. The 
Norwegians considered that slower development would lessen the extent of
their dependence upon the oil companies. Though the degree of their
dependence on the oil companies was indeed lessened, it remained considerable 
for reasons shown in Para 1.23, which sets out the factors which shaped the 
1964 U.K. offshore regime.
1.23 The Shape of the 1964 Offshore Regime In the early 1960's, marine
petroleum engineering was still a fairly rare expertise. (34) During the
late 1940's and the 1950's the technology had been developed for shallow 
depths only in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Mexico. The expertise, 
insofar as it was available, was principally in the hands of the seven Major 
Oil Companies (known as the Majors), and the large American independent oil 
companies (known as the Independents from the fact that they were independent 
of the Majors.) Thus from the standpoint of European States wishing to
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develop the resources of their North Sea Sectors, a significant part of the 
available technology was in foreign (principally U.S.) hands. There was no 
alternative source from which the relevant technology could be obtained, 
neither could the necessary skills be developed locally in the short or 
medium term. Even those companies which held the virtual monopoly on the 
available technology had great difficulty in obtaining and retaining good 
managers and petroleum engineers for offshore work. Only limited expertise 
of this type was available to host Governments wishing to supervise the work 
of the companies. Thus while slow development reduced dependence upon the 
oil companies, and a more rapid development increased that dependence as in 
the U.K., in neither Britain or Norway was there any early prospect of 
nullifying that dependency. Such was the background, against which the U.K.'s 
1964 offshore regime was established.
Given the desire to encourage both massive financial investment and the 
employment of scarce technology and personnel in the U.K. Sector of the North 
Sea rather than elsewhere, British conditions had to meet two critera.
British terms had to be on offer before those of other competing 
States. Secondly, those terms had to be more attractive to the oil 
companies, than the terms likely to on offer from elsewhere. Such an 
approach, might have disadvantages for Britain, and the nature of these 
disadvantages will be explained in Chapter 3, which deals with the 
development of the regime in the years up 1975, when the then Labour 
Government introduced fundamental changes in the arrangements, principally 
effecting the development of the oil resources of the northern part of the 
Bficish Sector of the North Sea. At this point, the broad dimensions of the
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U.K.'s 1964 offshore regime will be covered, leaving more detailed 
consideration for treatment in Chapter 3.
Dealing first with the legal dimensions of the regime. Partly from the 
urgent need to have British arrangements in place before those of other 
European States competing for investment in their North Sea Sectors, and also 
because the models available in the legislation of the 1930's were well 
suited to the purposes of the middle 1960's, given the general weakness of 
the British Government in the Oil Company Government relationship, the 
Continental Shelf Act, 1964 and the Petroleum Production (Continental Shelf 
and Territorial Sea) Regulations, followed fairly closely the spirit, style 
and content of their middle 1930's onshore counterparts, except of course 
that they contained certain features reflecting their application offshore, 
such as clauses in respect of navigation. The fees from licencees, and the 
royalty payable- 12&% on the wellhead value of petroleum- remained modest. 
The length of a Mining Licence was reduced from 50 and 40 years, but the 
length of this licence to exploit State property still remained exceedingly 
generous to the licensee. Very significantly though, since in 1964 interest 
was centred on the gas potential of the southern North Sea, the Nationalised 
gas industry was made the only permitted purchaser of any gas produced by the 
companies. The Administrative Allocation Licensing System was retained from 
1934, not because of any vested interest in its retention by the Civil 
Servants who were to determine the allocation of the licences, but because it 
could be used to ensure that a fair proportion of the work involved could be 
allocated to British, or part British interests, principally BP and Shell.
Even though 62.5% of the territory allocated in the first 4 Licensing Rounds 
went to foreign (largely U.S.) concerns, which was an inevitable outcome of
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the distribution of the available expertise, British companies obtained a 
good share of territory.
Turning now to the financial aspects of the exercise. With massive 
amounts of money involved, the Majors, till then traditionally self 
financing, were forced to move into external financing. The risks to be 
taken through the operation of untried technology at greater depth than 
formerly in more inclement conditions, meant that the rate of return on 
capital invested, had to be well in excess of the average rate of return on 
capital investment of 15% which then applied in the U.K. economy^^S), 
Slochteren, a simple enterprise by comparison, had achieved a rate of return 
on capital invested of 25%. One of the means employed to secure for the oil 
companies and the other financial institutions involved a favourable 
outcome in respect of the rate of return on capital invested, consisted of an 
offshore tax regime limited to a modest royalty, applied in the context of 
the normal application of U.K. Corporation Tax. This was a system described 
by MacKay and MacKay as being 'porous as a sieve'. Companies were able to 
set off quite extraneous expenditure (e.g. a tanker for use outside the 
North Sea) against their North Sea costs. They could further extinguish 
their U.K. tax liability through setting against it overseas losses and tax 
payments, through the operation respectively of transfer pricing and double 
taxation relief. The manner in which this was done will be covered in some 
detail in Chaper 3, as will the consequences for the U.K. Exchequer, but it 
is well to recall that in 1964 the achievement of revenue was by no means an 
important Government objective.
Whereas the bargaining relationship between the oil companies and the
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Government had been covert in 1934, since the government wished to avoid the
charge that it was selling out to 'vested interests', in 1964 and thereafter,
both sides took up public positions, for example on the price to be paid to
the companies for gas by the Nationalised Gas industry* The Government
wished to demonstrate that they were not paying too high a price for the gas,
( 35 )
while the companies sought to show that they were being underpaid.' In
the event, the bargain finally struck consisted of a relatively low unit 
price, combined with a somewhat higher rate of extraction than the gas 
industry actually required. Thus the total cash flow of the companies was 
increased by producing at higher volumes. The longer term consequences of 
this approach will be considered in Chapter 3. The argument between the two 
sides was concerned with the question of an appropriate division of economic 
rent, while the companies claimed that the low unit price paid them for gas 
was insufficient to justify the exploration needed to secure longer term 
supplies, through the discovery and exploitation of smaller deposits. 
Economic rent is defined by MacKay and MacKay (^7) gg the difference 
between the full market price of a product, and that price which is just 
sufficient to keep an operator in business.
Given the desire to secure macroeconomic benefits through rapid 
development, the Ministry of Power became involved in arranging some 
contracts for the U.K. engineering industry to supply the special
/ Og \
requirements of the new offshore industry. Jenkin relates that the
outcome of this effort was not a success. The British engineering industry 
performed poorly in terms of technical quality and delivery, since there had 
been no special effort to gear it up to the needs of the petroleum industry. 
Several contractors went bankrupt through involvement in the enterprise.
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Since it was anticipated that only 5 years would be needed to develop the 
southern gasfields, compared with the much longer lead times later needed to 
develop the northern oilfields, the Ministry became disheartened and did not 
repeat the attempt. The companies, for their part operated through approved 
suppliers lists. These lists were of foreign (mostly U.S.) suppliers of 
proven performance. Given the nature of the dependent relationship in which 
the Government found itself, the whole situation reflected the fact that the 
pace of development was largely company determined. Had the relationship 
been more favourable to the Government, then they might have insisted that a 
certain proportion of all contracts be reserved for U.K. industry. In that 
situation some special effort would have been justified to gear U.K. 
suppliers up to the challenge.
The Government in 1964 were overconcerned with the macroeconomic impact 
of the oil and gas effort in the North Sea, and with the development of new 
high technology industries (e.g. computers) and tended to disregard the 
sectoral impact of the oil and gas industry. There was an uncritically 
favourable view of multinational enterprise taken by both the Government and 
the Opposition. At that time there was no experience of the consequences of 
Multinational disinvestment, such as was later provided by the Chrysler 
episode. The Government wished to develop the North Sea's oil and gas 
resources quickly. To this extent their interests overlapped with those of 
the oil companies, who wished to recoup their very large investment as soon 
as possible, and move into a condition of substantial profit. In this 
context, if established U.S. suppliers could provide the right quality of 
equipment and at the same time meet tight deadlines, then it was in the
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interest of both the oil companies and the Government that they should do it, 
and it is hardly surprising therefore that no serious and sustained effort 
was made to gear up British engineering so as to meet the special 
requirements of the offshore supplies market.
1.3 Summary of Conclusions There were two problems which deterred 
reputable oil companies from the search for oil and gas prior to 1934. The 
first problem related to the ownership of oil and gas. These hydrocarbons 
exist in fluid form in reservoirs, and thus might lay beneath the land of 
several surface owners, any of whom up to that time could lay a claim to the 
proceeds of any consequent production. The second problem related to the 
difficulties associated with securing the necessary access for roads and 
pipelines from several surface owners. In 1934, the two problems were 
resolved by taking oil and gas into Crown ownership, and providing guaranteed 
access rights for Government licencees, subject to safeguards designed to 
compensate surface landowners for loss and disturbance and protect the 
environment. Prior to the Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934 any technically 
viable solution to the two problems of ownership and access was politically 
unnacceptable, given the predominant view in Parliament that the rights of 
private property were sacrosant. ( Para 1.11)
Given the need to deal with the economically depressed conditions of the 
1930's the National Government developed a system of tax reliefs and 
susidies, known as 'managed capitalism' which involved the Government to a 
greater degree than ever before in the running of the national economy. Yet 
when one remembers that the introduction of Nationalisation as an industrial 
strategy had to wait till Labour came to power in 1945 with an overall
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majority, it will be appreciated that the measures by which Crown ownership 
was extended over oil and gas in 1934 were very radical indeed, and went well 
beyond the range of measures covered by 'managed capitalism'. While reasons 
relating both to the economy and needs of national defence were advanced to 
justify these measures, those relating to defence predominated. Given the 
climate of public opinion in the middle 1930's the National Government felt 
that the risks associated with a formal rearmament programme were politically 
unnacceptable. However, given the clear evidence of German measures aimed at 
fuel preparedness for War, it seemed prudent, given experience in the 1st 
World War, to respond to these measures with a British programme of economic 
and technical fuel preparedness, which was not visible to the public in the 
same way as formal rearmament. (Para 1.12)
The justification provided by the Marquess of Londonderry to the House 
of Lords in April 1934 for the Government's measures, shows clearly that 
Stage 1 of the Model derived from Hossain was in operation (i.e. that the 
Government were seeking to attract the oil companies into a search for oil 
and gas). Opposition to the measures was restricted to a small group of 
Conservative MP.'s and Peers, led by the Duke of Devonshire. The Duke 
represented the coalowning interest, who opposed the Government's proposals 
because these measures supported a fuel in competition with coal, and also 
because they feared that once oil and gas was taken into Crown ownership this 
would provide a precedent for taking coal into public ownship at a later 
date. These various opponents claimed that the Government's proposed 
measures were 'socialism' and even attempted to revive proposals first 
suggested by the Duke of Northumberland in 1917, which were designed to
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stimulate an oil search without infringing the rights of private property.
In 1934, as at the earlier date, these proposals were not technically viable. 
Parliamentary opponents of the Government's proposals sought to show that a 
covert relationship existed between the Government and vested interests (the 
oil companies) by probing Ministers on the source of their technical advice 
in formulating the Government's proposals. (1.13)
In 1935, the Regulations under which Government Licencees were to 
operate, were produced with great urgency by the Petroleum Department of the 
Board of Trade, notwithstanding the limited expertise available to the 
Petroleum Department, and Professor V.C. Tiling of Imperial College, who 
together with his colleagues was the only independent source from which the 
Government could have sought advice, expressed the view that the Regulations 
were very skillfully prepared. This suggests that Tiling and his colleagues 
were not consulted, making it likely that such advice was obtained either 
directly from the Oil Companies, or through the Institution of Petroleum 
Engineers (later the Institute of Petroleum), an institution funded by the 
Oil industry (Para 1.13).
These 1935 Regulations provided very generous terms under which the 
companies were to operate. Exploration Licencees were to be for 6 years and 
cover an area of 200 square miles. On conversion to a Mining (i.e. 
Production) Licence, the original area was halved- though the company could 
usually negotiate for possession of the most favoured half. Under these 
Mining Licences, Crown Licences held their rights for 50 years, and had the 
option to extend these for a further 25 years. There was no provision to 
renegotiate these terms during the duration of the Lease. A very generous
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set of terms were provided for foreign capital, and a low royalty was to be 
paid. The aim was to stimulate the growth of exploration effort, not to 
secure revenue. Further stimulus to the exploration effort was provided, 
beyond the terms of these Regulations, by tax relief on motor fuels derived 
from indigeneous oils. (Para 1.13)
A comparison of contemporary licencing arrangements in Roumania and the 
U.S.A., demonstrates that the Administrative Allocation Licensing System 
introduced in the U.K. in 1934, was well suited to British conditions. 
Applications for Licences were evaluated by Civil Servants, who while 
ensuring that all the principal oil industry interests obtained a share of 
the allocation, were able to ensure that British interests in particular 
obtained a fair share. Thus the Government retained a power to discriminate 
against any particular company or companies in future allocations- a power 
which was used by the Labour Government after 1975 to discriminate against, 
or threaten to discriminate against, companies who did not 'negotiate' State 
participation in existing licences. This discriminatory process will be 
described in Chapter 4. As regards the normal non discriminatory application 
of the system, the companies were well pleased with the system, since it 
saved them the money expended on bidding for licences in the U.S.A., and this 
cash was then available as a contribution to their exploration expenses.
(Para 1.14)
In 1964, a bipartisan rapid development policy was applied for the 
development of the southern North Sea gas fields. This arose from the view 
shared by both the Conservative and Labour Parties of the overriding need to
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use the development of the North Sea as a means of providing a stimulus to 
the British economy, whose performance was so poor by comparison with those 
of our European neighbours. (Para 1.21)
Conditions in the Norwegian economy and society were so different, 
compared with those in Great Britain, that these conditions brought about a 
different policy in that country, namely slower development. The Norwegian 
decision to leave a greater part of their oil and gas in the ground, was 
based on a shrewd assessment of the benefits which would accrue from an 
escallation in energy prices. (Para 1.22).
Both Britain and Norway were highly dependnent on the oil companies in 
1964, though Norwegian dependence was lessened in some measure by their 
policy of slow development. Apart from the massive finance needed to begin 
the development of the North Sea, marine petroleum technology, the essential 
expertise for the task, was a rare commodity, substantially in the hands of 
the 7 major oil companies, which meant that much of it was in U.S. hands. 
There was no possibility of developing a local expertise to equal that of 
companies in the short or medium term. (Para 1.23)
The legal dimension of the 1964 offshore regime was substantailly 
derived from its 1934 onshore predecessor, both because the earlier model and 
experience were readily available, and since the general terms provided were 
appropriate to the constraints under which the British Government had to 
operate in the mid Sixties. There were modifications to reflect the movement 
offshore (e.g. rules on navigation), and the length of a Production Licence
1-44
was reduced to 40 years compared with its 1934 counterpart. This duration 
still remained very generous, and there was still no provision for a 
renegotiation of terms before expiry of the Lease. A significant provision 
made the nationalised gas industry the sole purchaser of North Sea gas.
The Administrative Allocation system was retained for just those reasons 
which had made it appropriate in 1934. (Para 1.23)
The level of dependence of the British Government on the oil companies 
meant that given their mutual interest in rapid development, the pace of work 
was largely company determined. A fiscal regime based on a 12i% royalty on 
the wellhead value of petroleum, plus the normal application of U.K. 
Corporation Tax assisted the companies to achieve a high rate of return on 
capital invested, commensurate with the risks they were taking. The 
companies took advantage of a combination of the normal operation of 
Corporation Tax, transfer pricing, a double taxation relief, in order to 
offset North Sea costs against their substantial expenditures outside the 
North Sea, including their foreign (i.e. non British) operations. (Para 
1.23).
The division of economic rent derived from southern North Sea gas 
operations became the object of bargaining between the nationalised gas 
industry and the oil companies over the price to be paid the latter for their 
gas production. The settlement achieved gave the companies a higher rate of 
extraction than that actually required by the nationalised gas industry, so 
that they obtained some compensation through turnover for the low unit price 
per therm that they received. (Para 1.23)
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Attempts by the Ministry of Power to stimulate the growth of a home 
based offshore supplies industry were not persisted with. Those British 
companies who did attempt to enter this market in the mid 1960's were often 
not successful. The oil companies preferred to use proven U.S. suppliers of 
oilfield equipment who delivered quality products to time. Since both the 
Government and the oil companies wanted rapid development, the provision of 
satisfactory equipment according to firm deadlines, was in their mutual 
interest. The British Government were more interested in the wider 
macroeconomic effect of the exploitation of the North Sea, and thus failed to 
appreciate the importance of the sectoral impact (i.e. in respect of offshore 
supplies). The time span needed for the development of southern North Sea 
gas of around 5 years, was also relatively short. All these reasons 
combined, contributing to the failure to gear up British industry to take 
full advantage of North Sea opportunities (Para 1.23).
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Chapter 2 The North Sea Delimitation Treaties; The Cross Boundary Agreements
2.1 Introduction Chapter 1 described how the character of the 1964 offshore 
regime was largely determined by the need to induce the oil companies and the 
financial institutions to invest the large sums of money, and the scarce 
technology, which were required for the rapid development of the oil and and 
resources of the U.K. Continental Shelf. However, favourable conditions 
would not in themselves have been sufficient to secure that end. Unless the 
oil industry and its sources of external finance could be assured that Great 
Britain's jurisdiction over her own North Sea Sector was accepted by the 
other North Sea States, then they would not have been prepared to accept the 
operational and financial risks associated with a dispute over ownership, 
after they had once embarked upon the project. Thus the bargain agreed 
between the British Government and the oil industry had to be complemented by 
action to secure internationally recognised boundaries for a British Sector 
of the North Sea. The progress of investigations in the North Sea, already 
described in the previous Chapter, had by the early 1960's created a similar 
pressure on all the North Sea States, to create an international regime under 
which to exploit the oil and gas resources of the Region.
This present chapter is principally concerned with the negotiations whereby 
that international regime was set up on the basis of a division of the North 
Sea into National Sectors. (These negotiations will be covered in Para 2.2) 
Factors which operated against free access to the oil and gas resources of 
the Region, will first be explained in terms of Keohane and Nye's analysis of 
the erosion of the free seas regime. Factors which prevented the development 
of a European Regional Regime will also be briefly considered. The main 
emphasis will be placed upon the British approach to the negotiations.
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showing how the bipartisan rapid development policy influenced Britain's 
playing of a strong negotiating hand. Two principles established in the 
Geneva U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, and consequently incorporated 
in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (1958) will be described. These 
two principles were well suited as the basis for a division of the North Sea 
into National Sectors, but it will be demonstrated that the negotiations were 
essentially a political matter, so that accession to the U.N. Convention on 
the Law of the Sea by the negotiating States was determined by a combination 
of geological and geographical factors, together with the stage reached in 
the negotiations. In order to appreciate the British negotiating stance, 
reference will be made to the relative strength and weakness in the 
negotiating positions of other North Sea States.
The distribution and extent of the oil and gas resources of the North Sea 
were largely uncertain throughout most of the negotiations, which were 
completed by August 1967, if one excepts the renegotiation of boundaries 
between Denmark, the Netherlands and West Germany (1971) which increased the 
West German share of the North Sea at the expense of those other two States, 
but in no way affected the jurisdiction of Great Britain over her own Sector. 
Uncertainty about the distribution and the extent of the resources to be 
exploited had two impacts upon the negotiations. Firstly, since there were 
no disputes over the ownership of known deposits, the negotiations were 
completed fairly rapidly. Secondly, as Birnie and Mason explain, the
negotiations had something of the character of purchasing tickets in a 
lottery, except that the prizes which were unknown at the time of the draw 
had been determined geologically many millions of years earlier. It was this 
very uncertainty about the distribution of the oil and gas resources to be
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allocated among the North Sea States which gave particular significance to 
the arrangments made between those States to manage any oil and has deposits 
which were later found to straddle the previously negotiated Sector 
boundaries. (These arrangements, particularly those involving Great Britain 
and her North Sea neighbours, will be covered in Para 2.3).
As an introduction to the discussion of the cross boundary arrangements 
negotiated between States to manage deposits which lay partly within one 
Sector and partly in another, an explanation in simple terms will be given of 
Unitisation. Where two or more oil producers share access to a common 
reservoir, it will be demonstrated that their best interests are served by 
exploiting that reservoir co-operatively as a Unit (hence the term 
Unitisation) rather than by wasteful competition. It will be shown that just 
as Unitisation is the normal regime for two or more oil producers accessing a 
common oil and gas deposit, so the same logic applies with equal force to 
those North Sea States whose commond Sector boundary cuts across an oil and 
gas deposit.
The need to reach agreement on cross boundary Unitisation was recognised at 
the time of the delimitation Treaties, and was reflected in a series of 
'agreements to agree' on this issue, between the signatory States, in which 
they pledged themselves with varying degrees of commitment to seek a 
practical solution to the management of any oil and gas deposits which 
straddled Sector boundaries. A simple outline will be given both of these 
'agreements to agree' and the arguments of international lawyers and others, 
on what the proper technical and legal bases of an international cross 
boundary Unitisation agreement ought to be. It was feared that while such
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agreements were necessary for the efficient exploitation of oil and gas 
deposits which straddled Sector boundaries, they would in practice undermine 
the basis of the international regime in the North Sea, by affording too many 
circumstances in which one country would be entitled to intervene within the 
Sector of its neighbour. This would undermine the principle of national 
control within Sectors on which the regime was founded, and create the 
circumstances for future conflict between States. Unitisation involves 
co-operative activity, and such co-operative activity conflicts with the 
principle of national jurisdiction, which involves a separation of activities 
on a national basis.
Despite these fears, however, it will be demonstrated by reference to the 
Frigg Field Agreement (1976), the first full international cross 
boundary Unitisation Agreement, which was signed between Great Britain and 
Norway, that the many economic, legal, technical and managerial problems 
faced were resolved between the two countries in a practical fashion. This 
was because the common interest of both Governments in reaching a settlement 
was so great. Given their almost equal interest in the Frigg Field, and 
notwithstanding some diminution of national authority arising from the 
co-operative nature of the enterprise, the two countries were able 
substantially to maintain the principle of national control within Sectors, 
and thus reduced the prospects for any future conflict between themselves. 
This they did by a balanced and mutually exclusive allocation of duties 
between them, along lines which had already proved effective in the Ekofisk 
Pipeline Agreement.
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Richard Young reminds us that the delimitation of the North Sea Sector 
boundaries was an essentially political matter, but points out that due 
weight has to be given to the impact of international law on the 
negotiations. A State will adopt any principle of international law which 
coincides with its interests and several States may adopt such a principle if 
it assists them to secure a mutually acceptable adjustment of their 
interests. However, the fact that negotiations will often be concluded 
without reference to any principle whatsoever, as in the case of the Denmark, 
Netherlands, West Germany renegotiations of North Sea territory (1971) serves 
to emphasise that negotiations are a political process for adjusting 
interests. That said, the two UNCLOS principles (1958), were a significant 
factor in the negotiation of the North Sea Sector boundaries. The geological 
and geographical features of the North Sea, and the manner in which they 
might be interpreted or treated as special factors by the negotiating States, 
could in turn have affected the outcome for these States through their impact 
on the application of the two principles. For this reason, an outline of the 
geological and geographical features of the North Sea in Para 2.11 precedes 
an outline of the two principles in Para 2.12, the whole thus forming a 
proper basis for consideration of the negotiating process in Para 2.2.
2.11 Geological and Geographical Features of the North Sea Young (in the 
work previously cited) reminds us that the North Sea is far more than an 
oilfield covered by water, since for Centuries it has been one of the major 
fishing regions of the world, and has provided the trade routes between the 
ports of N.W. Europe. The North Sea covers an area of approximately 220,000 
square miles between Great Britain and N.W. Europe. The northernmost limit 
separating it from the Atlantic is latitude 62*N or alternatively a line from
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the northernmost Shetland Islands, east to the Norwegian coast. On the east, 
the North Sea is separated from the Skaggerak, by a line running from Cape 
Lindesnaes in Norway to Cape Hantsholm in Denmark, and in the south by a line 
in the Straits of Dover, which is sometimes defined as running from the South 
Foreland on the English coast, to Cap Griz Nez in France. These limits are 
broadly similar to those which were laid down in the Convention of 6th May 
1882, for Regulating the Policing of North Sea Fisheries. The extent
of the North Sea is shown in the map which forms Appendix 1 to this Chapter, 
which gives the boundaries of the national Sectors as finally delimited.
The North Sea is rarely deep. The 100 fathom line is north of 62°N, while 
south of 57°N is within 50 fathoms. Brower^^^ observed that if Shell
Centre Tower, which stands 351 ft. above the ground were to be placed almost
anywhere on the North Sea seabed, then it would almost always extend above 
the surface. There are only a few significant depressions in the seabed 
which run counter to this observation, but the view taken by Great Britain 
and Norway of the geological character of one of these depressions, that 
known as the Norwegian (or Graben) Trough, was to prove a most important 
factor in the negotiation of their Sector boundary.
The Norwegian Trough, which as its name implies is close to the Norwegian
coasts, varies in depth from 100 to 300 fathoms, and in width from 20 to 50 
nautical miles. The rim of the Norwegian Trough is not really a shelf edge in 
the proper sense, but a slash in the seabed formed by glacial action similar 
to that observed on the Norwegian m a i n l a n d . A  paper prepared for UNCLOS 
1(1958) which stated that the Norwegian Trough forms part of the
Continental Shelf from a morphogenic point of view, and pointed out that
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it is separated from the Atlantic on the north by a sill at 150 fathoms, 
formed the scientific basis for the Norwegian claim that their Continental 
Shelf extended across the Norwegian Trough to that boundary line which they 
later agreed with Great Britain.
UNCLOS 1 had defined the Continental Shelf as extending from the coast to a 
depth of 200 metres, though an extension of this depth would be acceptable 
where the necessary technology existed to secure the exploitation of 
resources. At that time (1958), 200 metres was held to be depth at which 
existing and shortly anticipated technology could reasonably be expected to 
operate. Thus interest did not seriously extend to greater depths and 
certainly not to the deep seabed work presently envisaged. Of course, bad 
weather and extremes of temperature may increase the costs and hazards of 
working at even quite shallow depths. Thus while the Norwegian Trough did 
not at that time qualify as Continental Shelf in terms of either depth or 
exploitability, there were sound geological grounds for the contrary view 
that it forms no more than an interruption in the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf, which extends seaward to meet its British counterpart. Moreover, 
given the subsequent development of technology, it is possible to see with 
hindsight, that the greater the extent to which a definition could be based 
upon geological factors, the more likely it was to prove stable in character
The Continental Shelf will often provide a favourable environment for the 
existence of those sediments in which deposits of oil and gas occur, and a 
great deal of the North Sea fits this pattern. Having set out some of the 
principal geological and geographical factors of the North Sea which were to 
have an important impact on the negotiation of Sector boundaries, the two
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UNCLOS principles which contributed to a political settlement of those 
boundaries will be set out, before considering the negotiating process by 
which they were arrived at. The discussion of that negotiating process in 
Para 2.2 will open with a consideration of the erosion of the free seas 
regime, and include an explanation of why a Regional Regime amongst European 
States, was not a serious prospect for the North Sea. The two UNCLOS 
principles were designed for a division of territory between States on a 
national basis.
2.12 The Two UNCLOS Principles After eight years work by the U.N. Law 
Commission, and the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (1958), the two 
principles were incorporated in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
and available as the basis for a division of Continental Shelf between 
States. The two principles were set out in Article 6 of the Convention as 
follows:
(1) The Median Line Principle Where the Continental Shelf is adjacent to 
the territories of two or more States, whose coasts are opposite each other, 
the boundary of the Continental Shelf appertaining to such States shall be 
determined between them. In the absence of such agreement, and unless 
another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is 
the Median Line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest point 
of the base lines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
(2) The Equidistance Principle Where the Continental Shelf is adjacent to 
the territories of two States, the boundary of the Continental Shelf shall be 
determined by agreement between them. In the absence of such agreement, and
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unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the 
boundary line shall be determined by application of the principle of 
equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth 
of the territorial sea is measured.
Article 6 further stated:
'In determining the boundaries of the Continental Shelf, any lines which are 
drawn in accordance with the principles set out... should be determined with 
reference to charts and geographical features, as they exist at a particular 
date, and reference should be made to fixed permanent identifiable points on 
land'.
These two principles were the unchallenged legal bases for Continental Shelf 
delimitation till 1969, when the International Court of Justice advanced some 
additional ideas to assist Denmark, the Netherlands and West Germany to 
resolve the North Sea Dispute over the renegotiation of their North Sea 
'territory'. While none of these ideas formed the basis for the actual 
settlement of that dispute in 1971, which was resolved without reference to 
any principle whatsoever, the Court did emphasis that no State which had not 
acceded to the U.N. Convention (in this instance West Germany) was under any 
obligation to accept the two principles as the basis for delimiting the 
boundary of its Continental Shelf.
2.2 The Negotiations In 1945, President Truman issued a Proclamation to the 
effect that the 'United States regards the natural resources of the seabed of 
the Continental Shelf beneath the high seas, but contiguous to the coasts of
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the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control'. In this 
context, 'natural resources of the seabed' included mineral resources which 
were located under the seabed. As Keohane and Nye explain, from the 1880's 
onwards, the concept of the free access to the oceans, combined with the 
complementary system of Free Trade served the interests of the United 
Kingdom, which possessed the naval power to enforce compliance with this 
regime, should this prove necessary. This approach was generally acceptable 
both to the other European States and to the United States. With her victory 
in World War I, Great Britain re-established her naval superiority, though 
under the Naval Treaty of 1922 this was somewhat diminished when the relative 
strengths of the British, U.S., and Japanese navies were established in the 
proportions 5:5:3, a formal recognition of the power of Japan which was a 
Pacific rather than a global power. The United States generally accepted and 
supported the free seas principle, with the exception that Britain had 
conceded to her rights to intervene in order to carry out anti smuggling 
operations.
With the decline of British power from 1945 onwards, the United States still 
maintained a formal commitment to the free seas principle, however the 
maintenance of this principle was in conflict with the Truman Proclamation. 
The exploitation of mineral resources requires certainty of title if it is 
to secure the necessary financial backing, since investors will not be 
prepared to take risks, when if later successful, their rights are likely to 
be challenged by others. The free seas regime provided for the free movement 
of commerce across the World's oceans, while the complementary system of Free 
Trade provided for the free passage of goods across national frontiers, 
unhindered by tariff barriers, and by a natural extension of the liberal
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principle of free access, the free seas regime thus implied free access to 
the mineral resources of the Continental Shelf. If large sums were spent on 
determining the location and nature of those mineral resources, what under 
this natural extension of the free seas regime, was then to prevent others 
from exploiting deposits once they had been discovered? The situation was 
brought to a head in 1945, not merely by advances in oil technology which 
created pressure from the US oil industry to secure certainty of title to the 
'natural resources of the seabed... contiguous to the coasts of the United 
States' but also because parallel advances in fishing technology created a 
demand from U.S. fishing interests for action to secure for them exclusive 
access to fish stocks in offshore areas' contiguous to the coasts of the 
United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control'. Thus there was a 
very real conflict between on the one hand the free seas regime, and on the 
other hand, the Truman Declaration (1945) which created the conditions 
necessary for investment to secure the exploitation of the oil and gas 
resources of the U.S. Continental Shelf.
The Truman Declaration (1945) had an ongoing effect in that it encouraged 
various Latin American States to extend their territorial sea, and from 1945 
to 1967, Keohane and Nye describe the situation as being a strong quasi 
regime, which means that while the U.S. and other States continued to give 
general support to the free seas concept, it was still being generally
weakened. The statement of Arvid Pardo, Maltese Ambassador to the U.N. in
1967, emphasised that the untapped resources of the seabed were an important 
source of new wealth. This may be regarded as a point after which there was
a quickening of the process whereby the oceans were to become less of a free
highway, and far more a series of enclosed national reserves. Keohane and
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Nye (10) provide a useful chart to stress this process of regime change:
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By the mid 1960's when the negotiations began over the formation of an
international regime for the North Sea, the process of regime change
initiated by the Truman Declaration (1945), and the realisation of the
importance of the resources laying beneath the seabed, were so far advanced
as to make a regime for a free access to the oil and gas resources of the
North Seas a non starter in political terms, even though economic arguments
(11)have recently been advanced for free access to deep seabed resources.
If the two UNCLOS principles were applied to a settlement of the North Sea 
Sector boundaries without any allowance for special factors, then the outcome 
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Under a straight application of the two principles, well over 80% of the 
North Sea would fall to three States, Great Britain, Norway and Denmark, none 
of which were members of the E.E.C. at the time of the negotiations, and one 
of which, Norway never did join the Community. Britain did exceptionally 
well with just under 50% of the region; Denmark did well for a small country; 
Norway had an appropriate share for a country with an extensive coastline.
Of the six countries that were E.E.C. members at the time, Italy was a 
Mediterranean State with only limited indigeneous supplies of natural gas, 
Luxemburg was landlocked, Belgium and France fared very badly and West 
Germany received a very poor share relative to her economic strength, as a 
result of the impact of applying the two principles to her concave coastline. 
By contrast, the Netherlands was the one Community member that did well. She 
received a 10% share of the 'territory' which was appropriate for her size 
and economic importance, and the value of this share was enhanced by virtue 
of the fact that it contained good gas prospects. Thus 5 out of the 6 E.E.C. 
member States had good reason to favour the formation of a European Regional 
Regime, probably run from Brussels, which accorded rights and benefits to all 
member States, and was not based on the appliction of the two principles 
which accorded rights of exploitation to separate States with North Sea 
coastlines. However, since the majority of the States who benefitted from 
the application of the two principles were outside the Community at the
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time of the negotiations to establish an international regime for the 
exploitation of the oil and gas resources of the North Sea, no opportunities 
existed for disadvantages E.E.C. members to apply leverage, by offering to 
grant Denmark, Norway and Great Britain benefits in other E.E.C. policy 
areas, linked to a regional solution for the exploitation of those oil and 
gas resources. Thus a European Regional Regime was not a serious 
possibility.
States negotiating National Sector boundaries were engaged in the traditional 
diplomatic activity of drawing lines on a map, so as mutually to agree upon 
access to new territory. With this difference; in this case, their rights to 
this North Sea 'territory' were not fully sovereign. Historic animosities 
played no part in the negotiations, as they did in the Rockall dispute 
between Great Britain and I r e l a n d . T h e  negotiations were largely 
complete before the Arab-Israeli War (1967) and finalised well before the 
world oil crises (1973), so that the heightened perception of the value of 
oil and gas resources, which followed from the latter event, played no part 
in the negotiations. The Treaties in which the Sector boundaries were 
established, are shown in Appendix 2. For Britain, as the only State on the 
western side of the North Sea, the Equidistance principle did not apply.
Thus with only the Median Line principle applied, Britain stood to gain 
nearly 50% of the region. Had Britain stood out for the view that the 
Norwegian Trough did not constitute part of the Continental Shelf, then she 
could have claimed about 70% of the North Sea. However, as Grisel 
e x p l a i n s , a l l  the States involved in the negotiations had a strong 
mutual interest in a rapid and amicable settlement, in order to get 
investment started. For this reason, a claim by Britain for 70% would have
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negated the object of rapid development, as well as having adverse effects in 
other respects. As has already been shown, Norway had sound geological 
grounds for her view that the Continental Shelf extended across the Norwegian 
Trough to the Median Line. A dispute in the North Sea would have been a very 
strong general disincentive to investment, especially given the large area 
involved, and in any case, no investor would have been prepared to invest in 
the area in dispute, which might in due course have to be conceded to Norway. 
Thus it was, that the balance of interests, favoured acceptance of the 
Norwegian view.
For these reasons, not only Britain, but also Denmark, accepted the Norwegian 
view that Norway's Continental Shelf stretched across the Norwegian Trough to 
the Median Line. Both countries also took acount of the fact that Norway was 
both a N.A.T.O. partner and a long term friend, as well as a neighbour from 
whom they might in the future require some favour. Thus a combination of 
economic self interest, a desire to maintain friendship with Norway, and a 
sense of fairplay, combined to justify both Britain and Denmark, to reach 
their settlement with Norway in line with that country's view of what 
constituted her rightful share of the North Sea.
Great Britain ratified the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (and thus 
the Continental Shelf Convention), after the passage of the Continental Shelf 
Act, 1964. The Act was passed under a Conservative Government, whcih was 
almost immediately replaced by a Labour Administration. On the 2nd Reading 
of the Continental Shelf Bill in the Lords, Lord Shackleton, Labour's 
spokesman had observed that the Norwegian Trough was 800 metres deep, and 
thus did not form part of the Continental Shelf. Such circumstances must
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certainly be to the advantage of Great Britain, as they would surely increase 
her share of the North Sea, through the application of the Median Line 
principle. After some subsequent behind the scenes discussions with the 
Government side, in which the basis of the friendly discussions with Norway 
then proceeding were doubtless explained to him. Lord Shackleton shifted his 
position. He then stated that he now appreciated that the Norwegian Trough 
was only 800 metres deep in parts, and that for the most part its depth did 
not exceed 200 metres. On this basis it was quite reasonable to regard the 
Norwegian Trough as Continental Shelf. For this reason it becomes clear that 
both the Conservative and Labour Parties, who were in accord on the need for 
rapid development (as shown in Chapter 1) now moved into alignment further, 
by favouring the same approach to the negotiations with Norway. For her 
part, Norway had declared that her Continental Shelf extended to the Median 
Line, as early as June 1 9 6 3 . However, Norway carefully avoided 
following up this unilateral act by accession to the U.N. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, and only did so once all her boundary negotiations were 
completed, since earlier accession to the Convention might have given some 
credence to the alternative view of the Norwegian Trough and the Continental 
Shelf. This demonstrates that accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, was determined for States according to the stage of the 
negotiations, and the impact of geological and geographical factors on the 
two principles, and as such reinforces the view that the negotiations were 
essentially a political matter rather than a question of accepting a 
particular legal view of the boundary issue.
Britain later gained an unforeseen benefit for herself, be settling her 
Sector boundaries with Denmark and the Netherlands on the Median Line
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principle. West Germany, dissatisfied with the share of the North Sea she 
had received under Treaties with these States in 1964/1965, claimed an 
improved and fairer share, consistent with her role as a North Sea coastal 
State, and in line with the extent of her coastline. There then arose what 
became known as the North Sea dispute. Subsequently, when a renegotiation of 
boundaries took place to compensate Germany for her poor share of the North 
Sea, this compensation was only at the expense of Denmark and the 
Netherlands, since their sectors were adjacent to the West German Sector. 
Britain's role, was as a result, confined to recognising a reallocation of 
'territory' amongst these three neighbours.
The circumstances surrounding the North Sea dispute are as follows. The 
Sector obtained by West Germany, in Treaties with the Netherlands and 
Denmark, in December 1964 and June 1965 respectively, was only 5% of the area 
of the North Sea, since this allocation was based upon the application of the 
Equidistance (or Adjacency) principle to West Germany's concave coastline.
West Germany was a powerful State in economic terms, as a consequence of the
economic miracle, but her political strength was not congruent with this 
economic position, in view of Germany's defeat in World War II. German 
dissatisfaction was reflected in her refusal to the accede to the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which contained the Equidistance 
principle. When the settlement of the North Sea dispute was achieved in 
1971, it modestly increased the German share of the North Sea, without
reference to any principle, and at the expense of Denmark and the
Netherlands.
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Britain signed the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea at the outset of her 
negotiating process, because the Median Line principle, which gave her nearly 
half of the North Sea, was fully in accord with her interests. Norway only 
acceded to the Convention, when all risk of an adverse interpretation of the 
Median Line principle in respect of the Norwegian Trough had been removed. 
West Germany never acceded to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, as 
to have done so would have implied acceptance of the Equidistance 
principle, and limited her ability to secure an improved Sector. The 
Netherlands signed midway in her negotiating process. Belgium and France, 
who did very badly in terms of National Sectors, and whose interests would 
have been best served by a Regional Regime, never did accede to the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
2.3 The Cross Boundary Arrangements The modern oil industry may be said to 
have started with the drilling of the Drake well in Pennsylvania in 1854. In 
the early days in the U.S. and later still in other countries, oilwells were 
not spaced out as they are today, but clustered together, so that photographs 
taken in those days give oilfields the appearance of forests. At first, it 
was not realised that excessive drilling and production led to a premature 
drop in reservoir pressure, a consequent sharp decline in the rate of 
production and a reduction in the ultimate quantity of oil produced from the 
reservoir. However, even as this situation became clear to oil producers, 
they continued to drill and produce competitively with one another in those
cases where they shared access to a common reservoir. Each such producer
justified his own action by reference to the law of capture, an ancient legal 
principle derived from access to underground water resources, even though 
such underground water resources were renewed from springs, while oil and gas
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resources were finite. As a result of this folly, short periods of wasteful 
overproduction were followed by equally sudden slumps in production. The 
first person to propose a solution to this problem was Max W. Ball (1916) of 
the U.S. Bureau of Mines, who suggested that there should be voluntary 
agreements between oil and gas producers accessing the same oil and has 
reservoir, so as to secure efficient and economic production. Ball also 
suggested that steps should be taken to reduce the number of producers 
through changes in the law. Unfortunately, he was somewhat in advance of his 
time and nothing came immediately of his proposals.
In 1924, the petroleum engineer Henry L. Doherty suggested an idea which at 
the time seemed astounding to many in the oil i n d u s t r y . (^5) Some companies 
were then already attempting to co-operate, as for example Shell and Standard 
of California in the East Coalinga Field in California. Building on this 
basis, Doherty suggested that each oil and gas reservoir should be treated as 
a single Unit for the purposes of management. Later, Doherty (1926) was 
among the pioneers of systems being developed to stimulate fresh production 
from exhausted reservoirs, by injecting gas into them to restore pressure. 
Doherty's 1924 idea for treating each oil and gas reservoir as a single Unit 
for the purpose of management, stressed the benefits to be gained all round 
through co-operation between oil producers. Very soon it was appreciated 
that through such measures as appointing a common operator for all the 
owners, by agreeing to prorate the costs and benefits of the activity, and by 
applying sound engineering principles to the operations, the advantages for 
all concerned were far greater than any which might be obtained through 
wasteful competition. Because of the benefits which arose from applying 
Doherty s original idea of treating an oil and gas reservoir as a Unit, the
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regime developed for the common management of an oil and gas reservoir 
accessed by several producers was termed Unitisation and the agreements 
establishing these co-operative arrangements were termed Unitisation 
agreements. Within each National Sector of the North Sea, oil companies 
holding contiguous Licence Blocks naturally applied these proven methods of 
co-operation from the outset of their operations.
It was agreed at the time of the Delimitation Treaties, that before long 
cases would arise where a boundary line was found to cut across an oil and 
gas reservoir, and that if effective Unitisation were to be applied, then 
agreement between the countries involved would be essential, so as to provide 
a proper framework for co-operation between their respective concessionaires. 
As a result, the North Sea States made a series of statements of intention to 
agree on this problem should it arise. They did this however, with varying 
degrees of commitment. These statements of intention to reach agreement on 
the cross boundary problem became collectively known as the 'agreements to 
agree ' and a list of them is provided by Birnie and M a s o n . H e r e  , 
consideration of the 'agreements to agree' is restricted to those which 
involved Great Britain. In 1965, it seemed quite probable that gas deposits 
might be found which straddled the boundary then settled between Great 
Britain and the Netherlands, so the two countries set out in some detail how 
they intended to proceed in the event of this occurring. This they did in a 
supplemental agreement to their Delimitation Treaty. This supplemental 
agreement stated:
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Article 1 'if any single geological, mineral oil, or natural gas structure 
or field, which is situated wholly on one side of the dividing 
line is exploitable wholely or in part from the other side of the 
dividing line, the contracting parties will seek to reach 
agreement as to the manner in which the structure or the field, 
shall most effectively be exploited, and the manner in which the 
costs and proceeds relating thereto shall be apportioned, after 
having invited the licencees concerned (i.e. their respective 
concessionaires) to submit agreed proposals to this 
effect.
Article 2 Establishes that the basic principle of an agreement would be 
'to achieve technical effectiveness and the avoidance of 
dangerous competitive drilling' and further provides for the 
appointment of an arbitrator in the event of the two sides 
failing to agree.
In her Delimitation Treaty with Norway, Britain pledged herself to seek 
agreement on cross boundary Unitisation, should this be required, but did 
not actually pledge herself to achieve it. However, both countries agreed to 
involve their licencees in the process of seeking agreement. This was a 
recognition of the fact that the framework achieved was one within which 
those licencees had to operate. It also took account of the expertise of 
those licences, which meant that they had a valuable input to make to an 
effective settlement of the issue.
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In her Delimitation Treaty with Denmark, Britain pledged herself once again 
to seek agreement rather than to achieve it. Too much should not be made of 
this distinction in view of the point already made, that in such an event 
both countries involved would have such a strong interest in achieving a 
settlement. Strangely, in view of the important role for licencees 
recognised in all the other Delimitation Treaties, and the subsequent crucial 
part played by licencees in the Frigg Field Agreement (1976), the Danes 
refused to include any provision for consulting licencees in 'agreements to 
agree' to which they were parties. There is no doubt that the Danish 
Government fully appreciated how important it would be to consult with 
licencees in reaching agreements with Denmark's neighbours for the 
exploitation of any oil and gas deposits which straddled her North Sea 
boundary. Indeed, the Danes may well have feared that given the expertise 
possessed by these licencees, they would probably prove the dominant 
influence on the shaping of any cross boundary agreement. Thus the Danes 
probably refused to commit themselves themselves to such a consultation prior 
to the event, in order to stress the primacy of the role which they hoped a 
Danish Government would take, should cross boundary negotiations prove 
necessary.
In her final delimitation Treaty, with West Germany, Great Britain (1971) 
agreed to approach cross boundary Unitisation, should it prove necessary, in 
a manner essentially similar to that incorporated in the Anglo Dutch Treaty 
(1965).
All these 'agreements to agree' naturally stimulated arguments, between 
international-lawyers and others, on what the proper legal and technical
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bases ought to be. In some respects, the considerations raised in these 
discussions were rather generalised in the case of legal points, or contrasted 
somewhat with the actual solutions achieved in the Frigg Field Agreement 
(1976), the first full cross boundary Unitisation agreement, which was 
negotiated between Norway and Great Britain. In order to point out the 
difference between these technical and legal considerations and the political 
ajustment of interests between Norway and Great Britain contained in that 
agreement, the arguments of international lawyers and others will be briefly 
established.
The legal considerations are set out in two articles by William T.
O n o r a t o . *^3) Onorato outlines the development of the domestic law of the 
petroleum producing countries as it evolved in parallel with the system of 
Unitisation. He deals in particular with the central question of 
apportionment, and shows how its treatment reflects a set of correlative 
rights and duties. These prove to be the equivalent of Oran Young's Rights 
and Liability Rules,(1*) a 'set of economic and social relations defining 
the position of an individual actor with respect to the utilization of scarce 
resources'. Such correlative rights and duties, in respect of Unitisation, 
are designed to protect the common interest against the selfish or 
irresponsible action of one of the partners. To this basis derived from the 
domestic petroleum laws of the petroleum producing countries, Onorato adds 
other concepts taken from international agreements relating to shared access 
by countries to natural resources, such as the Czech-West German agreement on 
the mining of cross border coal deposits, or the various agreements on access 
to fishing stocks, which latter resources are mobile yet move in determined 
patterns. In respect of apportionment he expresses the view that such an
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agreement exists already in the Ems Dollard Agreement, between West Germany 
and the N e t h e r l a n d s . James E. Horigan, addressing the Society of 
Petroleum E n g i n e e r s ^ ^ l )  observed that the Anglo Dutch Agreement(1965) 
contained no definite principles of apportionment, and doubted if any 
arbitrator would be able to resolve a dispute on the matter, while at the 
same time achieving a result which was efficient from an engineering 
standpoint. In this, Horigan failed to take proper account of the strong 
common interest which States would have in reaching an agreement on efficient 
cross boundary Unitisation.
The legal principles covered by Onorato certainly encapsulated much 
experience from situations analogous to the negotiations of a cross boundary 
Unitisation agreement in the North Sea. However, valuable as these principles 
were, they did not in themselves constitute such an agreement. At the time 
when Onorato was writing, he had the situation in the North Sea very much in 
mind, yet he failed to realise how fully that experience which the North Sea 
States had already acquired in dealing with simpler cross boundary problems, 
might provide a relevant contribution to the solution of the complex problems 
of cross boundary Unitisation in the region. Indeed, that this experience 
did make such a contribution, will shortly be demonstrated by showing that 
the Frigg Field Agreement (1976), the first full cross boundary Unitisation 
agreement, was based upon the approach which both Great Britain and Norway 
had already found mutually satisfactory in the Ekofisk Pipeline Agreement 
(1973).
The Ekofisk Pipeline Agreement (1973), arose from the need to manage the 
Greater Ekofisk Development. Ekofisk, which lays entirely in the Norwegian 
Sector, consisted of some 22 platforms feeding into a central complex from
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instances of up to 18km away, in addition to which the Cod Field, some 75km 
away, also fed into this same central complex. The Norwegians, given that 
they did not require any of the oil or gas which might be produced for their 
domestic economy, decided to sell the gas produced to West Germany, and the 
oil to the U.K., subject to the proviso that they would be able to draw off 
any quantities they might require for their own use, after arrival in these 
markets. Based on this reasoning, a gas pipeline was to be built to Emden, 
and an oil pipeline to Teesside. The Norwegian Government took a major share 
in both these enterprises through Statoil, their National Oil Company. But 
an oil pipeline with Norwegian ownership, passing through the British Sector 
of the North Sea, to discharge crude oil in a terminal in Great Britain, 
presented the problem of determining which country's authority was to apply 
in the various aspects of the enterprise, and how possible conflicts between 
British and Norwegian authority might be minimised. This problem was 
reflected in seeking answers to the following questions. Was British or 
Norwegian law to apply to the pipeline? Who was to tax the crude oil passing 
through the terminal? Was the ownership of the terminal to be British or 
Norwegian? How were health, safety, welfare and pollution matters to be 
handled?
In approaching the solution of these problems, the British and Norwegian 
negotiators were conscious of the significance of four factors. Firstly, 
their authority over their North Sea Sectors was less than that they each 
exercised over their land territory, which fact was indicated by the need for 
domestic legislation to establish just what powers they respectively intended 
to employ within their separate areas. The sea did not yet consist of 
totally exclusive national reserves. Secondly, the British were anxious to
2-26
preserve their national right to manage their own sector, and Norway had an 
equal interest in preserving Britain's position in this respect, so as to 
preserve a similar right for herself within her own territory. Thirdly, a 
settlement had to reconcile this second factor with the balance of commercial 
interest in the enterprise. This meant, that while the crude oil was being 
delivered to a terminal in Teesside, it was oil originally produced in the 
Norwegian Sector and transported through a Norwegian owned pipeline, so that 
the principal stake in the enterprise was Norwegian, even though the lesser 
British interest was not inconsiderable. Fourthly, whatever arrangements 
were made, they had to be workable from the standpoint of the oil industry. 
All these factors were similar to those which would have to be considered in 
formulating a cross boundary Unitisation agreement, always remembering that 
the technical problems involved in Unitisation would add a further layer of 
complexity.
For the Ekofisk pipeline it was agreed, that the pipeline company being 
Norwegian, with a trading branch in the U.K. should be taxable by the 
Norwegian Government in accordance with Norwegian tax law, while the terminal 
company should be a U.K. company, whose profits were taxable in the U.K. 
only. The pipeline, as distinct from the pipeline company, was to be subject 
to both British and Norwegian Civil and Criminal Law, with the proviso that 
British arrangements with respect to conflict of laws were to apply. This 
reflected the fct that though the pipeline was Norwegian it passed through 
the British Sector. Accordingly, in case of a dispute the British acquired a 
special advantage. In similar fashion, health, safety and pollution matters 
were to be settled in accordance with both British and Norwegian Regulations. 
An Arbitration Panel was appointed, with one member from both the British and
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Norwegian side, and one neutral member acceptable to both Governments. The 
whole arrangement was mutually balanced, satisfied both sides, and worked 
very well, most probably because both of the countries involved wanted it to 
work, rather than because of any intrinsic virtues in the arrangements 
agreed.
The Frigg Field is a large gas reservoir which stretches across the sector 
boundary agreed between Great Britain and Norway in 1965. The Frigg Field 
Agreement (1976) was the first full cross boundary agreement in the North 
Sea, in that it included arrangements for Unitisation. The agreement is 
often referred to as a watershed a g r e e m e n t b o t h  because it is the first 
of its type, and because it set the pattern for all future cross boundary 
co-operation between Britain and Norway. The interests of the two countries 
were more evenly balanced in the Frigg Field than in the Ekofisk pipeline 
negotiation, in that the field was physically located in both sectors, and it 
was agreed that the gas would be transmitted in two pipelines (one British 
and one Norwegian owned) to St. Fergus on the Scottish coast. Moreover, the 
interests of the two countries were interdependent to a very great extent, 
since Unitisation was involved, and as has already been demonstrated. 
Unitisation as a regime arose originally from a recognition of the 
interdependence of producers accessing a common reservoir.
Basically, the Frigg Field Agreement(1976) fell under three headings: (1) 
Exploitation of the Frigg Field, consisting primarily of the arrangements for 
Unitisation, but also dealing with arrangements for establishing safety 
measures and providing guidelines on the rights of officials.
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(2) Transmission of gas from the Frigg Field reservoir, dealing principally 
with the pipelines, but similarly providing guidelines on the rights of 
officials from both countries and (3) General provisions. In this, the 
Governments commit themselves to agree on pollution and to set up the Frigg 
Field Consultative Committee, to oversee implementation. It also provides, 
interalia, for the establishment of an Arbitral Panel to resolve those issues 
which cannot be settled by the Frigg Field Consultative Committee. These 
three main sections are preceeded by an introduction which repeats the 1965 
commitment of both countries to secure agreement on all problems.
The negotiators looked to the earlier Ekofisk Agreement (1973) which had 
proved satisfactory to both sides, as a contribution to resolving the more 
complex problems they faced in the Frigg Field. Since the Ekofisk Agreement 
was concerned with the problems of managing a pipeline, those sections of the 
Frigg Field Agreement which relate to the problems of the two pipelines to 
St. Fergus have a direct similarity with the Ekofisk pipeline arrangements. 
However, since the interests of both countries were more equal in the Frigg 
Field, the rights of each country are more balanced. For example, one 
pipeline was to be owned by the U.K. and the other by Norway, although both 
pipelines were transmitting gas to the U.K. In general, the negotiators 
tried to achieve not only a balance between the rights of each country, but 
attempted to make these rights mutually exclusive. On the whole they were 
successful and provided a framework which permitted the oil companies to 
establish most of the technical arrangements required, provided that the 
Governments were properly informed of the decisions taken. Thus licencees 
were required to enter into agreements on exploitation and submit these to 
the two Governments for approval. Within this framework the national right
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to manage was substantially maintained, though there was some diminution of 
the rights of each country within its own sector. For example, a Norwegian 
licencee can drill a well in the British Sector for the purposes of reserve 
assessment, and a British licencee can take similar action in the Norwegian 
Sector. In extreme circumstances, an Inspector from one country may enforce 
safety measures within the other country's sector. However such a modest 
diminution of national authority is of no great consequence, given that 
Article 29 of the Frigg Field Agreement formally states that 'nothing in this 
agreement will effect the jurisdiction of each State over its Continental 
Shelf'. The Department of Energy^^^^ stated that' the agreement for the 
Frigg Field gas field (1976) has proved an efficient and flexible document, 
and has enabled the two Governments in the Frigg Field Consultative 
Commission to regulate the field through the development and into the 
production phase'.
A reading of successive volumes of the U.K. Department of Energy's 
"Development of the oil and gas resources of the United Kingdom" suggests a 
progressively interdependent relationship in the North Sea between Great 
Britain and Norway. Agreements on the Statfjord and Murchison Fields were 
signed in Oslo on 16th October 1979 and in the year ending June 1980, 
licencees in both fields concluded an agreement between themselves providing 
for the Unitisation of the fields, their development and the apportionment of 
reserves. The Oslo Agreement(1979) provided for an initial apportionment of 
Statfjord of 16% to Great Britain and 84% to Norway, but further provided for 
a reapportionment of these reserves on first production. Thus, as in the 
Frigg Field Agreement (1976), provision was made for the reapportionment of 
reserves as more data became available. The Oslo Agreement built broadly
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upon the same framework as that successfully established for handling Frigg 
Field gas. The interdependence of Great Britain and Norway is emphasised by 
the existence of the U.K. Norwegian Consultative Committee. This Committee, 
headed by responsible Ministers from each country, meets on a regular basis 
to discuss matters of common interest, and spends much of its time discussing 
the Median Line fields. Under this Committee, there is a Working Group on 
Safety and Related Matters, which covers offshore safety and contingency 
planning. The licencees themselves have set up safety areas, given the names 
of colours (red, orange, blue) which cross national sector boundaries, and 
within which co-ordinated planning takes place to deal with possible 
emergencies. Thus there is clear evidence, that while the National Sector 
Regimes in the North Sea remain largely distinct, the nature of the overall 
task being carried out, necessarily imposes a considerable measure of 
interdependence.
Further evidence suggests^^^^ that where problems arise within the British 
Sector of the North Sea, these are far more likely to develop from the 
conflicting interests of the many British Agencies which operate within the 
British Sector, than from any limited action taken by the Norwegian 
authorities within British 'territory'. Where the Norwegians do take action 
within the British Sector however, this is often more effective than 
comparable British action. Norwegian Safety Inspector, for instance, will 
often drop in without prior warning, while their British counterparts give 
several hours warning. This may be due to the fact that in Norway the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy does not have a direct day to day practical 
concern with offshore matters, which are the function of the Norwegian 
Ministry of Labour. This derives from the Norwegian Government's fear that
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too close a connection between the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy on such 
day to day matters, might prove detrimental to the country's best interests.
2.4 Summary of Conclusions
A weakening of the Free seas regime, initiated by the Truman Declaration 
(1945), had progressed so far by the early 1960's that free access to the oil 
and gas resources of the North Sea was not a viable political option, 
especially having regard for the need to provide a certain legal title to 
those resources in order to secure the investment needed for their 
exploitation. The process was by then well advanced which was to turn those 
Oceans into national preserves, rather than an open highway, a change 
signalled by the Pardo Statement to the United Nations (1967) drawing 
attention to the untapped resources of the seabed. (Para 2.2).
While the interests of 5 out of 6 E.E.C. members favoured the creation of a 
Regional European Regime, a regime under which all States would benefit from 
the resources of to be exploited, and not just those North Sea States who 
benefitted from a National Sector approach, the three main benefactors of a 
division of the North Sea into National Sectors according to the two UNCLOS 
principles (1958), were Great Britain, Denmark and Norway. On this basis, 
these three countries between them would share in excess of 80% of the area. 
Since none of them were members of the Community, it was not possible for any 
of the disadvantaged E.E.C. countries to exercise leverage on these three by 
offering them trade offs in other areas of Community policy, in return to a 
regional approach to the exploitation of oil and gas. As a result, the 
creation of a Regional European Regime was not a practical possibility.
(Para 2.2).
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Since the Equidistance (or Adjacency) principle did not apply to the U.K. (as 
it was the only country on the western side of the North Sea), a straight 
application of the Median Line principle in a settlement with Norway would 
give Great Britain somewhat less than 50% of the North Sea as her Sector. 
While a much larger area could have been claimed by Britain if she had chosen 
to contest the Norwegian view that the Norwegian Trough formed part of the 
Continental Shelf, such a major dispute over North Sea territory would have 
discouraged the investment sought by Britain, and would have been contrary to 
the rapid development policy. To this important consideration was added the 
desire to deal fairly with Norway, and old friend and N.A.T.O. ally, which 
possessed a sound geological case for their view of the Norwegian Trough.
Thus the balance of advantage to Britain lay in settling with Norway on a 
straightforward application of the Median Line principle, without regard to 
any special factors. (Para 2.2).
By settling her boundaries with Denmark and the Netherlands on the basis of 
the Median Line principle Britain gained an unforeseen benefit. When 
compensation was provided to West Germany for the poor sector she received 
(as a result of applying the Equidistance principle to her concave coastline) 
at the settlement of the North Sea Dispute, that compensation was provided at 
the expense of Denmark and Norway. Britain merely recognised the changes 
made between Denmark, West Germany and the Netherlands. (Para 2.2).
States involved in the negotiation of North Sea sector boundaries only 
acceded to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea when it was to their 
advantage and according to the stage in the negotiations combined with a 
range of geographical and geological factors. This shows that the
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negotiations were an essentially political process rather than a matter of 
international law. Indeed, the settlement of the North Sea Dispute (1971) 
referred to no principles of international law. These principles were 
applied only where they assisted a settlement which was acceptable to the 
negotiating States. (Para 2.2).
Where two or more producers access an oil and gas reservoir in common, the 
co-operative exploitation of that reservoir through a regime known as 
Unitisation, which is based upon efficient engineering principles and an 
agreed apportionment of costs and benefits amongst the participants, provides 
benefits for all, which are preferable to wasteful and uneconomic competitive 
production. Since the sector boundaries in the North Sea were negotiated 
before the distribution of oil and gas resources was known, it was 
appreciated at the time of the negotiations, that circumstances would 
probably arise where a deposit was found to straddle those boundaries, and 
this would give rise to the need for cross boundary Unitisation. To 
establish a framework within which concessionaires could co-operate to this 
end, cross boundary Unitisation agreements would become necessary between the 
countries involved. (Para 2.3).
The various North Sea countries entered with varying degrees of commitment 
into a series of 'agreements to agree' as and when the problem of cross 
boundary Unitisation arose, and the prospect of cross boundary Unitisation in 
the North Sea, resulted in a debate between international lawyers and others 
on what the proper legal and technical bases for cross boundary Unitisation 
ought to be. (Para 2.3).
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The Ekofisk Pipeline Agreement (1973), negotiated in circumstances where 
Norway's interests were greater than those of Great Britain, was developed on 
the basis of a balanced and mutually exclusive allocation of duties between 
the two countries. It was feared that Unitisation, which was based upon 
co-operative activity would undermine the foundations of the international 
regime in the North Sea, which was established on the principle of national 
control within sectors, since a cross boundary Unitisation agreement would 
afford too many occasions in which one State might intervene in the sector of 
its neighbour, with all the prospects that held for future conflict. (Para 
2.3).
The Frigg Field Agreement (1976), extended those principles already applied 
in the earlier Ekofisk Pipeline Agreement (1973), to a much wider series of 
cross boundary matters including the inherently more complex issue of cross 
boundary Unitisation. This Agreement, in turn, formed the basis for the 
management of other Median Line fields.
Notwithstanding some modest dimunution in national authority, the principle 
of national control by each country within its own sector has been 
substantially maintained in the cross boundary agreements. There has however 
been a steady growth in co-operation and interdependence between Great 
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APPENDIX 2
DELIMITATION TREATIES
(Excludes Treaties between Denmark, Sweden, Norway and West Germany of a 
minor character and irrelevant to the argument) based upon details given by 
C.M. Mason).
A. Treaties terminated at resolution of North Sea Dispute
Parties Signed In Force
A1 West Germany 
Netherlands
Bonn 1.12.64 18. 9.65
A2 West Germany 
Denmark
Bonn 9. 6.65 27. 5.66
B Principal Délimitât ion Treaties
Parties Signed In Force
B1 United Kingdom 
Norway
London 10.3.65 29. 6.65
B2 United Kingdom 
Netherlands
London 10.6.65 29. 6.65
B3 Norway
Denmark
Oslo 8.12.65 22. 6.66
B4 United Kingdom 
Denmark
London 3.3.66 6. 2.67
B5 Denmark
Netherlands
The Hague 31.3.66 1. 8.67
C Resolution of North Sea Dispute










(British Recognition of Resolution of North Sea Dispute)
C4 United Kingdom London 25.11.71 7.12.72
Netherlands
C5 United Kingdom London 25.11.71 7.12.72
Denmark
C6 United Kingdom London 25.11.71 7.12.72.
West Germany
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PART 2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGIME
Chapter 3 The Question of Regime Change; The U.K. National Regime for Oil and 
Gas, 1964-1975
3.1 Introduction From 1964 to July 1974, the rapid development policy, and 
the conditions generally favourable to the oil industry, under which the oil 
companies operated in the U.K. Sector of the North Sea, remained essentially 
unchanged. Then, in July, 1974, ^^^ the recently elected Labour Government 
announced its intention to modify these conditions in three ways. Firstly, 
through the creation of a national oil company to be known as the British 
National Oil Company (B.N.O.C.), which was to act as the agency for the 
introduction of a substantial measure of State participation into North Sea
operations. Secondly, the system for taxing these operations was to be
altered by placing a ring fence around the North Sea for the purposes of 
applying U.K. Corporation Tax. As a result of this change, it would no 
longer be possible for oil companies to offset costs and losses incurred 
outside the area, against tax liabilities arising from their North Sea 
activities. New fiscal measures (in July, 1974 unspecified, as they had yet 
to be consulted with the industry) would, when combined with the former 
decision, have the effect for the first time, of producing a substantial 
Government revenue from North Sea operation. Thirdly, while stating their 
commitment to build up U.K. Sector crude oil production in the year ahead, 
the Government announced their intention to take powers enabling them to 
control the level of such production from current and future licences. In a 
later Commons statement by Eric Varley, which became known as the Varley 
Guidelines, they set out the (non legislative) constraints they
proposed to use in the application of these controls, which had the effect of
F5H40I
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assuring the oil companies that control over the rate of depletion from oil 
and gas reservoirs was a matter for the 1980's, rather than an immediate 
prospect. Notwithstanding the Varley Guidelines, Labour's statement of their 
intention to take powers for the future control of depletion rates, marked a 
definite break with the policy of unqualified rapid development.
Except for State participation, involving as it did the negotiation of a 
State interest in existing licences, and the creation of B.N.O.C. as the 
agency for this participation, all these measures had the broad support of 
the Conservative Opposition, since with the exception of the matters just 
mentioned, the previous Heath Government had been committed to a similar 
package of changes. While sharing Labour's view on the need for a greater 
degree of Government control over the North Sea, the Conservatives believed 
that this might be better achieved through their proposed conservation 
agency, to be known as the United Kingdom Oil Conservation Authority a body 
designed on North American lines. Setting aside the questions of the lower 
cost of the Conservative proposal, and the issue of its likely effectiveness, 
the real difference of approach between the two parties, arose from their 
contrasted ideologies on the best means for organising industry. This 
difference marked the first break with the hitherto bipartisan approach to 
North Sea policy, and thereafter. Labour and Conservative policy in this 
issue area was to become progressively distinct. To probe the reasons 
behind this divergence, the treatment of State participation and the creation 
of B.N.O.C., together with the subsequent development of the Corporation, 
through to the end of 1981, is reserved for consideration in Chapter 4.
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The present Chapter will concentrate (in Para 3.2) on the reasons why 
conditions for North Sea operators remained unchanged from 1964 till the 
enactment of Labour's measures, and further explain that particular
combination of circumstances which contributed to those changes in the U.K. 
National Regime for Oil and Gas which took place in 1975. Outside Britain, a 
process of fundamental change in the world oil industry (to be explained in 
P^ra 3.11), had been in train from around 1960, and was to culminate in the 
world oil crisis of 1973. By 1971, this process of change had become 
publicly visible outside the oil industry, when the Multinational Oil 
Companies (MNOCs) were seen to have lost their former power to determine 
levels of production, and rates of investment in the principle producing 
countries in the Middle East and elsewhere. At Tehran in that year, 
(Footnote*) they were forced by a group of these countries to sign the Tehran 
Agreement, in which they conceded to the producing countries considerable tax 
and royalty benefits, together with a rise of 30^ U.S. a barrel on the 
price of crude oil F.o.b. (Free on board) the Persian Gulf, plus a further 
11^ U.S. rise per barrel in each subsequent year till 1975. These 
concessions by the companies were made under a threat by the Governments with 
which they were negotiating, to cut off their crude oil supplies. After 
Tehran, the companies still retained a considerable technological advantage 
in their possession of exploration and production expertise, and remained the 
dominant factor in worldwide transportation, refining and distribution
Footnote *
Actually, there were two linked agreements. The Tehran Agreement (14/2/71) in 
respect of the Gulf States; and the Tripoli Agreement (20.3.71) in respect of 
Mediterranean Producers. Negotiations on the company side were co-ordinated 
by the London Policy Group (LPG).
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activities. However, in order to protect the supplies of crude oil they 
required to carry on this range of integrated activities, they became more or 
less willing partners in participation agreements, with the host Governments 
in the producing countries. Under these participation agreements. State 
participation within the producing countries, was progressively extended on 
organised and reasonably effective basis, in a process which a Kuwaiti Oil 
and Finance Minister frankly observed, was in reality a form of creeping 
nationalisation.
Viewed from Britain, this process of change within the international oil 
industry, suggested to both Conservative and Labour politicians (well before 
the events of the 1973 oil crisis provided them with a powerful case for the 
extension of Government control over North Sea activities), that the time 
might well be right for U.K. to obtain an improved financial return from the 
North Sea. From 1969 onwards, interest had switched from the southern gas 
fields supplying gas to meet the needs of the U.K.'s nationalised gas 
industry, to newly discovered oil fields further north. A number of
important oil fields had been discovered in the north of the British Sector
in the years between 1969 and 1971: Montrose (September 1969); Forties 
(November 1970); Auk (February 1971); Brent (July 1971); Argyll (October 
1971). These finds reinforced the view in both the Conservative and Labour 
Parties, that given these new resources, the time was obviously right for the
Government to secure improved terms from the oil industry for their
exploitation. This bipartisan opinion, which arose in some measure from a 
sense of Britain's relative deprivation, compared with the 'take' of other 
oil industry host governments, gave far too little weight to the considerable
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time which must elapse between the discovery of such oil fields, and their 
development to full production. Neither was there a proper appreciation of 
the costs involved in this process.
It was in these circumstances, that criticisms of the existing U.K. 
National Regime for Oil and Gas crystallised in the Findings of the Public 
Accounts Committee, 1972/1973.^^^ These Findings, prepared before the 1973 
oil crisis will be analysed, so as to relate them both to changes within the 
international oil industry and progress in the exploitation of the northern 
North Sea oil fields. In this context it will be explained how the U.K. 
National Regime for Oil and Gas remained essentially unchanged for a decade, 
and why when changes came, they particularly occurred in 1975, and not at 
some earlier date.
As an aid to the argument, the broad shape of the Committee's Findings 
must first be outlined. At the core of these Findings was the Committee's 
concern over the failure of the arrangements in force to produce any 
substantial revenue for the British Government. The failure of the fiscal 
system to produce any significant tax revenue up to 1973 was noted, and the 
Government was criticised for permitting this situation to persist, 
particularly in the absence of any compensating factor in the shape of State 
participation in the exploitation of the northern North Sea oil fields. The 
situation which allowed costs and losses outside the North Sea to be set 
against tax liability for U.K. Corporation tax arising from North Sea 
operations should be ended.
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As regards Licensing Policy, far too much territory had been allocated 
too quickly for overlong periods of time - 46 years without any provision for 
renegotiation of terms. An experiment in bidding for licences, which had 
shown the considerable revenue which might accrue from such an approach had 
been included in the 4th (then the latest) Licensing Round, but should have 
preceeded it. Even when the results of this experiment were known, there was 
still time to cancel the 4th Licensing Round. Yet no action was taken to put 
this option before Ministers. In the view of the Committee, there ought to 
have been a full Ministerial Review of Licensing policy before the 4th 
Licensing Round. While the rapid development policy was noted, the Committee 
made no call for the introduction of depletion controls.
As regards the exploitation of southern North Sea gas, the Public 
Accounts Committee recognised that the faults of the fiscal and licensing 
system in failing to produce revenue, were substantially mitigated by the 
involvement of the Gas Council, both as a North Sea Operator, but more 
especially since the Council was the only, or monopsony buyer of gas from the 
operating companies, unless the gas was to be used for non fuel purposes, 
i.e. chemical feedstock. Thus there was no criticism of the arrangements for 
the management of southern North Sea gas, under which the nationalised gas 
industry obtained its supplies of natural gas at prices well below 
international market levels.
In a further criticism of Government policy, the Public Accounts 
Committee drew attention to the lack of effective measures to stimulate the 
development of a home based offshore supplies industry prior to the
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commissioning of the IMEG Consultants Report which was published in May 
1972.
The various critical findings of the Public Accounts Committee (those 
relating to Government revenue and the fiscal system, licensing policy, and 
the offshore supplies industry) will be considered against the background of 
the rapid development policy, changes in the international oil industry, and 
Stages 3 and 4 of the model derived from Hossain. Stages 3 and 4 of this 
model demonstrate that the further oil companies become engaged in the task 
of developing oil and gas reservoirs, in order to bring them to full 
production, the more costly it becomes for them to disengage from the 
enterprise. At the same time, the companies become more vulnerable to host 
Government action, designed to increase the host country's 'take' and 
progressively introduce State participation. The point of maximum 
vulnerability for the companies is reached with the achievement of full 
production. On the basis of these considerations, it will be explained why 
British Government action to change the character of the U.K. National Regime 
for Oil and Gas did not follow immediately from the publication of the Public 
Accounts Committee's Findings, but took place particularly in the year 1975.
The failure of Government action to stimulate the growth of a home based 
offshore supplies industry prior to the commissioning of the IMEG Consultants 
Report will be further related to a substantial consensus within the two 
Parties between 1964 and 1975 on the value of foreign investment, allied for 
most of the period to an uncritical view of foreign based multinationals, 
which tended to depoliticise the issue of their impact upon the domestic
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economy, A further factor will be shown to have been the development of 
Conservative industrial policy between 1970 and 1974, which passed through 
two phases. The earlier phase of general industrial disengagement and no 
help to 'lame ducks' was not conducive to Government action to stimulate the 
establishment of a home based offshore supplies industry. However, the need 
to nationalise Rolls Royce and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders initiated a second 
and more interventionist phase, the commencement of which fitted well with 
the recognition that a more positive Government approach to stimulating a 
home based offshore supplies industry was desirable. The measures taken by 
the Conservative Government will be set against the background of this more 
interventionist phase in their policy. The role of the Offshore Supplies 
Office will be described. This agency monitored progress and performance by 
U.K. firms, helped to clear blockages to progress (e.g. with planning 
applications) and audited the Quarterly Returns on offshore supplies, which 
the Government required the companies to submit, using the leverage derived 
from the discretionary allocation of licenses under the Administrative 
Allocation Licensing System, to secure effective compliance. The role of 
Interest Relief Grants to place British contractors on an equal footing with 
foreign firms subsidised by their own Governments will be explained.
On this basis, it will be shown how the 1974-1979 Labour Government, 
committed to a more interventionist industrial policy than the Conservatives, 
built up the role of the Offshore Supplies Office, by introducing the 1975 
Memorandum of Understanding which required the oil companies agreement to the 
principle of 'full and fair opportunity' for British firms. It will be shown 
that the association with the Department of Energy gave the Offshore
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Supplies Office considerable influence, since the DOE had control over both 
licensing and the approval of development schemes. Thus the oil companies 
were forced to comply progressively with what was in reality a 'Buy British' 
policy, a policy which in later years meant they were to buy 70% of offshore 
supplies from U.K. sources. This was an arrangement with which in all 
fairness, the companies frequently stated themselves to be well satisfied.
Labour's decision to take powers for depletion control (subject to the 
constraints of the Varley Guidelines) will be considered against the 
background of the following factors. Firstly, there were expectations of 
further increases in crude oil prices, which would make it more profitable to 
leave crude oil in the ground so as to escalate in value, rather than to 
extract it for use at current prices. The likely increase in the crude oil 
reserves of the British Sector tended to reinforce this argument. A second 
consideration was the value of these crude oil reserves as a hedge against 
another energy crisis, while a further factor was the growth of informed 
concern at the consequences of an exhaustion of all mineral and natural 
resources, arising from influential work of the Club of Rome.
There remains however, the need to consider (in Para 3.3) those 
arrangements established in 1964 for the exploitation of the southern North 
Sea gas fields, arrangements which were not criticised by the Public Accounts 
Committee or changed in any significant fashion by either the Heath 
Government or their Labour successors. In this connection it must be 
recalled that when the foundations of the 1964 regime were laid in the 
Continental Shelf Act, they took particular account of the need to manage
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such gas deposits, which it was confidently expected would be found in the 
southern part of the British Sector, and which were indeed discovered there 
between 1965 and 1969. The cost benefit analysis made for converting the gas 
supply industry to natural gas will be set out, since the assumptions behind 
this analysis, included a very favourable price to be paid for gas delivered 
to the gas industry by the producing companies. In this context it becomes 
clear whey the Gas Council was made the sole (monopsony) purchaser of such 
natural gas, except where it was to be used for non fuel purposes, i.e. as 
chemical feedstock.
The system of pricing developed under conditions where the Gas industry 
was the sole purchaser involved negotiations unlike those in any real market. 
It will be shown that these had the effect of dividing the economic rent, 
which is the difference between the true market price of a product, and that 
price which is just sufficient to keep the producer in business, between the 
gas industry and the oil companies in a manner highly favourable to the 
former. To compensate the companies for a price well beneath international 
market price for their product, they were permitted to deplete the southern 
North Sea gas deposits at rates somewhat in excess of those actually required 
by the gas industry. Thus the companies obtained by turnover what they could 
not obtain through a higher unit price per therm. The prices paid the oil 
companies remained well below international market prices, despite subsequent 
renegotiations of the original contracts designed to take acount of altered 
economic conditions, principally the effects of increased rates of inflation, 
competitive bidding for Norwegian gas, and changes in world gas prices.
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Against this background, the process of price negotiations between the 
gas industry, represented by Sir Dennis Rooke, and the oil companies, will be 
investigated, showing how the constraints of bargaining within the monopsony 
system, given the limited possibilities for use of the gas as chemical 
feedstock and the Government's refusal of permission to sell the gas in 
alternative markets, had the effect of shifting the balance of advantage in 
the Oil Company-Government relationship to the government side, so that the 
Gas Council secured their desired outcome. Arising from the prices they 
received under these arrangements, the oil companies claimed that their 
return from the southern gas fields was insufficient to fund the further 
exploration and development needed to find and exploit the smaller gas fields 
needed to secure longer term supplies. The evidence for and against this 
claim will be considered.
3.11 Regime Change in the World Oil Industry Events in the international oil 
industry outside Great Britain had an impact on the changes in the U.K. 
National Regime for Oil and Gas introduced in 1975. In order to assess this 
influence, the process of regime change within the international oil industry 
from 1946 onwards must be appreciated. The nature of the regime which 
existed from 1946 under the aegis of the seven Multinational Oil Companies 
(MNOCs) will be established, followed by two phases by which this regime was 
modified prior to the fundamental changes initiated by the 1973 oil crisis.
The period from 1946 to 1960, was characterised by a globally integrated 
world oil industry built around the activities of seven Multinational Oil 
Companies (MNOCs), known as the Majors: BP, Royal Dutch/She11, and 5 U.S. 
companies, Esso (now Exxon), Mobil, Gulf, Socal and Texaco. To these was
F5H40L
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added the French company CFP, a junior Club member with a strapontin 
position. The origins of this regime lay in arrangements made between the 
Wars, principally an accommodation between British, Dutch, French and U.S. 
interests over access to the oil resources of the former Offoman Empire (The 
Red Line Agreement 1928), and the Acnachary Agreement, between BP, Esso and 
Shell, known as the 'As is' agreement because it froze market shares and 
eliminated competition amongst the partners. Such arrangements (not uncommon 
between large international companies at the time) formed the basis for an
(7)
ongoing loose alliance, elements of which remain today (e.g. Shell/Esso
in the North Sea.) The 8 companies involved were horizontally integrated in 
so far as their activities extended to most of the countries of the non 
Communist World, and vertically integrated in that their activities included 
both Upstream operations (exploration and production) and Downstream 
operations (transportation, refining, distribution and marketing of products), 
The Upstream operations were carried out in the principal producing countries 
under favourable concession terms which enabled the companies to determine 
the rates of investment in the industry and the level of production, and thus 
to regulate any imbalance between local production and the requirements of 
their worldwide Downstream operations. Waste was thus eliminated. The 
relative market shares of each Major were maintained. Crude oil prices were 
determined in a market which was substantially dominated by the activities of 
these Major oil companies.
As the years passed, the Middle East became the most important producing 
area in the world, and since the costs of producing crude oil in countries 
such as Saudi Arabia were so much lower than elsewhere, relatively cheap
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crude oil in substantial quantities was readily supplied to the western 
economies, which as a consequence became progressively oil based, as cheaper 
oil products displaced higher cost home produced fuels, which were either 
coal or gas produced from coal.
Throughout these same years , British power declined with the close of 
the Colonial era, the vacuum so created being filled by the United States, as 
leader of the Western Alliance. Concurrently with this change, a rising tide 
of nationalism was taking place in those countries so long dominated by the 
West. Nowhere was this more true than in the countries of the Middle East. 
Two events, the Iranian Crisis (1952/1953) and the Suez Crisis (1956) were 
landmarks in this process of change, and stages which already marked the 
decline of British power and its replacement by that of the United States. 
Both of these events also resulted in oil supply problems for the western 
countries, which demonstrated that the survival of the regime and the 
security of the West against an oil embargo, rested upon the availability of 
alternative crude oil supplies from politically stable producing areas. The 
United States herself was one of these alternative sources of supply, and a 
net exporter of crude oil, so that it was difficult to exert leverage upon 
her by a withdrawal of oil supplies. These factors enabled the United 
States, operating through the regime at times of crisis, to organise the 
supply of crude oil to her allies, thus increasing their dependence upon her 
leadership. However, the regime also persisted for another very important 
reason. This reason was the interdependence of the interests of the oil 
consuming and oil producing countries, since the former required a continuing 
supply of crude oil to fuel their economies, while the latter required a 
continuing flow of revenue to fund their development plans. These two
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interdependent factors contributed jointly to the progressive integration of 
the world economy, which formed so important a stimulus for its continued 
growth. (Footnote*)
Notwithstanding this basic interdependence of interests between the 
consuming and producing countries, as it existed in the years from 1946 
onwards, many of the producing countries felt a sense of grievance. The 
concessions under which the Majors operated had been negotiated in the 
Colonial era, as between unequal partners. Large territories had been 
covered by these concessions, and at the time when the concession agreements 
had been signed, the vast resources available for exploitation had not been 
appreciated by either side to the bargain. In the event, it often proved 
impossible for the concessionaies. to adequately exploit all the territory 
involved, yet in many instances, the provisions for relinquishment of 
territory in the event of non exploitation were defective. This naturally 
served the interests of the concessionarires, since the territory could not 
be transferred to competitors, whose entry into the business would have been 
a threat to the Cartel of Majors.
Footnote * The increased price which the West had to pay for crude oil from 
1973 onwards, and more especially the temporary price escalations of 1979, 
following the fall of the Shah, and 1980, on the outbreak of the Iraq Iran 
War, may be viewed as having so disrupted this relationship as to have 
contributed significantly to the world depression of the early 1980's, with 
which has been associated a general reduction in energy demand, that has so 
adversely effected the economies of the oil producing nations.
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The Iranian Crisis had demonstrated to the other producing countries, 
that as a means of improving a producing country's position, the strategy of 
outright nationalisation, as employed by Mossadegh, was innappropriate, in 
view of the unnacceptable penalties it brought. Iran's crude oil had been 
excluded from the international market and the Downstream infrastructure of 
the Majors pending a settlement. The resolution of the Iranian Crisis in 
1953/1954 had begun with the displacement of Mossadegh by General Zahedi, and 
the return of the Shah, an operation in which the C.I.A. was involved. When 
the final settlement was concluded, the purely British interest which had 
been represented by the Anglo Iranian Oil Co. Ltd., was replaced by a 
Consortium of British, Dutch, French and U.S. interests, in an agreement 
negotiated on the Iranian side by the remarkable diplomat Abdullah Entezam. 
The disruption which had been caused by outright nationalisation, was clearly 
unnacceptable.
During this period however, there was one development, which suggested 
an alternative strategy for producing countries seeking to improve the 
benefits they obtained through the oil industry. It involved a modest break 
with the control exercised by the Cartel of Majors, through what were called 
50-50 Agreements or Joint Ventures. The origins of this development were as 
follows. In the 1950's the U.S. Government became worried about the decline 
in domestic U.S. oil reserves. Within the U.S.A., there existed some very 
important oil companies, who though their operations were purely domestic, 
possessed the necessary exploration and production expertise to engage in 
foreign operations, although their financial resources were not so extensive 
as those at the command of the Majors, These companies, who were 
collectively known as the Independents, which term marked their independence
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from the Majors, were offered a tax concession called a depletion allowance, 
conditional upon their seeking new oil resources abroad. These Independents, 
together with the National Oil Companies (NOCs) of the consuming countries, 
most notably the Italian State company E.N.I., negotiated a series of new 
agreements with the producing countries, on those relatively small areas of 
new of reliquished territory which were available. This they did, on terms 
more favourable to the host Governments than those of the original concession 
agreements. Investment costs, taxes, royalties and profits were split 
equally between the host country's National Oil Company (NOC) and the foreign 
company in the event of success, but in the event of failure, the foreign 
company took the whole risk. The use of the terms 50-50 Agreement or Joint 
Venture to describe these arrangements, stressed the concept of partnership, 
which was to become so important in the years ahead.
These new arrangements were to trigger further developments, which would 
prove to be of growing significance in the future, since they brought on to 
the market a relatively small amount of crude oil free from the control of 
the Majors. At the same time, a number of refineries were being built in the 
oil consuming countries, similarly free from the control of the Majors, with 
a view to providing a measure of supply flexibility in the event of an oil 
embargo, and further assisting these countries with their balance of 
payments. Thus in a small way, complementary facilities were being developed 
on both the supply and demand sides of the oil industry, which were free from 
the control of the Majors.
As Fadhil at Chalabi and Walter J. Levy stress, 1960 was a
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watershed year, which initiated a period of steady and ongoing change within 
the international oil industry, through to 1968, The introduction of fresh 
crude oil into the market as a result of the Independents' foreign 
operations, had the effect of adding a degree of uncertainty to the Majors' 
market calculations, the impact of which was not dissimilar from the effect 
of Soviet crude oil sales, which were made either for political reasons, or 
according to comercial criteria quite unlike those which normally obtained in 
the Free World. The Independents, lacked the financial resources of the 
Majors, so that when they were faced with market surpluses, which coincided 
with their own serious cash flow problems, they tended to react by cutting 
their prices excessively. The Majors, anxious to restore their 
competitiveness, cut their crude oil prices in turn, which had the effect of 
seriously alarming the producing countries, concerned over the security of 
their development funds.
By 1960, these price cuts were beginning to have a serious impact on 
the various oil producing countries, so that when Aramco (the Arabian 
American Oil Co, which was owned jointly by Standard New Jersey, Standard of 
California, The Texas Co, each with 30%, and Socony with 10%) cut the price 
of Saudi crude oil by 9 U.S. a barrel, and alliance was formed between 
Abdullah Tariki of Saudi Arabia and Perez Alfonzo of Venezuela, which led to 
the formation in September 1960 of OPEC (The Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries). The new organisation had an initial membership 
consisting of the 5 dominant oil producing countries Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. The formation of OPEC, with the initial aim of 
restoring the price cuts which had triggered its birth, was a collective 
political statement by the membership, that they were no longer willing to
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leave the determination of crude oil prices, upon which so much of their 
future rested, exclusively in foreign hands. An agreement was reached 
between OPEC and the companies, in which it was agreed that the real value of 
crude oil would be restored over a period of five years, so as not to 
unnecessarily disturb the market. The producing countries within OPEC then 
took on the role of junior sleeping partners in the process of price 
determination, and began to use their collective strength to bring about 
changes in the system, which would be to their advantage. It was not at this 
point their intention to radically change the arrangements under which the 
international oil industry was managed. Over the years the membership of 
OPEC was extended as follows: Qatar (1961); Indonesia (1962); Abu Dhabi 
(1967); Algeria (1969); Nigeria (1971); Ecuador (1975); Gabon (1975).
From the early 1960's the U.S.A. became a net importer of crude oil, and 
over the decade as a whole, she moved to a point where some 15-20% of her 
crude oil needs had to be imported. As a result, while formerly sensitive to 
the effects of an oil embargo through the need to assist her allies with 
crude oil supplies, she now became vulnerable herself to the impact of such 
an interruption in supplies, and less able to lead the Western countries in 
withstanding such a threat. The crude oil available to the Western countries 
from other than Middle East sources was no longer sufficient to withstand a 
prolonged embargo from that area. In 1967, as a response to the Arab Israeli 
War, Algeria nationalised 51% of French oil interests in that country, 
imposing participation on the French, and by this means securing a market 
outlet for the resultant crude oil. In 1968, OPEC included the objective of 
securing participation in its Statutes. From being a buyers market for crude
3-19
oil at the start of the 1960's, conditions had now changed so that it was a 
sellers market. The OPEC objective was now to extend State control over 
Upstream (exploration and production) activities, while retaining foreign 
expertise, since the oil companies dare not withdraw from the enterprise for 
fear of loosing their crude oil supplies. While the Majors remained dominant 
in crude oil transportation and trading, even in this phase of the business 
the role of the National Oil Companies (NOCs) was growing, and the 
consequences which arose from all these changes will be explained at the 
start of Chapter 4.
In 1969, a second and more accelerated phase of change began, triggered 
by events in Libya. In that country, some 20 foreign oil companies were 
operating, including the Majors. However, these various companies did not 
operate as a Consortium, and their interests were not all identical. For 
some of these companies, Libya was their only source of crude oil, which made 
them vulnerable to any action by the Libyan authorities. The new Libyan 
Revolutionary Government imposed crude oil production cuts, and then defeated 
the oil companies in detail, since their varying interests meant that they 
lacked the strength to maintain a common front. Before long, one of the oil 
companies operating in Libya, Occidental Petroleum, surrendered to Libyan 
Government pressure and conceded the Libyans improved terms, and it was not 
long before Libya obtained from all the companies a combination of improved 
tax payments, a 30 ^ U.S. a barrel price increase and a. 1 i U.S. a barrel 
price rise in each successive year till 1975.
It was these events in Libya which demonstrated the vulnerability of the 
oil companies to the other producing countries, and led ultimately to OPEC's
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imposition of improved terms upon the companies in the Tehran Agreement 
(1971), under a threat of withdrawal of crude oil supplies. As an outcome of 
Tehran, crude oil prices rose by roughly 15%, the companies gave up the 
special discounts that they had enjoyed on certain crude oils, and the 
grading of crude oils for pricing purposes was revised. At two further 
conferences at Geneva, the companies guaranteed the OPEC producing countries 
against the impact of currency changes on their revenue. Two supplementary 
agreements were reached at Lagos and Tripoli, dealing with regional issues.
It was clear from Tehran, that in future the OPEC countries intended to take 
a far more aggressive role in respect of price determination. It was Tehran 
that brought about a growing awareness in Britain of the changes which were 
taking place in the international oil industry, which coinciding with an 
appreciation of the oil resources available for exploitation in the northern 
part of the British Sector of the North Sea, together contributed to demands 
for change in the U.K. National Regime for Oil and Gas.
In Autumn 1973, as a consequence of the Yom Kippur War, the Arabs 
embargoed supplies to two of the Majors' home countries, the U.S. and the 
Netherlands, ostensibly for their assistance to Israel. Whatever the support 
provided to Israel by the U.S., the embargoing of supplies to the Netherlands 
arose more from an appreciation of its wider impact, since Rotterdam was an 
important centre of the oil trade. The effect of this embargo, could not as 
a result be localised. Supplies of crude oil became very tight, and as a 
result, the price of Saudi Arabian Light crude oil rose from U.S.$ 2.89 in 
June 1973 to U.S.$ 5.12 in October 1973, to U.S.$ 11.65 by Christmas, while 
on the spot market (i.e. the free market) the price reached U.S.$ 22.5 at 
about the same time. It was in these circumstances that BP and Shell refused
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to give preferential supplies to the U.K., unless the British Government 
issued them with an instruction to this effect, stating clearly against which 
other countries they were to discriminate. It was these events (discussed 
fully in Chapter 4) which convinced Edward Heath of the need for Britain to 
exert greater control over her own North Sea crude oil.
In November, 1974, the oil consuming countries of the O.E.C.D. formed 
the International Energy Agency (the I.E.A.), to carry out research on energy 
conservation and the use of alternative energy sources, to build up 
relationships with the oil producing countries, and to create emergency 
procedures and stocks. The plan for creating emergency procedures and 
stocks, was known as the International Energy Programme (I.E.P.). The oil 
companies became involved in the process of developing and implementing these 
procedures, including the building up of the necessary stocks, since by this 
means they safeguarded themselves against the possibility of being asked to 
discriminate for or against particular countries in any future oil embargo, 
while the United States pledged itself to make its oil available to assist 
its allies in the event of another curtailment of supplies, since by this 
means Henry Kissinger, who expected the U.S. to become energy self sufficient 
by the 1980's as a result of Nixon's Project Independence, hoped to reassert 
U.S. leadership of the Alliance. (Footnote*)
The Western oil companies, in order to safeguard their crude oil 
supplies, entered into partnership with the producing countries, in projects 
to build Downstream facilities such as chemical plants and refineries in 
those countries, notwithstanding the surplus refinery capacity in the Western
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consuming nations, itself a consequence of the early stages of recession, 
which is some respect derived from higher crude oil prices. Since in the 
final resort, the key resource of the companies is their technology, a more 
recent development has been the Service Agreement, in which work is carried 
out by an oil company for a country for a fee, without any share in the 
equity. (Footnote **)
Footnote* Krapels explains that a programme such as the I.E.P. if it
is to be successful relies on a combination of two elements, effective 
national stocks and a programme for their fair allocation. A 10% reduction 
of supplies effects Japan which bases 70% of its energy economy on imported 
crude oil to a greater extent than the U.S. which has only 50% of its needs 
met by crude oil, and has domestic supplies. This is the basis for 
allocation, namely the differing needs of members. The effectiveness of 
national stocks (usually 90 days) is constrained by the costs of holding 
stocks. After a certain delay, the I.E.P. is triggered when certain levels 
of supply constraint, either globally or with respect to a single member, are 
reached. Fortunately, Britain is one of the four major industrial nations 
(Canada, U.K., USA and U.S.S.R. which have domestic supplies available. 
Countries usually pursue the often mutually opposed objectives of an ongoing 
supply of crude oil and a stable price. The automatic triggers of the I.E.P. 
can only be stopped by a weighted vote of the members. One of the objects of 
the I.E.P was to prevent the 'beggar thy neighbour' policies where consuming 
countries sought Government to Government deals at the time of 1973 oil 
crisis. Paradoxically though, the system being designed to assist countries, 
it proved unable to assist the main sufferers from the 1979/80 oil rises. 
Majors such as BP, and Independent refiners, such as those in Japan. (12)
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Footnote ** For the detailed study of regime change up to and including 1973, 
an essential source is: U.S. Senate, Sub-Committee on Multinational 
Corporations, Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearings (1974/1975) 12v. 
(Known as the Church report after Senator Frank Church).
3.2. Regime Change in the U.K. National Regime for Oil and Gas Having 
established the framework of the wider changes in the international oil 
industry, which had an impact on the formation of opinion in the U.K. about 
the need for change in the U.K. National Regime for Oil and Gas, the focus of 
attention can be turned to events in Britain itself, and more particularly 
the state of development of the northern North Sea oilfields, which was an 
important factor in the Government's timing of the changes which occurred in 
1975.
A full list of the commercial oilfields discovered between 1969 and 1971 
was given earlier, and it will be recalled that the first of these 
commercially viable oilfields was the Montrose Field discovered in September 
1969, in the same year that the Libyans secured those greatly improved terms 
from the 20 oil companies operating in Libya, which event was instrumental in 
triggering a phase of accelerated change in the international oil industry, 
which culminated in the events of 1973/1974. Neither the first significant 
oil discoveries in the northern North Sea, nor the importance of the Libyan 
success were widely appreciated when they first occurred.
With respect to the oil discoveries, this resulted from two factors. 
Firstly, it was the result of the delay which took place between the 
announcement of a discovery and the taking of a development decision. For
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example, in the case of the very important Forties Field, the discovery was 
announced in August 1970, but the development decision was only taken in 
December 1971, after Sir Eric Drake, the Chairman of BP had received 
assurances from John Davies the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
(into which the Conservatives had merged the Ministry of Power), that no 
modification of the terms under which BP was operating would take place while 
the development of the Forties Field was underway. Sir Eric was concerned 
over estimates for the cost of the task, which were £100 million, and which 
in practice proved to be £1,000 million. The second factor which delayed 
public awareness of progress in the northern North Sea, was the reticence of 
many of the Operating Companies about publicising their success, for unlike 
BP, they felt that such publicity might give some advantage to their 
competitors. As a consequence, it was probably the Tehran Agreement (1971) 
which by demonstrating the weakened position of the Majors, focussed public 
attention on the possible value of Britain's own North Sea oil.
There were some exceptions to the general lack of an appreciation of the 
significance of events in Libya. The companies of course, because they were 
involved in these events and their consequences, had a very good appreciation 
of their significance, but hoped that the final nationalisation of their 
assets through the process of participation, might yet be delayed for many 
years. A very similar appreciation of the Libyan success, was held by Angus 
Beckett of the Department of Trade and Industry's Petroleum Division. Like 
the companies, Beckett foresaw that the Libyan achievement must ultimately 
lead to full nationalisation in many of the producing countries, though like 
them, he also believed that this eventuality lay some time in the future. 
Operating on this scenario, (1^) advised that the 4th Licensing Round
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should continue the generally soft terms which had applied formerly, with a 
view to stimulating exploration activity, which had fallen off. Taking 
Account of the Tehran negotiations then in progress, he feared that the 
announcement of stiffer terms by Britain in the North Sea, would provide the 
overseas producing countries with just the excuse they needed in order to 
move rapidly to full nationalisation, at a time when most British companies 
overseas were operating under less disadvantageous participation agreements.
To discover the true value of Britain's oil, while not providing such an
excuse for a rapid move to full nationalisation overseas, Angus Beckett 
advised that an Auction Bidding experiment, covering territories of varying 
likely worth, be included in the 4th Licensing Round. It is perhaps ironic, 
that the Public Accounts Committee, one of whose objectives was also to 
assess the true value of Britain's oil, were to criticise the timing of this 
experiment, and its inclusion in the 4th Licensing Round. As will be shown 
later, however, they were also concerned to enquire why the Government had so 
far failed to take measures to improve its income from the North Sea, which 
compared so unfavourably with that obtained by overseas producing countries.
In this context, they did not give the same weight as Beckett to the
likelihood of retaliatory action by the OPEC countries against British oil 
companies being triggered by British action to improve the Government's 
financial return from the North Sea. Beckett resigned before the 
publication of the Public Accounts Committee Findings, which were so critical 
of decisions taken on the basis of his advice.
Following the Tehran Agreement (1971), belief grew both within the 
Conservative and Labour Parties that Britain should obtain improved financial 
benefits from her North Sea oil, comparable with those obtained by overseas
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producing countries. Tom Balogh, economic advisor to the previous Wilson 
Government (whose role in the development of B.N.O.C. will be described in 
Chapter 4) lobbied his Labour Party colleagues to have the issue of Licensing 
policy for North Sea oil placed upon the agenda of the Public Accounts 
Committee. In February 1972, he made his views public in a Sunday Times 
article in which he stated that unless Britain stiffened her terms she
would continue to receive a poor financial return from the North Sea relative 
to the revenues received elsewhere. Balogh described the companies' use of 
transfer pricing, by which means artificially created book losses overseas 
were combined with the operation of double taxation relief so as to enable 
them to escape from the payment of U.K. Corporation Tax. Balogh's advocacy 
of regime change, so as to improve the economic and financial benefits 
Britain would obtain from North Sea oil, was such that by the opening of the 
1972/1973 Session of the Public Accounts Committee, both Conservative and 
Labour members had a broad idea of what they thought Britain ought to be 
receiving from North Sea oil, and were jointly determined to probe the 
financial weaknesses of the regime, and thereby to press the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer for the early implementation of the changes they believed 
necessary.
More or less concurrently with the 1972/1973 Session of the Public 
Accounts Committee, support was growing for the Scottish National Party. The 
SNP were making projections at various levels of crude oil prices, of the 
benefits accruing to the economy of an independent Scotland. On this basis 
they were able to present to the Scottish electorate a choice between a rich 
independent Scotland and continued membership of a relatively poor Great 
Britain.
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The Public Accounts Committee opened its 1972/1973 Session on 15th May 
1972 under the Chairmanship of Harold Lever, though when he fell ill, the 
Chair was taken over by Edmund Dell. As a result of the climate of opinion 
in Parliament brought about by a combination of changes in the international 
oil industry, and Tom Balogh's advocacy of changes in the U.K. National 
Regime for Oil and Gas, the Committee considered critically three matters 
which were obviously connected with the economic and financial benefits they 
felt Britain ought to receive from North Sea oil.
These were taxation. Licensing policy, and the failure to take measures 
till a quite recent date, with a view to stimulating the development of a 
home based offshore supplies industry. The Committee also considered 
depletion policy, but accepted the absence of any such policy, in view of the 
continued primacy of the rapid development strategy. In examining the regime 
for southern North Sea gas (for the exploitation of which the 1964 
arrangements had been primarily established) the Public Accounts Committee 
took the view that since under this system, the Gas Council was involved both 
as the monopsony buyer of gas from the companies, and as a southern North Sea 
operator, the strictures made about the poor financial return from northern 
North Sea oil, were largely mitigated in the case of gas. Neither the 
Conservatives before 1974, nor the Labour Government thereafter, contemplated 
any changes in these arrangements, though the companies claimed that their 
return from the monopsony pricing system was so poor that it was insufficient 
to find and exploit the smaller gasfields, whose resources would be needed, 
once production from the larger deposits began to decline. For these 
reasons, consideration of the gas regime will be reserved for Paragraph 3.3, 
where the basis of the regime will be fully explained and the companies'
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claim evaluated.
The Public Accounts Committee's views on taxation, licensing policy, the 
failure to stimulate an offshore supplies industry and depletion policy will 
now be considered to establish in each case, those factors which were 
important in determining the timing of change. The Committee's criticism of 
taxation and licensing policy will be considered first in Paragraph 3.21, and 
set against the background of those considerations which led both the 
Conservative Government and its Labour successor to move towards the 
introduction of changes in 1975, and not at an earlier date as a result of 
those particular structures.
3.21 Taxation and Licensing Policy and the Timing of Change As regards 
taxation of North Sea oil operations, the Public Accounts Committee found 
that most of the work done in the North Sea was done by oil companies, who 
held over half of all North Sea Licenses. The principal share of the work 
done in the North Sea by oil companies, was in the hands of nine 
international oil companies. Due to the operation of Double Taxation Relief, 
the liability of these companies for U.K. Corporation Tax was largely 
extinguished by credits for tax paid elsewhere. Tax not paid by these nine 
international oil companies as a result of various forms of exemption had 
reached £1,500 million, and this figure would continue to grow if no action 
were taken, since there was no time limit on how far forward such unpaid 
taxes could be carried against future liabilities. By contrast, the 
Government's total revenue up to that date from all licence fees and 
royalties was only £66 million.
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Plasschaert explains that horizontally integrated companies move
monies and commodities between different countries, to secure commercial 
advantages. Vertically integrated companies, have prices called transfer 
prices, at which to transfer products in various stages of manufacture, 
between subsidiary companies carrying out successive phases in their 
vertically integrated operations. The Majors, were both vertically and 
horizontally integrated companies, and the Committee noted that the prices at 
which their overseas producing companies transferred crude oil to their 
trading organisations, were so low that these producing companies made 
losses, and these losses were then set against liability for U.K.
Corporation Tax. Such experience suggests a high degree of central planning 
and coordination, together with a willingness by overseas profit centres to 
accept such losses. It is doubtful, even if otherwise possible, if such a 
policy could be sustained in present day conditions, due to the high degree 
of dissatisfaction this would cause to those parts of a Group forced to carry 
a loss.
The Public Accounts Committee found that where a company in the North 
Sea was part of a wider Group, then expenditures in no way directly related 
to North Sea operations could be allocated to North Sea capital allowances, 
and thus set against tax liabilities arising within the area. A Group's 
tanker company, for example, could build a tanker for use outside the North 
Sea, yet the tax regime allowed this expenditure to be set against North Sea 
tax. Without a change in the existing tax arrangements, the Treasury could 
not expect to receive any revenue, even in 1980, the then expected year for 
the achievement of oil self sufficiency by the U.K. While North Sea 
Operators were expected to provide the Government with geological
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information, they were under no obligation to provide the Government with 
financial information relating to their costs, and where this was provided on 
a voluntary basis, its inadequacy was repeatedly demonstrated by the 
inability of witnesses before the Public Accounts Committee, to provide 
adequate answers to the Committee's questions on financial matters. True tax 
liability could not be assessed without proper cost data. As a result of 
these factors, the Committee concluded, there was no way in which Britain 
could hope to secure either the 'take' or the benefit to its balance of 
payments, which other countries had obtained by having oil produced within 
their territories.
As regards licensing policy, the Committee took the view that too great 
a weight had been given to the possibility of repercussions from OPEC 
countries, when formulating the soft terms of the 4th Licensing Round. It 
will be recalled that the terms of this Licensing Round had been built upon 
the advice given by Angus Beckett. The Second and Third Round terms had been 
formulated with the expectation of gas discoveries in the southern North Sea, 
where the involvement of the nationalised gas industry provided a proper 
return to the country in the view of the Committee, but the 4th Round of June 
1971, was a very different matter, since oil deposits were concerned, and the 
enterprise was entirely in the hands of private interests. The Committee 
believed there should have been a full interdepartmental review of policy, 
in these changed circumstances, before the terms, timing and scale of the 4th 
Round were decided. If the object of the tender (auction bidding) experiment 
had been to learn lessons on the use of this method, then it should have 
taken place at an earlier date, so that its results could have been assessed, 
and the experience so gained, incorporated in the licensing of further
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territory.
The total return from the tender experiment had been £37 million, 
including a single bid of £21 million from Shell/Esso, which suggested that 
although it was not possible to scale up these results for the whole 
territory allocated in the 4th Licensing Round, a very considerable revenue 
might have been obtained, by extending the tender approach to that very large 
amount of territory, which had now been irrevocably allocated with no 
provision for State participation. The Committee were not convinced that the 
revenue advantages of the tender approach, could not be combined with the 
safeguards associated with Administrative Allocation. They did not mention 
the advantage of Administrative Allocation, that it provided the Government 
the possibility of discriminating for or against particular applicants. The 
Committee pointd out that when the results of the tender experiment were 
known on 21st August, 1971, there was still time to cancel the rest of the 
Round, but no interdepartmental meeting took place to consider this 
possibility, and the matter was therefore never put to Ministers for a policy 
decision. It was considered highly unsatisfactory, that all the most 
promising areas in the North Sea, were now allocated on terms essentially 
unchanged from those of 1964, and that the rights to the territory were 
assigned for 46 years, with no break clause, or means to renegotiate the 
terms with a view to including a measure of State participation.
In order to appreciate why a move to change the terms of the Oil Company 
Government relationship, did not proceed immediately from these criticisms, 
it is first necessary to set down certain brief data. The following data 
relate to the number of commercial oilfields discovered, in production, and
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under development, at various dates, relating to the 24 commercial oilfields 
discovered between 1969 and September 1976, which were either in production 
or under development in July 1980. This list is taken from Klitz with
further information on related production data being abstracted from
other OfficialDevelopment of the Oil and Gas Resources of the U.K., 
sources, and Hoare Govett.
24 North Sea Commercial Oilfields, either in Production 






Discovered In Production Under Development Production
by the end of in in 000's Millions
barrels of tonnes 
a day
13 0 5 NIL NIL
19 0 10 NIL NIL
23 2 8 23) (1) )
24 7 7 237) )12.6(2)
24 13 11 78.7(3)
(1) Figures in barrels a day to show production build up, as only figure in 
millions of tonnes in for both years combined.
(2) 1975/1976 combined.
(3) This is a figure for the whole of 1980
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Figures for expenditure in the North Sea are not available prior to 1976, a 
point emphasised by the Public Accounts Committee, when they drew attention 
to the lack of cost data which made it so difficult to assess liability for 
tax. The figures from 1976 to 1980 shown below are taken from the 
Development of the Oil and Gas Resources of the U.K. (Op»cit)^
North Sea Expenditure 1976-1980 
(£ million)
Exploration Oilfield Oilfield Gasfield Gasfield
Development Operations Development Operations
1976 69.7 1507.1 81.3 373.5 48.5
1977 70.4 1555.6 158.9 344.3 47.7
1978 65.2 1690.4 258.2 282.9 87.7
1979 57.1 1841.1 426.6 191.3 92.7
1980 67.4 2163.0 618.5 216.8 107.5
The following table gives the price in $ U.S. per barrel of Saudi Arabian 
Light Crude Oil fob Ras Tanura. This crude oil is the OPEC marker crude, 
which provides a benchmark for other crude oil prices from 1959 to 1975.
From 1959 to November 1974, these are given as posted prices, and thereafter 
in the form of State selling prices, which replaced the former system.
Saudi Arabian Light Crude Oil 
fob Ras Tanura 
1959-1975
Posted Prices ($ U.S. per barrel) State Selling Prices ($ U.S. per barrel) 
1959 November 1974 November 1974-October 1975
1959 13/2 1.900 1973 1/1 2.591 1974 1/11 10.463
1960 9/8 1.800 1973 1/8 3.066 1975 1/10 11.510
1971 15/2 2.180 1973 1/12 5.036
1971 1/6 2.285 1974 1/10 11.651
1972 20/1 2.479 1974 1/11 11.251
F5H40J
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Source: E.I.U. Special report 
No.94 February 1981 
. OPEC Annual Statistical . 
Bulletin 1978, 1979.
Considering the Public Accounts Committee Findings of early 1973, which 
pressed for tax changes and alterations in licensing policy to increase 
Britain's 'take' from North Sea oil against the background of these three 
sets of data. The first table which gives brief information on oilfields 
discovered, in production and under development, shows that by the end of the 
year 1973, 13 oilfields which were judged to be commercially viable, had been 
discovered, and 5 of these were under development, but none were so far in 
production. The second table, covering North Sea expenditure does not cover 
the years 1973-1975, for reasons already explained. However, the data for 
1976-1980 show clearly that by far the largest part of North Sea expenditure 
related to oilfield development. The table for crude oil prices demonstrates 
that these prices had already risen quite considerably, well before the 
dramatic rises of late 1973. All these rises brought with them an escalating 
drain on the balance of payments, consequent on the costs of importing crude 
oil, which situation in turn reinforced the British Government's commitment 
to its rapid development policy, with the intention of staunching this loss 
at the earliest possible date.
If Britain's balance of payments situation, and the enormous development 
programme in hand in the British Sector of the North Sea, are for the moment 
isolated from any international considerations regarding the position of the 
oil companies in the international oil industry, then conditions in early 
1973 were not right for a change in the terms of the Oil Company-Government
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relationship in favour of the Government side, since this might will have 
discouraged the companies at just that time when their maximum effort and 
investment was required. However, in practice the weakened position of the 
companies elsewhere (described in Para 3.11) had increased their commitment 
to the North Sea, where despite the much higher costs of extracting crude oil 
compared with the Middle East, this factor was compensated for by the 
political stability of the area and the prospect of an assured source of long 
term crude oil supplies. Notwithstanding this increased commitment of the 
companies to the North Sea, which had the effect of strengthening the hand of 
the British Government should it seek to impose regime changes, the need not 
to discourage the companies in view of the ongoing importance of rapid 
development, provided a potent argument in favour of a careful consideration 
of the nature and timing of such changes. In this context, Patrick Jenkin 
explained that in 1973, well prior to the Yom Kippur War, the then 
Conservative Government were already determined to change the regime in order 
to improve the benefits Britain obtained from the North Sea. With this end 
in view, they carried out a careful examination of the various options for 
tax changes, which they considered as an alternative to State participation, 
a strategy which was also fully investigated. In Patrick Jenkin's view, 
given that rapid development was still a high priority, an ill judged move 
against the oil industry which discouraged it from the necessary effort had 
to be avoided, and whatever the Parliamentary pressure for early changes, it 
was most important that any proposed package of measures be correct, rather 
than quickly imposed.
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By the end of 1975, the Labour Government which had succeeded the 
Conservatives in February 1974, had enacted the changes it proposed in its 
July 1974 Whitepaper. By the end of 1974, 19 commercial oilfields had been 
discovered and 10 of these were under development, out of the 24 such 
oilfields discovered prior to July 1980. The Labour Party's view on the 
measures it judged necessary in the North Sea, had been evolved over a 
considerable period of time, so that like the proposals of their Conservative 
predecessors (with which they were broadly in accord with the exception of 
the creation of B.N.O.C.) their impact had been carefully considered. By the 
end of 1975, 23 out of the 24 oilfields discovered by July 1980 had been 
discovered, 8 of these oilfields were under development and two were now in 
production. The 24th oilfield discovered before July 1980 was discovered in 
September 1976. Thus by 1975, a substantial part of the most important 
oilfields to be located in the British Sector of the North Sea had been 
discovered, a good proportion of these were under development, a couple were 
in production and the companies' commitment to the area had been reinforced 
by the weakening of their position elsewhere. Thus conditions were right for 
the British Government to impose regime changes designed to improve the 
'take' Britain obtained from North Sea oil operations, whereas the attempt to 
impose such changes in early 1973 might have proved premature.
While important oilfields were to be discovered after July 1980, the 
companies by the early 1980's were pointing to the lack of commercial 
discoveries since 1976, and suggesting that the application of the tougher 
tax regime introduced in 1975 was discouraging the industry from the costly 
exploratory and development activity needed to exploit the smaller and less 
obviously commercial oilfields, whose viability was influenced both by the
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tax regime and the prevailing level of crude oil prices.
3.22 Measures to Stimulate the Development of an Indigeneous Offshore 
Supplies Industry The Public Accounts Committee drew attention to the 
failure of the British Government to take any positive action to stimulate 
the growth of an indigeneous offshore supplies industry prior to the 
commissioning of the IMEG Consultants Group in 1972. The unfavourable 
climate of the early I960’s which brought about the failure of the Ministry 
of Power’s efforts to arrange contracts for British firms in the offshore 
supplies sector, has already been described in Chapter 1.
Michael Hodges^^Z) discusses the results of surveys which show that from 
1964 to 1970, Ministers of the Labour Government, senior Civil Servants and 
Conservative M.P.’s predominantly took a positive view of investment by all 
Multinationals (not just oil based Multinationals) in the U.K. They 
considered that the Multinationals made a significant impact on the economy 
in a favourable sense, alleviating balance of payments problems and 
introducing new technical skills and efficient management. They were 
considered to be far better corporate citizens than U.K. firms, since they 
were most anxious not to be in conflict with the U.K. Government. The only 
doubts about the impact of Multinationals on British industry were expressed 
by a number of backbench Labour M.P.'s and their views were given scant 
attention. From 1964 to 1971, very little attention was given in Parliament 
to the issue of foreign investment in Great Britain, and there were very few 
cases in which either Labour or Conservative Ministers advocated intervention 
in the affairs of foreign companies. When this did occur, it was restricted
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to those cases, where British companies were taken over by foreign companies 
(e.g. Rootes) or where the Government had decided to create sponsored 
companies in certain industrial sectors (e.g. ICL in computers) and these new 
companies were competing for business with the subsidiaries of foreign based 
Multinationals. The result of this consensus, was to depoliticise the 
question of the role of foreign based Multinationals in the U.K. economy, and 
thus to delay a realisation that in addition to the many benefits these 
companies brought to that economy, they might also have adverse effects, 
including in the case of the Multinationals Oil Companies (MNOCs), a tendency 
to reinforce the market dominance in the U.K. of the U.S. based offshore 
supplies companies.
Prior to the appearance of the IMEG Report (1972), the Department of Trade 
and Industry and its predecessor the Ministry of Power, lacked any meaningful 
date on the levels of expenditure in the North Sea, so that it was not 
possible to assess the extent of the offshore market. An attempt at such an 
assessment had been made in 1967, when Sir leuan Maddock, the Ministry of 
Technology's Chief Scientific Advisor had called a three day conference, one 
of whose objectives was such an assessment. In 1968, a committee of senior 
civil servants under the Chairmanship of Sir Fergus Allen, made a study of 
Government policy with regards to ocean technology, and prepared a Report on 
Marine Science and Technology, in the Introduction to which, Fred Peart made 
reference to the Labour Government's intention 'to promote the commercial 
development of general equipment for seabed operations' notwithstanding the 
fact that in those few passages where the report referred to this issue, the 
prospect was viewed depressingly in view of U.S. market dominance.
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When the Heath Government came to power in 1970, they did so with a policy of 
general industrial disengagement, which gave little scope for challenging the 
existing consensus about U.S. market dominance with a policy to promote the 
development of an indigeneous offshore supplies business. Then towards the 
latter part of 1971, a number of events converged, which brought a change in 
Conservative industrial policy, and ushered in a more interventionist phase. 
The collapse and rescue of Rolls Royce and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders through 
nationalization, signalled that the policy of no help for 'lame ducks' could 
no longer be sustained and consequently a U turn in policy was under way. As 
the Government reassessed its attitude to industrial disengagement, it began 
to take measures for the general stimulation of the economy, and took steps 
to provide financial aid for industry, which culminated in the Industry Act 
(1972). Speaking in Aberdeen in December 1971 Sir John Eden, the Minister 
for Industry at the Department of Trade and Industry, mentioned the great 
opportunities opened up for British industry by the new oil discoveries in 
the North Sea. However, Sir John warned that British industry was failing to 
take full advantage of these opportunities. Reference made earlier to the 
levels of oilfield expenditure for development, underlines that these 
expenditures were vast, which emphasises the fact that the great 
opportunities mentioned by Sir John were not only very great, but very much 
in excess of the market involved in the earlier development of the southern 
North Sea gasfields. This combination of a greatly expanded market for 
offshore supplies with a change of direction in Conservative industrial 
policy, suggested to officials at the Department of Trade and Industry, and 
members of the Central Policy Review Staff, that Ministers would soon be in 
need of a new strategy for stimulating the growth of an indigeneous offshore 
supplies industry within the U . K . I n  anticipation of this need, they
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took a policy initiative, by jointly commissioning the IMEG Report, the 
object of which was to identify means for stimulating the growth of a U.K. 
based offshore supplies industry. (Footnote*).
When Labour took office in 1974, the OSO played some part in industrial 
reorganisation, as for example vdien British Underwater Engineering was formed 
under the N.E.B., when Vickers withdrew from subsea engineering. In 1975, 
there was introduced the Memorandum of Understanding, by the signature of 
which, the oil companies accepted the formal principle of 'full and fair 
opportunity' for British suppliers. In practice, the influence of the OSO 
was exercised most effectively through its association with the Department of 
Energy. Performance of oil companies in respect of using British suppliers, 
became a factor in the allocation of licences under the discretionary
Footnote*: Notwithstanding the interventionist phase which Conservative
policy had now entered, some of IMGE's recommendations proved too 
interventionist for the Government so they were i g n o r e d . (2^) ^n Offshore 
Supplies Office (OSO) was set up, initially under the DTI, though it later 
moved to Glasgow under the Department of Energy. Using the leverage they 
possessed under the Administrative Allocation Licensing System, the 
Government required the companies to submit quarterly returns of their 
expenditure, which were audited by the OSO, which also monitored the progress 
of U.K. firms in offshore supplies, and cleared away any administrative 
problems in the way of their acquiring contracts (e.g. help was provided on 
planning permission). For administrative convenience. Interest Relief Grants 
were paid to the oil companies, to compensate British suppliers for the 
subsidies received by foreign suppliers.
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application of the Administrative Allocation Licensing System. Though the 
consequences of failing to buy less then a good proportion of company 
requirements was nowhere specified, the force of the situation was fully 
recognised. (Footnote*)
(Footnote*) By 1984, the situation had changed to the extent that 70% of 
offshore supplies used in the North Sea come from British suppliers. The 
companies have publicly stated their commitment to the use of British 
s u p p l i e r s . (25) However, the price of crude oil, which reached around $
U.S. 40 a barrel at the end of the 1970's has now dropped to around $ U.S. 30
a barrel. The cost of producing North Sea oil is high, at around $ U.S. 12 
per barrel and it has never been cheap compared with other producing areas. 
Thus Shell and Esso^^^) while identifying the need to develop some 60 to 90 
new fields in the North Sea to provide for longer term requirements, are now 
highlighting those phases of the businesses where U.K. performances can be 
improved, seeking to achieve a 15% cut in costs through better project 
management in co-operation with suppliers, and pointing to the incentive of 
the much higher levels of investment required to exploit the smaller deposits 
under consideration.
3.23 Depletion The Public Accounts Committee did not recommend any change 
in the policy of rapid development, but observed that successive Governments 
since the start of work in the North Sea had felt:
'that the balance of advantage to the United Kingdom lay in exploiting
and extracting these reserves of oil and gas as quickly as possible.
In arriving at this decision they took into account relevant factors,
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including balance of payments savings, security of supply, possible 
future fuel shortages'
Despite this view. Department of Trade and Industry witnesses stated that a 
review was in progress to determine 'whether there would in certain 
circumstances be advantage in delaying the exploitation of our own resources 
of oil rather than expediting them'. By July 1974, the Labour Government's 
Whitepaper 'United Kingdom Oil and Gas Policy' stated:
'The Government will therefore, for current as well as future licences, 
take power to control the level of production in the national interest. 
This does not effect their determination to build up production as 
quickly as possible over the next few years. The question of reducing 
the rate of depletion is unlikely to arise for some years but the 
Government believe they should take the necessary powers now'.
There was little contention over the issue of taking these powers to control 
depletion, since the Conservatives also took the view that it might be 
necessary to control depletion in the future, which they proposed to do 
through the mechanism of their intended United Kingdom Oil Conservation 
Authority. Given the concentration of northern North Sea oilfields within 
the area of what would be the North Sea Sector of an independent Scotland, 
the Nationalists favoured a policy of slow development, with a production 
ceiling of 50 million tonnes a year. With this exception, how did the 
consensus between the two main Parties in favour of future control of 
depletion come about?
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The events of late 1973, which resulted in a greater degree of uncertainty in 
the international oil market, which was no longer dominated by the 
Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs), led to an increased priority being 
placed on security of supply by all Western Governments. An indigeneous 
source of supply such as that under development in the British Sector in the 
North Sea was competely secure. As expectations of rising crude oil prices 
took shape, it seemed only realistic to keep a supply of crude oil in the 
ground in anticipation of further rises. Moreover, as crude oil prices rose, 
so to did estimates of the crude oil reserves located in the British Sector. 
While it seemed entirely right to both Conservative and Labour Governments, 
that the rate of extraction of southern North Sea gas should be substantially 
producer determined, to compensate them for the poor unit price per therm 
they were receiving, the same could not be said in respect of the rate of 
crude oil production.
The work of Jay F o r r e s t e r (^^) the late 1960's on natural resource
depletion had been followed by the still more widely disseminated work of 
D.L. Meadows(28) and the Club of Rome, which impressed upon informed 
opinion the fact that natural resources such as crude oil were ultimately 
finite and ought therefore to be husbanded. Robinson and Morgan^^^) 
emphasise the general point that the more rapid the rate of oil extraction, 
the smaller the total quantity of oil ultimately extracted. While 
Robinson^^^) suggests that increased public awareness of the importance of 
energy as a result of the oil crisis of 1973/1974 made politicians realise 
that there were votes to be captured through being seen to do something about 
energy, it is probably fairer to say that as a result of those events energy 
matters were placed higher on the political agenda. Robinson's observation.
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was made as part of the argument suggesting that the market is a superior 
determinant of depletion rates compared with Government action, since in his 
view, even if short term political considerations are excluded from 
Government decisions, he doubts if British Governments are capable of 
optimising depletion rates, given their poor record of economic management 
since the war.
Extensive powers to control depletion were taken by the 1974-1979 Labour 
Government, in the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act, 1975 and the Energy 
Act, 1976 and in Chapter 5, the manner in which these powers were exercised 
in 1980/1981 in respect of the Clyde Field development decision will be 
considered. However, in the mid 1970's the Government were anxious to assure 
the oil companies that depletion control was a consideration for the 1980's 
rather than for the immediate future, and in late 1974, Eric Varley proceeded 
the legislation, with these (non legislative) guidelines, which became known 
as the Varley Guidelines:
(1) Finds made before the end of 1975 under existing licences
No delays would be imposed on development plans. Any production 
plans would not be applied before 1982, or four years after the 
start of production, whichever is later.
(2) Finds made after end 1975 under existing licences.
No production cuts would be made before 150% of the investment 
made in a field had been recovered.
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(3) Development delays on finds made after the end of 1975 would only 
be made after consultation to avoid premature investment.
(4) Any production cuts imposed would recognise the technical and 
commercial factors involved in the field concerned and would not 
exceed 20%. Consultation would take place to determine the 
appropriate period of notice before the cuts had to be effective.
(5) In considering any production cuts and development delays, account 
would be taken of the interests of the offshore supplies industry.
3.3 The Gas Regime When the Public Accounts Committee drew attention to the 
poor 'take' from North Sea taxes, licences fees and royalties, they 
considered that as regards the southern North Sea gasfields (for the 
exploitation of which the existing fiscal and licensing arrangements had been 
established) this adverse effect was substantially mitigated by the economic 
and other effects resulting from the involvement of the Gas Council in the 
enterprise. The Committee's concern was to highlight the dangers of 
continuing these same fiscal and licensing arrangements for the exploitation 
of the northern North Sea oilfields, where the enterprise was entirely in 
private sector hands. The Gas Council's involvement in the southern North 
Sea gasfields took two forms. Firstly, the Council had a direct stake in the 
discovery, development and production of some of these gasfields, and were 
involved in operations, as a result of which their technological expertise 
was enhanced and their degree of dependence on the oil companies was 
correspondingly reduced. Secondly, the Council was the sole or monopsony 
buyer of North Sea gas, unless this was to be used for non fuel purposes.
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which in effect means chemical feedstock. Should there be a failure to agree 
a price between the Gas Council and the companies, the Minister of Power had 
the right to intervene to secure a settlement. These conditions formed a 
considerable countervailing power enjoyed by the Government to offset the 
liberal financial conditions enjoyed by the companies. The Minister of" 
Power, could if he wished, grant a producer the right to sell gas outside 
Britain, but in practice the U.K. placed and embargo on the export of gas, 
which complemented the Council's position as monopsony buyer. Despite 
repeated calls from the companies to end this embargo, it has been maintained 
up to the time of writing.
From the first discovery of the West Sole gas field in October 1965,
interest was centred on the economic and social aspects of converting the
whole of the U.K. gas supply industry to the use of North Sea gas. As the
remarkable extent of the ensuing discoveries became clear, a final decision
was taken in 1967 to abandon the production of all manufactured gas produced
( 31 )by the Lurgi process and carbonisation.'^ ' However, in the decade 
preceeding this decision a massive investment of public money had been made 
in order to re-equip the gas manufacturing industry, so that the decision to 
convert the natural gas, required a writing off of £400 million of capital 
expenditure, well before the end of the new equipment's life. Manufactured 
gas has a calorific value of 500 BTU, and North Sea gas has a calorific 
value of 1,000 BTU, and this made it necessary, either to reform the North 
Sea gas so that it could be accommodated by the existing equipment, or to 
totally convert the domestic burning appliances. The total costs involved 
after a decision had been taken to convert the domestic burning equipment 
consisted of two elements:
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Coastal pipelines and terminais £2,000 million
Writing off manufacturing equipment
and domestic appliance conversion £1,027 million
It was found that North Sea natural gas would have to meet the 
requirements of three markets.
1) The Premium Market This was the market in which North Sea natural 
gas showed a substantial premium advantage over other fuels. In 
1960, this market consisted of 13 million domestic users and 80,000 
industrial users.
2) The Semi Premium Market This was the market in which North Sea 
natural gas showed a small competitive advantage over manufactured 
or town gas prepared from coal or oil, although this competitive 
advantage (in 1967/1968) was much smaller than the margin in (1) 
above.
3) The Bulk Industrial Market This market required the greatest 
crude heat, offered at the lowest price per therm, so that in order 
to succeed in this market. North Sea natural gas would have to be 
sold at a very low price indeed, compared with coal or oil.
The Premium and Semi Premium markets, some displacement of coal would 
result. Without natural gas, the premium market would have to be supplied 
with gas made from imported oil, and the semi premium market from liquid 
petroleum products at the lighter end of the range. The use of North Sea 
natural gas, it was estimated, would save £50 million by 1970/1971. In the
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absence of North Sea gas, further investment would be needed in conventional 
gasmaking equipment. It was decided the cost of writing off the considerable 
public investment in gasmaking equipment should not be a charge on North Sea 
gas. The National Coal Board the point very strongly, that in
the Bulk Industrial Market, where natural gas would be offered at very low 
prices in order to make it competitive with other fuels, this strategy would 
result in the closure of a substantial number of pits, and the writing off of 
many millions of public investment, in view of the loss of the market. The 
Ministry of Power carried out a most searching investigation of all the 
possible consequences of conversion, and in support of this, a Pilot Project 
based upon the conversion of domestic burners was carried out in Canvey 
Island in 1966, prior to a final decision.
As a result of the foregoing analysis, it was concluded that the payment 
of a low price to the gas producers, would enable the gas industry to keep 
prices at a satisfactory level in the semi premium and bulk industrial 
markets. The first company to negotiate a price for the delivery of gas to 
the Gas Council, was BP, which as the first company to reach such an 
agreement with the nationalised gas industry for the supply of indigeneous 
natural gas, were able to obtain a price of 5 old pence (2.083p) per therm, 
following the intervention (4/2/65) of the Minister, Fred Lee. It was made 
clear at the time that this was an incentive price paid to BP in recognition 
of their decision to press ahead with the necessary development.
Nevertheless, since the Gas Council had obtained a supply of gas at a level 
well below either the cost of manufacturing town gas, or importing gas from 
Algeria, the other companies believed that they might expect roughly 
equitable treatment. Thus when negotiations opened in 1966, these other
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companies (who negotiated cartel like as a group) were surprised to find the 
Gas Council was offering them a price of 1.8 old pence per therm. During the 
following 2 years of negotiations, all arguments by these companies to the 
effect that they had been induced to go ahead with development on the 
prospect of obtaining a price similar to that paid to BP failed to move the 
Gas Council from its position.
The negotiating process between the Gas council and the companies, which 
also involved interventions by the Minister of Power, brought Dennis Rooke to 
the fore on the Gas Council side. Dennis Rooke was a professional engineer 
who had been involved in organising the natural gas supply grid, and the 
import of Algerian LNG (liquid natural gas) using the Methane Pioneer, a ship 
especially designed for that purpose. The Gas Council took the position that 
notwithstanding the international market price for gas, the price paid the 
companies should consist of the price of bringing the gas ashore, plus a 
relatively small premium as a reward for their enterprise in having found the 
gas in the first place. the Government, represented by the Minister
of Power, took a broadly similar view of the issue, except that they felt 
that the price paid the companies should be rather better, as an incentive 
for the future exploration.
With the negotiations dragging on, the companies investigated any means 
which might help them to get round the legislative requirement forcing them 
to sell to the Gas Council for other than non-fuel (principally chemical 
feedstock) purposes. The companies used Lord Robens (paradoxically, he was 
at that time Chairman of the NCB) as their Lobbyist. He sought to convince 
his former colleagues in the Labour Government of the need for an improved
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price. He also suggested to them that some gas might be sold to the 
C.E.G.B., for use in an East Coast power station. Conoco, recognising that 
they could obtain 3 times the Gas Council's offer by selling their gas 
abroad, sought the Government's permission to export, which was technically 
possible under the legislation, given official agreement. This permission 
was refused, thus effectively establishing an embargo on gas exports, which 
was thereafter maintained to support the Gas Council's position as a 
monopsony purchaser of North Sea gas. The Government has possessed and where 
it judged necessary, exercised the power to prevent the export of both oil 
and gas since 1939 under the Defence Regulations, and this power has been 
restated in subsequent legislation, notwithstanding that it may be 
technically contrary to the Brussels Treaty. In this context, it is 
interesting to note that in May 1984 the Netherlands had just ended a 10 year 
embargo on the export of their gas.
Two further options existed for the companies in seeking to avoid sale 
to the Gas Council. Firstly, they could use the gas a chemical feedstock, 
most practically at that time, to produce anhydrous ammonia for use as a 
fertiliser, except that the quantities of gas available were well in excess 
of the amounts needed to fully supply that market. Secondly, through an 
apparent loophole in he legislation, there was one way in which they might 
export the gas. Conoco's thwarted attempt to export gas involved piping it 
abroad, which required Mninsterial consent, but if the gas was liquefied for 
export in containers, this did not require such approval, except that the 
costs associated with such a proposal, given the quantities involved, made 
this outlet commercially unviable, with which fact the Gas Council and the
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Minister were well aware. Assuming that the Government had agreed to the 
piping of gas abroad in the 1960's, such a course would have been politically 
difficult, given the opportunities to use the gas in the U.K. economy and the 
visibility of the action given contemporary public expectations of 'cheap' 
gas.
As the negotiations extended into 1968, the Government made it clear 
that unless they were brought to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion they 
might not permit the Gas Council to purchase gas produced from the smaller gas 
fields, and this had the effect of breaking the common front till then 
maintained by the companies. Arpet and Conoco, were involved in one of these 
gasfields, the Hewett Field, and the Government's threat led them to settle 
at a price of 2.87 old pence per therm. The other companies maintained a 
rearguard action for a time seeking a recognition of the 1967 U.K. currency 
devaluation. Finally, Shell/Esso agreed to a price of 2.83 and 2.87 old 
pence per therm depending on the rate of daily delivery, and Amoco settled at 
2.90 old pence per therm.
At the time when the settlement was finally reached, the National 
Executive of the Labour Party were pressing the Government to extend public 
ownership to oil and gas through the setting up of a National Hydrocarbons 
Corporation (which the Government judged incompatible with rapid development) 
and had the companies continued to stand out against a settlement on lines 
acceptable to the Government, this would have provided the Left on the N.E.C. 
with a valuable argument to use in pressing its case.
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Notwithstanding their final reluctant acceptance of terms, the companies 
maintained that the price they received was inadequate to justify the 
exploration needed to secure the long term supplies required by the U.K. gas 
industry, which would involve the development of newer and smaller gasfields. 
This claim can be investigated from several points of view. Would 
exploration levels have improved in response to a better price? Are 
adequate quantities of gas available from British and foreign sources to meet 
current requirements? What adverse consequences follow, if imports from 
foreign sources are required to meet British requirements?
Peebles (1980) states: (54)
'It is impossible to say beyond dispute whether the exploration effort 
would have been substantially greater if the long term contracts 
negotiated in the later 1960's had been more attractive to the 
producers.'
While Dam (55) writing in 1970, states that at that time there was no 
evidence of a drop in exploration effort, while Peebles (in the work 
previously cited) explains that by August, 1971, of the 79 southern North Sea 
Blocks offered in the 4th Licensing Round, only 21 were taken up, but this 
may well have been due in some measure to the fact that by that time, 
interest had passed to the more exciting oil prospects further north. As 
regards the future availability of supplies, Peebles estimated that these 
might prove to be from all sources, and with hindsight from the standpoint of 
mid-1984, these seem more that adequate given the present excess of supplies 
over demand in a European context. (56) However, for sometime there has
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been a shortfall between British Sector gas supplies and U.K. gas demand, 
which has been substantially met from Norwegian sources. In May 1984, a 
British Gas contract to purchase £20,000 million of gas from the Norwegian 
Sleipner Field (31% Exxon interest) over 15 years was under consideration.
The Treasury view, notwithstanding the British Gas opinion that it was good 
deal, was that it might be better to spend money on finding and exploiting 
further gasfields within the British Sector, an attitude supported by BP, who 
pointed to the benefits of this course of action for employment in 
particular, and the UK economy as a whole.
3.4 Summary of Conclusions When in 1973, the Public Accounts Committee 
called for changes in the fiscal and licensing arrangements for North Sea 
operators, they had in mind the inappropriateness of these arrangements for 
the exploitation of oilfields in the Northern North Sea, where unlike the 
southern gasfields, conditions were not mitigated either by an element of 
State participation, or the monopsony purchase system. (Para 3.2).
In view of the early stage reached by 1973 in the exploitation of the 
northern North Sea oilfields, having regard to the number of oilfields 
discovered, under development and in production, it would have been premature 
for the Government to have stiffened the terms for the companies at that 
time. To have done so might have lessened company commitment to the area 
where so much of the most costly work remained to be done. (Para 3.21).
When wide ranging changes were introduced by the Labour Government in 
1975 exploitation was further advanced, and while in terms of the model 
derived from Hossain it might still have been premature to have introduced
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stiffened conditions for operators, by that time, changes in the worldwide 
oil industry, the origins of which lay well prior to the oil crisis of 1973, 
had matured to such an extent, that the global position of the oil companies 
was irrevocably weakened and their commitment to the North Sea thereby 
increased, which strengthened the hand of the British Government in the Oil 
Company Government relationship (Para 3.21).
Government measures to stimulate the development of an offshore supplies 
industry were delayed not only by the requirements of rapid development 
policy (Chaper 1) but also because such action would have been inconsistent 
with the first non-interventionist phase of the Heath Government's economic 
policy. The IMEG Report coincided with a change of Conservative policy in 
favour of a more interventionist approach, though change to a still more 
thoroughgoing Government involvement had to wait till Labour came to power 
in 1975, when the leverage of discretionary licensing was applied to secure a 
fuller use of British offshore supplies. In recent years, the oil companies 
have themselves become fully committed to maximising the use of the British 
offshore supplies industry (Para 3.22).
Notwithstanding the fact that the Public Accounts advocated no changes 
in the rapid development policy, the introduction of powers to control 
depletion and the Varley guidelines on their future application derived from 
a heightened perception of the dangers of natural resource depletion and the 
fact that due to the 1973 oil crisis, security of energy supplies was now 
higher on the political agenda. (Para 3.23).
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The system whereby the Gas council was the monopsony (or only) buyer of 
gas, combined with the ban on the export of gas piped abroad, plus the fact 
that the permitted alternative uses (as chemial feedstock, or for export 
after liquefaction) were not viable, shifted the balance of advantage to the 
Gas Council in their negotiations over price with the companies. While the 
companies claimed the prices received were insufficient to stimulate the 
exploration needed to produce future long term supplies it is not possible to 
say with any certainty that exploration effort would have been increased by 
the payment of a price more favourable to the companies in the contracts 
negotiated in the late 1960's. While the quantities of gas presently 
available from domestic and foreign sources are more than adequate, the cost 
to the balance of payments of contracts for long term gas supplies from 
abroad to meet the shortfall between UK demand and British Sector production, 
does raise the related question of whether the money might be better spent on 
maximising British Sector reserves (Para 3.3).
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Chapter 4 State Participation; The Establishment and Subsequent Development 
of the British National Oil Corporation (B.N.O.C.)
4.1 Introduction Chapter 3 demonstrated that combination of circumstances, 
arising from changes in the international oil industry and the state of 
development of the northern North Sea oilfields, which strengthened the hand 
of the British Government in the Oil Company Government relationship, and 
thus made possible the regime changes of 1975. This changed situation 
reduced those constraints which has thus far contained policy within a 
bipartisan framework, and from 1975 onwards the North Sea policy of the two 
Parties progressively diverged along lines determined by their ideological 
views on the proper means for organising industry. This divergence first 
manifested itself in 1975, when the Labour Government decided to introduce 
State participation into the North Sea (in existing licences) as a means of 
extending their control over oil and gas operations, and established the 
British National Oil Corporation (B.N.O.C.) as an instrument for this 
purpose. Their Conservative predecessors were also committed to extending 
State control over the North Sea, though by different means, and as with 
Labour this commitment proceeded in some measure from their past experience 
of British Government relationships with BP, which will be considered in Para
4.21. The Conservatives proposed means for extending control over the North 
Sea involved the creation of a regulatory agency, designed on North American 
lines, to be called the U.K. Oil Conservation Authority.
The roots of this difference in approach will be established in Para
4.22, which considers the debate between the two Parties on the setting up of
N5H41Q
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B.N.O.C., and the progressive divergence of their North Sea policies, will be 
illustrated through the history of the Corporation, first under Labour from 
1975 onwards, and thereafter under the Conservative Government from 1979 
onwards. In Para 4.3, B.N.O.C. under Labour, it will be shown how the 
Corporation's Board was carefully constructed to exclude oil industry 
influence, and how the resulting management then worked in close concert with 
the Department of Energy to secure agreement to State participation in 
existing licences, from a reluctant oil industry. The manner in which the 
Corporation obtained some degree of financial independence from the British 
Government by negotiating the Britoil Loan from a consortium of U.S. Banks 
will be explained, and it will be shown that by securing this loan against 
the future revenues from crude oil sales, some counter was provided against 
any plans by a future Conservative Government to introduce privatisation.
Para 4.4, B.N.O.C. under the Conservatives, will cover Conservative attempts 
at privatisation, and the manner in which these were initially frustrated by 
Lord Kearton, who argued that selling off wealth creating assets, would deny 
the Government a future stream of profits. It will then be explained why the 
Conservative Government had returned to its first objective of privatistion 
by the end of 1981, and at that time seemed likely to push its objective to 
completion, as was finally achieved in 1983. Chapter 5, will deal with the 
broader development of Conservative policy, from 1979 to 1981, as illustrated 
by two Case Studies, the Gas Gathering Line Case Study, and the Clyde Field 
Development Delay Case Study.
The creation of B.N.O.C. introduced a new and crucial element into the 
bargaining relationship between the British Government and the oil industry.
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While the formation of the Corporation was in this sense a purely British 
event, it was also part of an international trend whereby National Oil 
Companies (NOCs) were assuming greater importance in the international oil 
industry, as part of that process of change already described in Chapter 3.
In the decade from 1970, the share of the Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) 
in the international oil trade has declined from 70% to 50% a large
part of this loss being taken up directly by the activities of NOCs, That 
part of the 20% not attributable directly to the activities of the NOCs 
results from the growth of the spot market, a free market for crude oil to 
which both MNOCs and NOCs have access. For these reasons, the position of 
NOCs in the wider international context must be considered before turning to 
the development of B,N,0,C, in its domestic political setting, Para 4,11 The 
Rationale of the National Oil Company, establishes the purposes behind such 
companies and the motives which cause Governments to form them, contrasting 
their objectives with those of the MNOCs, Para 4,12 The Growth of National 
oil Companies, goes on to explain why these companies have achieved greater 
importance within the international oil industry, since 1970,
4,11 The Rationale of the National Oil Company The structure of an industry 
reflects the economic and social conditions of the period in which 
it operates, ^^d throughout much of the present Century the predominant
form of enterprise in the oil industry has been the Multinational Oil Company 
(MNOC) the nature of which was described in the last Chapter, To assist the 
present argument, the principal characteristics of the MNOC will be briefly 
restated. It is large (i,e, horizontally concentrated), because both the 
risks and capital expenditure involve in the oil industry are great. It
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extends over most countries of the Free World (i.e. it is horizontally 
integrated), and it is vertically integrated, because if you produce crude 
oil it makes good commercial sense to refine it and sell the resultant 
products, in order to capture the full value added. In its ideal form, an 
MNOC seeks crude oil wherever it can profitably find it, refines it in 
whatever location suits the best interest of its business, and sells its 
products in every profitable market. Indeed, till the 1970's when changes in 
the industry reduced their global rate of profit, such companies would often 
operate in unprofitable markets to exclude competition. Thereafter, they 
were forced to be more selective in their choice of markets. Such companies 
are said to operate on the principle of global optimisation, which with its 
large economies of scale has brought great benefits to most of the countries 
involved in the system. However, such benefits have always been economic 
benefits, and even when the system has operated at maximum efficiency, it has 
been sub optimal economically for some of the countries involved.
Where, for a particular country, the results of global optimisation 
operated by MNOCs have proved sub optimal in the economic sense, this has 
provided clear economic grounds for Governments to intervene in the industry. 
Such cases explain only a minority of those occasions when Governments have 
decided to set up NOCs. As Leslie Grayson observes, ^^^ where economic and 
social factors have been involved, these have normally been of secondary 
importance. Grayson's point is illustrated by the three following examples 
of European State petroleum enterprises, established for primarily strategic 
reasons.
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The first State petroleum enterprise established, was set up in 
Austria in 1907. In that year a large oilfield had been discovered in 
Galicia, at a time when World crude oil demand was adequately catered for by 
oil production from Roumanie, Russia, Mexico and the U.S.A. As a consequence 
of the new discovery the first interntional crude oil glut occurred. The 
military authorities in the Dual Monarchy, appreciating the strategic value 
of a domestic source of refined products, wished to have Galician crude oil 
refined locally, and when the oil industry was unable to reconcile this 
requirement with their own attempts to solve the wider economic imbalance, 
the Austrian Government built their own refinery at Drohobycz in the centre 
of Galicia, with a capacity of 100,000 tons of crude oil per annum.
Chapter 1 emphasised the great importance which oil products attained 
during the First World War, and mentioned in particular that occasion in 
November 1917, when France came close to defeat due to the near exhaustion of 
her petrol supplies. In the post war years, as a result of this wartime 
experience, the French Government set up CFP (Compagnie Française des 
Petroles) to control the stake in the international oil industry which had 
been acquired from the defeated Germans. Within France, the domestic arm of 
CFP carried through an extensive refinery building programme, and set up a 
comprehensive marketing infrastructure. Many of the installations built in 
France by CFP, and many of their marketing activities, could not be justified 
on economic grounds. These activities, known as the Regie Autonome, were set 
up for primarily security reasons.
In like fashion, the Italian State Company AGIP, was set up between the
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Wars to promote national security, by reducing Italian dependence on the 
international oil industry, dominated by the Anglo Saxon based companies, BP, 
Esso and Shell. Refineries were built and a marketing infrastructure set up, 
while widespread exploration effort was applied both at home and in the 
Italian African territories. Perhaps ironically (in view of the post War 
development of Libya as a major crude oil producer) all these activities were 
a more or less total failure due to the inability to locate any crude oil 
deposits, so that Italy lacked the necessary crude oil base for these 
autarchic schemes.
For the management of a State enterprise commercial success and a steady 
stream of profit provides a bridge between its commercial objectives, and any 
non commercial objectives of its Government . The potential conflict between 
these differing ends is ever present, but without commercial success there is 
a greater likelihood that this conflict will surface. Yet to be commercially 
successful a State enterprise needs a dynamic management, and when such 
management achieves success, this tends to draw the enterprise away from 
State control. The post World War II history of the French and Italian State 
petroleum enterprises illustrates these problems. After the Second World 
War, Italy created a new company called E.N.I. (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi), 
to operate in the international oil industry, leaving AGIP to handle domestic 
marketing within Italy, while in 1953, France set up SNEA (Société Nationale 
Elf Aquitaine) to manage her 'national' crude oil resources within the then 
French Colonies. E.N.I. became a highly successful company, pioneering
many of the new joint ventures in exploration and production, and thus
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challenging the dominance of the Multinationals, In this process, the 
company (in particular its vigorous leader, the late Enrico Mattei) achieved 
a high degree of independence from Government control.
Within France, CFP has faced an ongoing conflict with the Government 
over the requirements of the Regie Autonome, under which the company ha to 
maintain unprofitable activities and installations, in order to retain a 
dominance over the domestic market, which its management would prefer to 
lose. This parallels the situation of Air France, which is forced to 
maintain unprofitable routes to former Colonies, and to the Overseas 
Departments, for various reasons of prestige and security. Such situations 
raise the issue of whether the Government or the State Company, are to decide 
the tradeoff between political and social objectives, and the return on 
capital employed.
To create a State enterprise in a mixed economy, which will compete with 
the private sector, a Government has to provide special support to the 
company in the early stages of the enterprise, and on later occasions when 
operating conditions become difficult. In these circumstances, such State 
enterprises are said to' sail in the national direction when the wind is 
behind them, and in the commercial direction when the wind is against them'. 
The management of a new NOG set up in these conditions, if at all worth its 
salt, will take full entrepreneurial advantage of all the special support 
provided by its Government, which leads the private sector to perceive such 
special support as unfair, especially if the NOG is commercially successful.
4—8
Grayson considering Western European NOCs, outlines the objectives 
of such companies as follows:-
(1) To reduce dependence on MNOCs. Till the advent of these NOCs, 
MNOCS dominated West European crude oil supplies, through their 
control of low cost crude oil.
(2) To gain a real understanding of the oil business. In order to
obtain from the oil industry as a whole the information it needs
for economic and energy management, the Government needs to know 
what questions to ask, and how to interpret the answers. Direct 
experience via an NOG will provide them with the expertise needed 
for this task.
(3) To obtain better deals from OPEC countries on an NOG to NOG basis.
As regards the ability to properly interpret oil industry data,
( 7 V
Odell' ' doubts if B.N.O.C. adequately carries out this function, for he 
considers that the interpretation of information from the North Sea, on which 
estimates of the oil and gas reserves for the British Sector are based, has
been so permeated by an oil company view, even within the Corporation, that
these reserves are consistently underestimated. However, in practice there 
are several divergent views on the issue of estimating oil and gas reserves, 
which is amongst the most controversial of forecasting activities, and not­
withstanding the increased attention paid to the matter since 1973, which has 
produced many models, techniques and estimates, questions relating to the
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proper information needed to assess the resource base and the role of 
technology in its future recovery are still the subject of a wide 
d e b a t e . T h a t  estimates of recoverable reserves vary both overtime and 
according to the estimation technique used is clear from the work of Meyer 
(1977) (9) and Odell and Rosing (1980)^^°\
The objective of obtaining better deals from OPEC countries for the 
supply of crude oil, through NOC to NOC deals has not been achieved, for 
experience shows tht OPEC NOCs operate firstly in their own national 
interest. Indeed, probably because of the ongoing business relationship 
between the MNOCs and the producing countries, deals between MNOCs and the 
producing countries have generally had a superior outcome from a Western 
standpoint. The value of NOCs as a means of reducing countries dependence on 
the MNOCs has also varied, because some countries such as Norway and Great 
Britian have their own crude oil, and are not dependent on imports. There 
has been a considerable variation in the importance attributed to these three 
objectives by the different European countries, which may well be a factor 
underlying their inability to establish a common European energy policy.
The expression 1 'enterprise témoigné, refers to an enterprise which 
bears witness, and as applied to an NOC in a mixed economy this means that 
the NOC acts like an MNOC, and competes with MNOCs, so as to provide its 
Government with a standard against which to judge the activities of MNOCs.
The concept suffers from two weaknesses. Firstly, the scope of an MNOC is 
international, while the scope of an NOC is primarily national, not-
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withstanding those instances when NOCs enter into exploration and production 
ventures overseas, or engage in interntional oil trading on the basis of 
their indigeneous sources of crude oil. Secondly, an NOC has social and 
political objectives, which may distort its ability to act like a true MNOC. 
Even though MNOCs have social and political objectives (for example, social 
responsibility programmes involving work in the community) such objectives 
are clearly subordinate to, and supportive of their primary aim, which is to 
make a profit.
The French experience of CFP, supporting non commercial activities for 
other than business ends, suggests a generalised role for NOCs, which is to 
carry out this work in those parts of the oil industry where the MNOCs will 
not operate, since there is no profit in it for them, more particularly those 
activities the MNOCs have progressively surrendered from 1973 onwards, as a 
result of the squeeze on their profit margins. Such a role, if widely 
extended, could only increase the risk of conflict between an NOC and its 
Government.
4.12 The Growth of National Oil Companies The strategy of creeping 
nationalization, whereby producing countries progressively extended State 
participation and their control over the oil industry has been described in 
Para 3.11 (of the last Chapter), Regime Change in the World Oil Industry.
The process of change outlined, necessarily increased the importance of NOCs 
within those countries in the years up to 1973, when that process culminated 
in a visible demonstration of the power of the OPEC countries. As a 
collective response to the Arab Israeli conflict, the Arab OPEC members
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restricted their production, and placed limits on the supply of crude oil to 
the Western countries. The Arabs, who on the basis of the Suez Crisis 
(1956), and the 6 Day War, were judged incapable of a sustained common 
effort, now acted in just such a way to reduce the flow of oil to the West. 
Supplies were curtailed on a scale, which was alleged to correspond with the 
degree of sympathy for Israel in each Western Government, or alternatively, 
their extent of support for the Arab cause. Thus the U.K. and France were 
both judged favourable to the Arab cause, and suffered a 10% reduction, while 
the Netherlands, whose Government was considered to particularly favour 
Israel, suffered the maximum discrimination, even though the real cause of 
this treatment was the Arab recognition of the widespread trouble that would 
follow their decision, since Rotterdam was the centre of the West European 
oil trade.
Differential discrimination by the Arabs was one of two factors which 
weakened the chance of a collective response by the Western Nations to the 
crisis. The other factor limiting the chances of such a collective response 
was the varying extent to which the various Western countries were dependent 
on imported crude oil. Thus by 1973, Norway was totally self sufficient in 
crude, while Great Britain expected to become so in the future, but Japan was 
totally dependent on imported crude oil. As a result of this situation, each 
of the Western countries sought to make its own special arrangements with the 
producing States, particularly the important non Arab producing States, such 
as Venezuela and Iran. It was in this contact that British Ministers flew to 
St. Moritz to seek the special favour of the Shah. These initiatives 
reinforced the demonstration of power by the Arab States, so that all the oil
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producing nations were perceived as powerful.
Since neither the oil companies or the Governments of the Western States 
had made any preparations equal to the scale of the restrictions, not 
withstanding the stocking obligations introduced by the E.E.C. in 1968, the 
effectiveness of the Arab challenge demonstrated both to the Western 
Governments, and to the producing States, that the MNOCs were now in some 
ways powerless in the face of determined action by a host country. This 
stimulated the desire of all host Governments to participate further in all 
phases of the oil industry, and thus gave an extra stimulus to the growth and 
significance of NOCs. For example, 1978 saw a total takeover of the domestic 
oil industry within Venezuela, carried out amicably in co-operation with the 
oil companies, whose primary interest now lay in preserving their crude oil 
supplies.
Within Western Europe, not only were most countries dependent to varying 
degrees on the Arab States for imports of crude oil, but within these 
countries, the refining marketing and transportation facilities were under 
the control of the MNOCs, so that the Governments were in this respect 
dependent to varying degrees on the oil companies. Those Governments who 
were not home Governments to the MNOCs (all apart from the U.K. and Holland, 
together with France if ELF ERAP is included) feared that the companies would 
discriminate in favour of their home states, and when they subsequently acted 
equitably to all their customers this was immaterial, serving only to 
demonstrate to all Governments their powerlessness, and the extent to which 
they were dependent on the companies. While tax measures might be quite
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adequate as economic instruments to cream off oil company profits, energy had 
now become a matter of visible public concern, so that such measures in 
themselves were politically inadequate, and it became necessary to 
demonstrate to electorates that something was being done. The formation of a 
National Oil Company was a clear demonstration of action.
Within the U.K. the Heath Government attempted to obtain preferential 
treatment from BP and Shell, and their failure to achieve this objective, 
will be covered fully in Para 4.21, The Relationship between the British 
Government and BP. In the circumstances of 1973, the Government urgently 
required information on the oil stocks position, and the crude oil and 
products in transit. They found difficulty in probing and questioning such 
data, so as to form a proper basis for decision making. Speaking of this 
situation in an Open University Programme Peter Walker explained the
situation as follows:-
"You obviously called in the oil companies, as I did, and asked 
them what the position was as far as stocks and what would come 
to Britain, and what was on the seas to Britain and so on. And 
the figures you had them to check and see how good they were and 
so forth. But... the oil companies operate internationally and 
as such you couldn't rely upon them being particularly favourable 
to you as opposed to any other countries they were supplying.
And you had to therefore negotiate with them and obtain what 
information you could as to what oil was coming out of various 
countries and say to them 'Look this amount is coming out of
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these countries, on the proportion of our normal share we expect 
to obtain at least this'. And therefore you were constantly 
pressurizing them to get the maximum you could from the available 
supplies on the high seas".
Geoffrey Chandler, for Shell, speaking on the same programme explained:-
"From a number of governments we came under very severe pressure 
to give them preferential treatment, but when we asked and this 
was particularly true of Britain and France - when we said if we 
favour you who should go short, we in fact got no answer and 
what we therefore did in the absence of any government ruling 
was to try and administer the shortage equitably... to equalise 
the misery so that everyone went short by about the same amount... 
although we were vilified at the time we have been fully 
vindicated since."
The effect of this situation was to demonstrate to the U.K. Government its 
powerlessness. The other Governments of Western Europe found themselves in a 
similar position, irrespective of whether they were the home Governments of 
MNOCs or not, so that a sense of powerlessness in the consuming countries, 
combined with a sense of increasing power in all the producing countries, to 
stimulate the growth and significance of National Oil Companies. Oil was far 
too important a business to be left entirely to the oil companies.
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4.2 Setting up B.N.O.C. ; The Background and the Debate
4.21 The Relationship between the British Government and BP Both the 
Conservative and Labour Parties were equally determined to extend Government 
control over the North Sea oil industry, though they differed on the means of 
achieving this. The nature of these differences will be demonstrated in Para 
4.22, but it is first necessary to explain how the experience of both parties 
while in Government, with respect to their relations with BP, contributed to 
the view they held in common, that Government control must be extended over 
North Sea oil. The clearest outline of relationships between the British 
Government and BP is derived from a report by Krapels made to the U.S.
Senate.
The origins of the British Government's involvement with BP has been 
described by Geoffrey Jones, There was a steady growth of interest in
fuelling ships with oil, beginning in 1865. Although at first inhibited by 
technical problems, these had substantially been resolved by the turn of the 
Century when Admiral Fisher, known as the oil maniac by his naval colleagues, 
was in charge of the Admiralty. Thereafter, the move to oil to fuel the 
British Fleet was constrained by other factors, principally the fact that the 
British Empire locked any significant oilfield, combined with the important 
consideration that South Wales coal was cheaper than oil. As a result 
Fisher's revolutionary Dreadnought battleship remained coal burning. In 
1912, Churchill secured Government approval to build a squadron of oil 
fuelled ships. Subsequently, as a logical extension of this decision, the 
British Government, at Churchill's suggestion, purchased a controlling
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interest in the then Anglo Persian Oil Co. Ltd (subsequently A.I.O.C. and 
then BP) in 1914. Thus the British Empire obtained an assured source of 
crude oil, a vital matter, as the Royal Navy was then about to embark (more 
fully) on conversion from coal burning to oil burning vessels. From 1914 to 
1951, the commercial efforts of the company and the diplomatic effort of the 
Foreign Office, ran broadly in parallel. The Government made two appointees 
to the Board of BP, but despite this the company always operated as a 
commercial enterprise. While the company certainly enjoyed a special 
relationship with the Admiralty, its relationships with the Foreign Office 
were not dissimilar from those enjoyed between the Foreign Office and Shell, 
which also played its part in meeting Britain's naval requirements.
According to Anthony Sampson the Iranian Crisis led to a
significant difference of opinion between a substantial body of opinion in 
the Foreign Office and the Chairman of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company, Sir 
William Fraser. Sampson quotes John Strachey as saying that the
information at the Government's disposal from inside Iran was scant, and 
largely obtained from A.I.O.C. sources, which were naturally suspected of 
bias. Herbert Morrison at the Foreign Office, and E. Shinwell at the 
Ministry of Defence, egged on by Sir W. Fraser, both favoured intervention. 
Kenneth Younger, the Minister of State, followed opinion from with the 
Foreign Office, that opposed intervention, since to work the oilfields was 
impossible faced with a hostile workforce. Lord Mountbatten with his Indian 
and S.E. Asian experience, feared that the whole British position is that 
part of the world would be undermined through intervention. Strachey's own 
advisors favoured a rapid solution by any means, since they feared that delay 
would destabilise Iran and lead to a British energy crisis. Strachey, for
4-17
his part, was opposed to intervention, and pointed out to his advisors, that 
neither destabilisation of Iran, nor an energy crisis was likely to result 
from delay.
A Parachute Brigade was readied for action, and H.M.S. Mauritius was 
sent to the Persian Gulf. The situation then dragged on throughout the 
Summer, till Morrison visited Washington to see Harry Truman in September, 
when the President indicated his firm opposition to British intervention. 
Notwithstanding the U.S. position, on his return to the U.K., Morrison held 
to his stance in favour of intervention in the Cabinet Meeting on 27th 
September 1951, till Attlee firmly terminated the discussion by stating that 
in the absence of U.S. support, independent action by Britain was quite out 
of the question. Those members of the Labour Party involved in these events, 
whether for or against intervention, must have drawn the conclusion, that in 
the event of a future conflict between the requirements of the Government, 
and the interests of the company, BP might well prove an inadequate 
instrument for carrying through Government policy. In the Labour Party at 
large, suspicion of BP has persisted through to more recent times, fuelled by 
the experience of the Rhodesian sanctions, so that in 1978 the Labour Party 
Conference called on the then Labour Government to exercise control over the 
company, using its shares to this end. As a result of this call by the 
Labour Party Conference, a committee of Cabinet Ministers was established to 
consider future relationships between the company and the Government.
With the resolution of the Iranian Crisis (which broadly coincided with 
the start of a long period of Conservative rule lasting till 1964) relations
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between BP and the Government would appear to have reverted to their original 
condition, so that in 1973, addressing the Public Accounts Committee,
Sir Eric Drake the Chairman of BP, described the position of the company in 
the following terms:
'our policies are normally those of a commercial company and these have 
been agreed for 60 years or more with Government, and have I think, 
suited successive Governments. This has never been a controversial 
matter... we take our decisions commercially without influence from 
Ministers.'
Within a few months there was to be a conflict between the requirements 
of the Government and the interests of the company, arising from the 1973 oil 
crises, the nature of which was indicated earlier, in the statements by 
Peter Walker and Geoffrey Chandler. Edward Heath seriously considered 
issuing the company with a direct order requiring it to maintain normal 
supplies to Great Britain while discriminating against its other 
c u s t o m e r s . T h i s  was part of a general attempt to get all the oil 
companies, particularly BP and Shell, to act in a manner more favourable to 
Great Britain, and it was collectively resisted by the industry.
On 21st October 1973, Edward Heath called both Frank McFadzean, for 
Shell, and Sir Eric Drake, for BP to Chequers. In the ensuing talks, some 
fairly acrimonious discussions took place which were unreported at the time. 
Mr. Heath pointed out to Sir Eric Drake, that the Government owned half 
Bp(17) but Sir Eric, who had previously taken the precaution of taking 
legal advice, stated that he was only prepared to discriminate in favour of
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the U.K. in response to a direct Order from the British Government, coupled 
with a clear written instruction of which other countries were to be 
discriminated against in order to effect compliance. Unless, all the 
company's customers were treated fairly, then there was a risk that the 
company's assets might be expropriated in some countries.
Meanwhile, Mr. McFadzean, in separate talks with Lord Carrington, who 
was assisted by Lord Rothschild, the Head of the Think Tank (a former 
Director of Shell Research Ltd., brought in to argue the case with his former 
colleagues) was subjected to the same pressure as Sir Eric Drake, and having 
co-ordinated his response with that of BP, similarly asked that the 
Government make entirely clear in writing which other countries Shell would 
be required to discriminate against. McFadzean argued that discrimination 
was a function of the Government, a public responsibility, which the oil 
companies being part of the private sector, and more subject to international 
pressures, were not prepared to take. He added, that in practice the Majors, 
in supplying Western Europe in the manner they had, were already taking a 
considerable risk, for in order to comply with the letter of the Arab 
embargo, they were making up shortfalls to heavily hit customers, with 
supplies of Nigerian and Iranian crude oil.
Following these discussions with the representatives of BP and Shell,
Heath took advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and it was their 
opinion which finally turned the scale, and caused him to abandon his idea of 
issuing the companies with a direct order. The FCO pointed out that BP was 
on the very brink of penetrating the U.S. market and developing the vast oil
and gas resources of Alaska, both of which events must bring long term
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benefits to the U.K. economy. Once the company was seen to be subject to the 
direction of the U.K. Government, even for the purpose of handling short term 
difficulties, its independence would be perceived as fatally flawed in U.S. 
eyes, and in the strongly free enterprise U.S. business environment, the 
entire BP effort would be at risk.
In the aftermath of these events, the British Government became 
conscious of its powerlessness, and with respect to the North Sea, felt 
themselves particularly vulnerable on such issues as the control of depletion 
rates, and their ability to prevent the re-export of crude oil once landed. 
Now the Government had long possessed the legal means to do all it required 
in the North Sea (for example, powers to prevent the re-export of crude oil 
had existed since 1939) but it now recognised that such legal powers had to 
be complemented by appropriate organisational means, and thus far, the Labour 
Party agreed with this general assessment. It was on the choice of the 
appropriate means that the two Parties differed. The Heath Government 
believed this end could be secured by establishing a United Kingdom Oil 
Conservation Authority, a supervisory body, designed along the lines of the 
Texas Railroad Commission, or the Alberta Energy Resources Board, the Texas 
State and Alberta Provincial authorities respectively charged with the 
technical supervision of conservation. These were State/Provincial 
Authorities in Federal systems, and had not been designed as instruments for 
the discharge of a wider energy policy. In the event, the Conservative 
approach was never put to the test, since the Miners Strike and 3 Day Week 
intervened, causing Edward Heath to call the February 1974 Election, which 
the Conservatives lost. Thus it was Labour's chosen means to establish 
greater control over the North Sea, namely the formation of B.N.O.C. (as an
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agent for the State to take an interest in existing licences) which was 
proceeded with. This brought to the fore for the first time in a North Sea 
context, both ideological and other differences between the two Parties, 
which revealed themselves in the debate over the formation of the 
Corporation, to be covered in Para 4.22 (Footnote*).
Footnote* The events of 1973 also had their impact on a far wider stage, 
through Britain's involvement in the I.E.A. from November 1974. At that 
time, although Britain had yet to achieve any oil production (but was clearly 
destined to be a substantial producer) the terms under which she was to 
contribute to the International Energy Programme were very favourable. Other 
members were anxious to ensure the involvement of Britain and Norway to the 
fullest possible extent in the whole range of I.E.A. activities, so that 
Norway (which was then fully self sufficient) escaped any formal obligations 
to assist the others through the I.E.P. Britain could not, even if she had 
chosen to, gone it alone at a later date when she achieved oil self 
sufficiency, for her crude oil from the North Sea was lighter than the 
Middle East crudes for which her refineries were designed. This necessitated 
crude swops of light North Sea crude for heavier varieties, requiring a 
relationship with countries and companies with access to these supplies. In 
1980, with the build up of production and in the second oil price shock, 
Dafter and D a v i d s o n ^ w e r e  to argue for a wider use of Britain's oil to 
secure trade offs in other policy areas from our Western partners.
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4.22 The B.N.O.C. Debate; the Differences between the Conservative and 
Labour Parties In their July 1974 review of energy policy^^^) the newly 
elected Labour Government under Harold Wilson set out the planned objectives 
for B.N.O.C. as follows:
"majority State participation in existing licences for commercial fields 
provides the best means for the nation to share fully the benefits of 
the North Sea. A British National Oil Corporation (B.N.O.C.) will be 
set up through which the Government will exercise their participation 
rights. The Corporation will represent the Government in the present 
consortia... and also build up a powerful and expert supervisory staff 
which will enable it to play an active part in the future development, 
exploration and exploitation of the Continental Shelf".
The Labour Party held a fundamental belief in the virtues of State 
enterprise, and from this arose a favourable attitude to the extension of 
State participation in the mixed economy. In April 1975, John Smith, 
the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Energy set out the case for 
the Corporation in the following terms:
"First, B.N.O.C. participation in the industry will give the nation a 
direct right to the oil extracted from our own seabed. Oil underground 
belongs to the nation, but once extracted it becomes the property of 
the licencee. Under participation, we shall gain a right in the 
property and a say in the disposal of our own oil... we shall acquire 
our own direct knowledge of the different techniques of oil and gas 
production... in future Licensing Rounds, it will be possible for
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B.N.O.C. to be the majority holder and in some cases the sole 
licencee...we shall gain for this country an independent capability 
in oil and gas production which will reduce our dependence on 
international and other oil companies".
Earlier in the Debate, Patrick Jenkin, the Conservative Energy 
spokesman, with reference to that part of Labour's plan, which involved 
obtaining a stake in existing licences, stated^^i).
"majority State participation is no more than the ugly unacceptable 
face of Socialism".
Krapels sets out the arguments used by the two Parties to support these 
clearly opposed positions, under three headings, as follows:
1. Participation as a way to increase the public share of North Sea Wealth
The Conservative Party used three arguments to counter Labour's 
contention that a State Oil Company would ultimately increase the public 
share of North Sea wealth. Firstly, they claimed that the 'dead hand of 
political c o n t r o l '(22) would affect the oil industry, as was the case 
they contended with the steel industry and the Post Office. Secondly, 
B.N.O.C. could not be well staffed as it would not be able to attract 
staff with employment terms comparable with those on offer from the oil 
companies. Moreover, public involvement would displace private effort. 
Finally, Government funds used for North Sea investment, would not be 
available for use elsewhere, and the new Corporation would not be able
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to borrow more cheaply than private industry, or indeed, than the 
Government itself. The Conservatives principally objected to the 
Government's insistence that B.N.O.C. participate in existing licences, 
as well as being the majority holder in future licences, since the 
imposition of new conditions on existing licences was 'just as much 
expropriation as the acquisition of p r o p e r t y '(^3),
In answer these arguments, the Government pointed to the success 
already achieved in the North Sea by the Gas Council and the National 
Coal Board, and saw no reason why B.N.O.C. should not emulate this 
success, or that of its Norwegian counterpart Statoil. It was their 
intention that B.N.O.C. should work together with the oil companies, not 
replacing them, but participating with them in the exploitation of the 
North Sea. As a result of the introduction of B.N.O.C. into the North 
Sea it was intended that the companies would be 'no better and no worse 
o f f  and that there would be 'a continuing and profitable' role for 
t h e m . (24) Participation in existing licences was to achieved through 
free and voluntary negotiation' and not by compulsion.(2^) The 
Government pointed out that some companies had asked for participation in 
existing licences, but ommitted to add that these were small companies in 
financial difficulties, who saw the resulting payments as a way out of 
their problems. The Majors, responsible for the largest part of existing 
licences certainly did not welcome the Government's plans to buy an 
interest in these. Purchasing an interest in existing licences raised 
two questions, the answers to which will become clear later, in 
considering the actual development of the Corporation. Firstly, where 
was the money to be raised to purchase a B.N.O.C. interest in the
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existing licences? Secondly, how would the Government and the
Corporation proceed, if companies refused to sell some of their existing 
acreage?
2. Access to Information
In answer to Labour's contention that B.N.O.C. would enable them to 
acquire more information, and provide for its proper interpretation, 
the Conservatives agreed there was a need for more information, but 
argued 'the Government's legitimate objectives would be far better 
achieved... by setting up a proper, well staffed regulatory agency'(2*) 
and added they were 'much impressed by the trust and confidence in which 
the Alberta Board was held by the industry, and also... by the confidence 
of the Board that it in turn was not being bamboozled or misled by 
industry... the U.K. would do much worse then learn from this 
experience...instead of saddling industry with B.N.O.C., a huge, unwieldy
operating partner'.(^2)
In answer to these arguments the Government replied that there was 
no substitute for participation, since the Tories' proposed regulatory 
agency would have no right to explore for oil, and so could not acquire 
the necessary expertise to interprète exploration information. The 
Government could not hive off decisions of magnitude to a regulatory 
agency, nor exempt themselves from matters so important as the regulation 
of the resources off our shores. B.N.O.C. was to be represented in all 
offshore Operating Committees, not just those for licences where it held 
an interest, as this was an essential requirement for overseeing
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development. (As will be shown when the development of the Corporation 
is discussed, the presence of B.N.O.C. representation on Operating 
Committees for licences where they held no interest, was to be a major 
source of conflict in the years ahead).
3. Participation as a way to enhance Government control over Development
The main weaknesses of North Sea policy, as viewed by Labour were 
set out by Lord Balogh in the Lords, in April 1975:
'There were no controls over the rate of depletion/production... no 
adequate provision for the Government to receive financial information 
from licencees... there was no control over the flaring of gasses from 
oilwells'
Labour saw B.N.O.C. as an essential part of their strategy to correct 
this situation, however the Government seriously mixed up the general 
issue of control with the question of depletion in presenting their 
case:
'The present controls are totally inadequate... there is no control 
over the rate of depletion in the national interest... there is no
requirement for continuing e x p l o r a t i o n ' . ( 28)
( OQ )
Thus the Conservatives were able to argue that B.N.O.C.:
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'had nothing whatever to do with the controlling of production and 
depletion...the controls exist entirely independently of B.N.O.C., 
they bear no relationship whatever to participation. Therefore 
B.N.O.C. has no role...When the Secretary of State said 'we can 
have an effective depletion policy on the basis of public 
participation' he was talking absolute rubbish'.
In addition to these publicly stated positions on the issue, there 
may have been other considerations which influenced the standpoints of 
the two Parties. A search of the BBC Programme Library for this period, 
shows that in broadcasts, the two principle protogonists in the 
Parliamentary Debate, Eric Varley for the Government and Patrick Jenkin 
for the Conservatives, stuck close to their positions as stated in 
Parliament, and nowhere hinted that any other factors lay at the root 
on their differences, or the lengthy process, still in train, whereby 
they were coming to grips with complex policy issues.
A special consideration for Labour^^^) ^as a concern over a 
future situation which might arise in the E.E.C. Although a remote 
prospect, if a European Energy policy were formulated, and there was any 
likelihood of it being made to stick, then it would be theoretically 
enforceable against all U.K. companies. Experience suggested that MNOCs 
might resist a demand for special action from a national Goverment, but 
gave grounds for the belief that they would more readily accede to a 
European Community Directive. In any future crises, such a European 
Community Directive would most probably place Europe's needs ahead of 
Britain's special requirements, even to the extent of determining the
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disposal of British crude oil. Experience had also shown however, that 
no Community ruling would be pushed against an interest or company 
strongly supported by a national Government, since the maintenance of an 
apparent unity has been more important than strict compliance with a 
rule. It was Labour's view that if the British interest to be supported 
against Community pressure was B.N.O.C., then this considerably 
strengthened the chances of success.
The Conservative Party was publicly committed against the extension 
of public ownership, so whatever the merits of B.N.O.C., or the form it 
took they were constrained to oppose the idea of the Corporation. Yet 
in explaining why the Heath Government had resisted pressure for earlier 
changes from the Public Accounts, Patrick Jenkin explained that this was 
due to the need to make a very careful review of options, since it was 
more important to be right rather than quick. He a d m i t t e d ^ ^ l )  that 
amongst those options carefully considered was State participation, and 
that this was rejected in favour of fiscal changes, for which it was 
considered an alternative, because all the best territory had been 
already licensed, and the Conservatives believed it quite wrong to 
negotiate an interest in existing licenses, an action which they 
regarded as little removed from expropriation.
Labour by contrast, had already brought coal, gas and electricity 
into public ownership, so that the creation of a National Oil Company, 
while not full nationalization could readily be presented as an 
extension of that process. The very considerable influence of
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Tom Balogh lay behind the policy of forming B.N.O.C. Balogh, an 
academic colleague of Harold Wilson's from their days together in 
Oxford, beginning in 1938, had a far greater influence than that due 
to the fact that he was Anthony Wedgewood Benn's Energy Adviser «
Richard G r o s s m a n (32) recorded the behind the scenes involvement of 
Balogh in many matters dealt with by the previous Labour Government 
up to 1970. In 1973, Balogh had presented his views on the future 
control of North Sea oil to a hostile audience at the Institute of 
Petroleum, and these views were incorporated in the 1974 Whitepaper.
The Conservatives knew from experience the difficulties associated with 
denationalization and appreciated that once formed. State enterprises 
had a way of building up their defences against privatisation by a 
subsequent Conservative Government. The Banker (1977)^^^^ observed 
that full nationalisation to take all North Sea operations under State 
control was impractical. The proposed Conservative form of regulation 
was too weak. The creation of B.N.O.C. by Labour, and the subsequent 
negotiation of a State interest in existing licences, was more 
appropriate to the state of Oil Company Government relationship.
4.3 B.N.O.C. under Labour The principal matters with which B.N.O.C. was 
concerned, from its formation, till Labour left office in 1979, were firstly, 
the establishment of a presence in the North Sea, primarily through the 
introduction of State participation in existing licences, and secondly, the 
negotiation of the Britoil Loan. Since success in both these matters was 
partly attributable to the quality and character of the Corporation's top 
management team, some appreciation of how the B.N.O.C. Board was constituted, 
is a necessary preliminary to a consideration of these years under Labour.
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The composition of the Board, as set out in B.N.O.C.'s first (1976) Report 
and accounts is as follows:







Sir R. Fairbairn 
C.J. Hearne 




Lord Kearton (retired Chief 
of Courtaulds)
Lord Balogh
Deputy Secretary at the Dept, of Energy, 
i/c Oil and Gas Divs.
Deputy Secretary at the Treasury, 
i/c Industry Sector.
Retired senior Trade Union Official 
Representative of A.U.E.W.
Representative of Clydesdale Bank
Representative of N.M. Rothschild, Merchant Bankers
Chairman of British Gas
Chairman of British Aluminium
Former Chief Executive of the Shetland Islands
Council
Public Relations Consultant, who had worked for Gulf 
Oil and British Steel.
The above list, contains not a single person with relevant and 
significant oil industry experience, although Sir Dennis Rooke, had some 
managerial experience in the North Sea, through the involvement of British 
Gas in the Consortia which developed the southern North Sea gasfields, and 
had acquired a reputation as a tough negotiator, in establishing the price 
paid the oil companies for their gas production. At its formation, B.N.O.C. 
recruited staff for 'new' jobs, which paid somewhat above their private 
sector comparisons, since they were not subject to the constraints of the pay 
guidelines then in force. Despite this, when B.N.O.C. carried out a headhunt 
for people with relevant oil industry experience, to join the Board, the 
search proved fruitless. This suggests, that oil industry executives, with
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the necessary background, had decided as a group, not to join the Corporation 
as independent directors. The absence of directors, even in an independent 
capacity, with oil company backgrounds, reinforced the absence of an oil 
company view on the Board, which as will be shown shortly, was an intended 
consequence of denying the oil companies any formal representation on the 
Board of this new State enterprise, such as that accorded to other concerned 
interests.
The official reason, which was given for the formal representation of 
the Department of Energy on the B.N.O.C. Board, was in order to ensure that 
the new Corporation conformed to the overall guidelines of Government energy 
policy, but more probably this appointment helped in furthering the close 
co-ordination between the Department of Energy and the Corporation, which was 
necessary to bring about State participation in existing licences. The 
Treasury representatives was there to safeguard the Government's interest in 
the National Oil Account, into which all Government receipts from North Sea 
oil were paid, and from which the Corporation was permitted to borrow, as one 
of its primary sources of finance. The presence of these two Civil Servants 
on the Board of B.N.O.C. caused some concern in Whitehall, for it was seen as 
breaching the principle of their being a clear distinction between the 
formulation and carrying out of policy, and the normal relationships 
maintained between senior Civil Servants and a Public Enterprise.
Sir D. Allen (Lord Croham) the former Head of the Home Civil Service was 
appointed part time Deputy Chairman to replace Tom Balogh, when Balogh 
reached compulsory retirement age in September 1978. Balogh was immediately 
appointed as a consultant to the Corporation with powers little reduced 
compared with those he had exercised as Deputy Chairman.
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The former Chief Executive of the Shetland Islands Council was Ian R, 
C l a r k . M r .  Clark was appointed by A. Wedgewood Benn, in view of the 
remarkable skill he had exercised in negotiating the Sullom Voe terminal 
agreement with the oil companies, on behalf of the Shetland Islands Council. 
Clark had piloted a private Bill through Parliament to give the Council full 
control over this project, costing in all some £500 million. Thereafter, he 
insisted (for the first time in such agreements) that all the oil and gas 
brought ashore be stored, treated and liquefied within a single complex. 
Clark's negotiating position was undoubtedly very strong, since Sullom Voe 
was unquestionably the best geographical location available for the efficient 
operation of the terminal. As a trained accountant, he paid great attention 
to the minutest details which in the past the companies might have regarded 
as being too marginal for consideration. For example, he insisted on the 
profitable use of all peat removed in the building process, and secured extra 
payments for wear and tear on the Shetland Roads, arising from the use of 
heavy vehicles. Oilmen claimed that his attitude created delays and a mass 
of paperwork, and attributed his anti industry bias to his membership of the 
Plymouth Bretheren, but it was his evident ability as a tough operator which 
appealed to Mr. Benn.
Bailey(^^) expressed surprise that the oil companies were not 
represented on the B.N.O.C. Board, and attributes this to the fact that 
representation on the Board would have compromised the international position 
of BP, and once BP was excluded, it was necessary to exclude the other 
companies. It appears more likely that oil company representation was 
excluded for three other reasons. Firstly, B.N.O.C. had a statutory right to 
sit on Operating Committees (even where it did not hold an equity interest)
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and thus possesed perfect information, which it wished to protect from the 
oil companies who held only partial information. Secondly, company 
representation would have contaminated the decision making process with a 
company point of view. Finally, the representation of the Department of 
Energy shows that the Government proposed that the Corporation should work 
closely with the Department of Energy, and that this relationship took 
precedence over any relationship with the oil companies. Thus the original 
constitution of the B.N.O.C. Board was designed to facilitate a tight control 
over North Sea decisions, by the Department of Energy, the formal regulatory 
authority, acting in close concert with the British National Oil Corporation.
The process of securing a B.N.O.C. presence in the North Sea, involved 
two factors. The first factor involved the takeover of some existing 
interests held by the National Coal Board and the acquisiton of a substantial 
part of the North Sea holdings of Burmah Oil. These matters will be briefly 
described before considering in detail the second factor involved in securing 
a B.N.O.C. presence in the North Sea, the more interesting process 
(politically) whereby 'voluntary agreement' was reached for B.N.O.C. to buy 
into existing licences.
As regards the takeover of existing interests, under the Petroleum and 
Submarine Pipelines Act 1975, B.N.O.C. acquired the offshore assets of the 
National Coal Board, by purchasing them at face value from NCB (Exploration) 
Ltd. B.N.O.C. also took over certain long term obligations of the NCB 
relating to its North Sea activities, and discharged these with an advance of 
£90 million from the Government. In 1976, Burmah Oil got into serious 
financial difficulties, and both the Government and the Bank of England were
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involved in resolving its problem. As a result, B.N.O.C. acquired 80% of the 
interests of Burmah Oil (North Sea) Ltd., which itself included 80% of the 
Ninian Field. To manage these interests, a new B.N.O.C. subsidiary, B.N.O.C. 
Ninian was formed. The remaining Burmah North Sea interests, in Burmah Oil 
Development, a company responsible for Burmah's North Sea staff, and for its 
activities within the Operating Agreements, was similarly purchased by 
B.N.O.C. and renamed BODL Ltd. The total cost of these purchases was £130 
million, for which the Corporation obtained, as a compensation for 
substantial interest payments, a substantial North Sea acreage, together with 
the specialist staff needed to support operations. As a result of the BODL 
acquisition, B.N.O.C. obtained the following equity: Thistle field (16.2%); 
Murchison field (33%); Viking Gas field (50%).
The process of obtaining ’voluntary agreement' for B.N.O.C. to buy into 
existing licences, so that the companies were 'neither better nor worse o f f  
involved agreements falling into 3 groups:
(1) Agreements with Smaller Companies Companies such as Tricentrol, 
Ranger and Conoco fairly readily agreed to sell 51% of their crude 
oil to B.N.O.C. at market price.
(2) Agreements with Shell/Esso and other Majors These companies agreed 
to sell their crude oil to B.N.O.C. at the market price, and then 
to buy it back from the Corporation to meet the needs of their 
refineries. In later years, a further element was introduced, 
which enabled the companies to swap heavier crude oils from 
elsewhere for lighter B.N.O.C. crudes.
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(3) Agreement with BP Same as (2) except that BP agreed to train
B.N.O.C. staff in Downstream activities, subject to an agreement 
that B.N.O.C. would not go Downstream (into marketing and 
refining) for 5 years.
As regards (1) above, these smaller companies did not have their own 
refineries in the U.K., so that in conditions of refinery overcapacity then 
prevailing they were pleased that sale of their crude oil to B.N.O.C. gave 
them a guaranteed outlet. As regards (2) negotiations were particularly 
protracted, especially with Shell/Esso, who work together in the North Sea, 
with Shell as the operator. Strong language was used by the companies in 
stating their objections to B.N.O.C. proposals. For example, Clifton Garvin 
Jnr. of Exxon (Esso) stated 'as long as these agreements are
voluntary, we are not volunteering*. What lay behind these protracted 
negotiations has been explained by Austin W. Pearce^^^^ Chief Executive of 
Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd., Exxon's U.K. subsidiary. Before She11/Esso would 
agree, they had to be sure that they would be permitted to buy back 
sufficient of their North Sea crude to service their U.K. refineries, which 
took 2/3 of this production. However, at the outset of the negotiations, 
B.N.O.C. were only considering allowing the companies to buy back enough 
crude oil to meet 1/3 of their requirements. The resulting buy back 
agreements, which met the companies' requirements were regarded as something 
of a farce at the time, but they did establish B.N.O.C. ownership of crude 
oil, which meant that in the event of a dispute it would be the companies who 
would have to seek redress from the Courts. The Agreements were based on 
B.N.O.C. ownership of the crude oil in return for continued company access to 
the same crude oil, which in the circumstances of refinery overcapacity.
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suited all parties. The subsequent introduction of crude oil swaps into the 
arrangements, enabled the lighter North Sea crudes to be exchanged for 
heavier Middle East crudes, for which the U.K. refineries had been designed. 
The companies had some long term fears as to how and when B.N.O.C. would 
itself move into Downstream activities, but given the 30-40% refinery 
overcapacity then prevailing, and the likelihood that this would continue, 
the most probable scenario would be for B.N.O.C. to become engaged in special 
projects for 'whitening the barrel' (techniques concerned with increasing the 
quantity of gasoline obtained from crude oil).
During the Corporation's first year of operation, stated it's intention 
to act commercially yet amongst its staff there were those who saw the 
function of the organization to be supporting the watchdog activities of the 
Department of Energy, the official regulatory authority. For the Labour 
Party at large, the existence of the Corporation, and in particular the 
target of 51% participation, were symbols of political achievement. As for 
the oil industry, it feared that the Corporation would act as a ruthless 
entrepreneur, taking full advantage of all its special opportunities, so as 
to compete unfairly with the private sector.
With the 5th Licensing Round, the companies' fears appeared to be 
justified, for Amoco which had held out against 'voluntary' agreement on 
retrospective participation in existing licences, received no acreage under 
the discriminatory system of licence allocation. At the same time, a rift 
appeared between the Corporation and the U.K. Offshore Operators Association. 
Since B.N.O.C. was now to have a statutory interest in all the new Blocks 
allocated, both the Association and the Corporation realised that this would
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involve agreements being reached between the Corporation and each of its many 
partners, and so agreed to prepare and exchange proposed standard drafts for 
such agreements. The U.K. Offshore Operators Association rejected the 
Corporation's draft, the background to this rejection being as follows. The 
Offshore Operators expected that the Corporation would act commercially, 
which meant that it would act behind the back of its private partners in its 
own interest. Because of this, the Offshore Operators included in their 
draft agreement, a clause normal in such Operating Agreements up till that 
date, to the effect that each partner undertakes not to apply on its own 
account for Blocks surrounding the Block covered by the agreement in
question. Since all partners in a Block subject to a collective agreement
would have invested money in the exploitation of the Block, it would be 
unfair if one of the partners made an individual fresh investment on the
basis of information secured by all the partners as a consequence of
collective expenditure. Now B.N.O.C. would soon have far better information 
than any of its private sector partners and like its sister organization 
British Gas, it was permitted unlike the private sector companies, to apply 
for Blocks between Licensing Rounds. For these reasons, the B.N.O.C. 
excluded the conventional clause which would have placed a limitation upon 
its statutory rights.
Similar fears existed in the oil companies over the question of 
relinquishment. Under the licensing arrangements, continued control over a
Licence Block was subject to the performance of an adequate Work Programme, 
and failure to carry through such a programme led to relinquishment.
However, the authority which judged whether a Work Programme was satisfactory
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was the Department of Energy, and what was to stop the B.N.O.C., which was 
working closely with the DOE, from exerting pressure to have a Work Programme 
declared unsatisfactory, in order itself to take over a promising prospect? 
Furthermore, if B.N.O.C. was part of two Consortia, both bidding for the same 
Block, then it would require the judgement of King Solomon, to decide upon 
the merits of each bid, and decide between them. Many of these matters were 
not readily resolved, and as the Corporation moved to build up its staff, 
delays occurred in the North Sea decision making process, even where these 
delays were not the result of Department of Energy action designed to create
special advantages for the new Corporation.
By early 1978, many of the oil companies and their executives were 
becoming extremely depressed by the impact of B.N.O.C. upon the North Sea,
although the companies themselves did not complain for they feared to rock
the boat, as this might set off further moves against them in the shape of 
granting B.N.O.C. the first refusal on farm ins(sales of equity to secure 
fresh working capital), and the granting of B.N.O.C. sole rights in the 
ownership of Blocks. In short, a further shift of advantage away from the 
oil companies, and towards the Corporation, appeared to be in the pipeline. 
This did not prevent some individuals expressing their views, and indeed 
these private expressions of view may have been sponsored by the oil 
companies, in the sure knowledge that they could disclaim responsibility if 
the going got rough. The first public complaint came from George Keller of 
Standard of C a l i f o r n i a , a n d  it came in a David Frost interview by 
satellite, on 4th April 1978. Standard of California's subsidiary Chevron, 
was the Operator of the Ninian field, in which it will be recalled, B.N.O.C. 
held a substantial interest, through its acquisition of the former Burmah Oil
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holding.
George Keller said 'B.N.O.C. makes no contribution to your economy, or 
your control of the oil situation, and it does slow down and complicate out 
attempts to run a very professional business. I can think of nothing which 
has been accomplished so far which couldn't have been accomplished faster, at 
a lower cost, if there had been no B.N.O.C.' and he added that the 
Corporation was an 'albatross around the neck of the oil industry'. In 
reply. Lord Kearton stated that 'the organization, ideas, and motivation to 
place orders in the U.K. were all inadequate' and 'B.N.O.C. holding 21% of 
North Sea equity, was in a strong position to see the thing done properly,' 
adding that' the albatross was a good luck bird, and the trouble in the 
Ancient Mariner is they shot the good luck bird.' Immediately after the 
programme. Lord Kearton obtained a public retraction of the Keller statement 
from Standard of California.
On the day following the programme, B.N.O.C. announced that the Thistle 
field was in production, and Anthony Wedgewood Benn made a significant 
statement about the Corporation, to the effect that B.N.O.C. had been granted 
exclusive control of a number of licence Blocks, and that B.N.O.C., and to a 
lesser extent British Gas, had been given first refusal on all assignments 
(changes of ownership, including 'farm ins') for territory allocated in the 
1st to 4th Licensing Rounds. Mr. Benn announced a particular 'farm in' deal 
between B.N.O.C. on the one hand and the original licensees. Chevron, Siebens 
Oil and Gas U.K., and Westburne Drilling Co. The Benn announcement, suggests 
the real cause of the Keller outburst, but also indicated that relations 
between Standard of California and the British Government had not been
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seriously impaired. Mr. Benn stated 'Chevron will carry B.N.O.C. for all 
costs until a discovery is declared commercial, and a decision is taken to 
develop by the partners. At this time, B.N.O.C. must decide whether or not 
proceed with its interest, and pay its share of past and future costs'. 
Keller's reference to the slowing down and complicating of the decision 
making process, related specially to the annoyance caused by the manner in 
which this particular deal had been handled by B.N.O.C. and the Government, 
Chevron, Siebens and Westburne, had themselves agreed an arrangement in 
the Summer of 1977, whereby they had hoped to see their drilling ship Ocean 
Lancer at work in the territory in question by August of that same year. 
However, such arrangements were subject to the approval of the official 
regulatory authority, the Department of Energy, and there was a strong 
suspicion on the part of Standard of California, which had indeed existed for 
some time before the Frost interview, that approval of the deal between the 
original licensees was being purposefully delayed, till such time as 
procedures for the preferential inclusion of B.N.O.C. had been completed. 
Events suggested the suspicions of Standard of California to be well founded.
A similar incident occurred in the relationship between Occidental 
Petroleum and the Corporation, when Robert McAlister of Occidental prepared a 
letter for his company's House Journal, in which he claimed 'the unpublished 
objective of the Socialists is eventually to put the rest of us out of 
business in the U.K.' Like the unpublished objective, this letter was never 
itself published, and the author thought better of it, but it was leaked.
The letter as leaked, claimed that B.N.O.C. had influenced the Department of 
Energy, so as to delay the 5th Licensing Round for over a year, till such 
time as the Corporation was in a better condition to bid for acreage, and
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take full advantage of all the opportunities created for it by the 
Government. As for Occidental itself, approval for its drilling on Block 
14/18 had been held up for a further 3 months, so that B.N.O.C. might 
exercise its option to become involved. Lord Kearton obtained a public 
retraction of the view expressed in the leak from Armand Hammer, McAlister's 
superior.
The U.K. Offshore Operators Association attempted to get the provisions 
granting B.N.O.C. the first refusal on relinquishments repealed, but this 
pressure was not successful. The powerful position established by B.N.O.C. 
in the North Sea, caused Tom King, the Conservative energy spokesman to refer 
to the 'Godfatherlike power of B.N.O.C.' Lord Kearton dismissed all 
criticisms both from the oil industry and the Opposition, observing that 'the 
Government has been extraordinarily scrupulous in living up to the pledges it 
gave to the oil industry.' B.N.O.C. spokesman claimed the 'unpublished 
objective' was 'way off beam' and further stated that the reason behind the 
slowing down of North Sea decisions, related to concern over depletion, which 
in the light of the circumstances hardly rings true. The journal Industry 
Week(39) asked the question, why is B.N.O.C. able to exercise such power?
The conclusion it reached was, that under Benn and Kearton, the roles of the 
Department of Energy and the B.N.O.C. had become blurred, so that every 
project in the North Sea, be it a multi million pound project, or a 
relatively small matter, had to pass through both organisations before a 
decision could be taken. The article quoted an unnamed Operations Manager as 
saying 'if they want to get you, they can make life hell, they can delay a 
multi million dollar project, and they do if it suits them'. The company 
voice expressing itself here was now anonymous, but it was clear that the
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companies felt the delays to be intentional. At one point in the argument 
between the oil industry and the Corporation, Lord Kearton had said the 
intention of a mass of irrelevant complaints was merely to arouse the press, 
and to stimulate Opposition politicians, rather in the fashion of old 
fashioned lawyers who bring up a mass of irrelevant matters to influence a 
Jury. Now it was clear that the oil industry felt its grievances to be well 
founded.
In announcing the 6th Licensing Round, Anthony Wedgewood Benn, claimed 
that the terms were now tougher, in order to compensate the Government for 
the fact that the terms in previous Rounds had been so advantageous to the 
oil industry. In June 1978, the U.K. Offshore Operators Association sent a
delegation to the Department of Energy, to complain that the Government's
North Sea policy was now so obstructionist, that the whole North Sea 
programme was in danger of getting bogged down. The Association objected, on 
behalf of its members, to plans designed to give both the best Licence 
Blocks, and over 51% of the equity, to B.N.O.C., as well as the proposal that 
the private sector oil companies would cover B.N.O.C. for all its costs till 
such time as a commercial discovery was located. Then, as part of their 
bargaining strategy, they threatened to boycott the 6th Licensing Round 
entirely, unless their was some improvement in the situation.
Earlier in the same year (1978, Lord Kearton, speaking to the Select 
Committee on the Nationalized Industries, gave a hint that perhaps he too 
feared the balance of advantage in the North Sea had shifted rather too much 
in the Corporation's favour, by expressing the view that the best days in the
North Sea were over, and he believed there might be 'a retreat to home
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waters' by the U.S. oil companies, in order to concentrate on the development 
of their domestic oil resources. A shift of effort away from the North Sea, 
could of course be a reflection of the relative unnattractiveness of the 
North Sea as compared with elsewhere, rather than as Lord Kearton stated, the 
pressure to develop domestic U.S. oil resources, reflecting the progressive 
trend away from a state of self sufficiency in the U.S.A. While almost all 
production estimates in the North Sea tend to be high initially, and require 
subsequent adjustment downwards, the year 1978 was remarkable in this 
respect. Initial estimates, suggested production would lay between 60 and 70 
million tonnes, but these were sharply reduced to 55 million tonnes during 
the year. Thus it does appear that the bureaucratic delays of which the oil 
industry complained, and the reduced attractiveness of the North Sea, arising 
in part from these delays and stiffened terms, were having a practical toll. 
Thus the Government, in seeking to change the business environment in the 
North Sea at so rapid a rate in favour of B.N.O.C., had held up decisions 
till such time as the Corporation was ready to take advantage of each change 
in its favour, and the resulting situation had proved a general discincentive 
to the oil industry.
Throughout this period, there was no serious conflict between the dual 
roles of the Corporation as a State enterprise and a commercial company, as 
the energies of both the Corporation and the Government were jointly directed 
to building up both the capabilities and responsibilities of B.N.O.C. The 
general accord between Anthony Wedgewood Benn and Lord Kearton on securing 
these objectives, was maintained without any serious breach, even though 
Kearton did object to the Government's decision to build an extra Drilling 
Rig on the Clyde as a measure of support for the Shipyards, when in his view
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there was no commercial justification for the vessel. A greater possibility 
existed for conflict between the Government and the Corporation once the 
period of initial buildup was completed, or where the Government was 
ideologically opposed to State enterprise.
In June 1977, B.N.O.C. took advantage of its powers to borrow privately, 
and negotiated the Britoil Loan in the U.S.A., the advantage of which 
included a limited measure of protection against any attempt by a future 
Conservative Administration to reduce the Corporation's powers, through the 
privatisation of this recently acquired North Sea assets. The Corporation 
engaged in a defensive strategy^^O). At the time of the Britoil Loan, 
which was not guaranteed by the Treasury, the Corporation had borrowed £900 
million of U.K. Government funds from the National Oil Account, out of a 
total permitted borrowing of £1500 million, and was paying interest at 14.1% 
at a time when U.K. industry was borrowing money at 8%. The Britoil Loan, 
negotiated with a consortium of primarily American Banks (Barclays, Chase 
Manhattan, Chemical Bank, Citibank, Continental Illinois, Manufacturers 
Hanover Trust, Republic National Bank of Dallas) also involved repayment at 
8% of a loan of £825 million, which was secured against the forward sales of 
B.N.O.C. crude oil by an organisation called Britoil, which was set up in 
the U.S.A. for the purpose, and gave its name to the agreement. Repayment 
started in the 3rd Quarter of 1978, with funds obtained by this means, and 
the Loan lasted for 8 years, so that any Government move which might 
seriously undermine the flow of crude oil to fund this repayment, would lead 
to an instant demand from the banks for the total repayment of the capital 
sum. At the time of the Britoil Loan, estimates of North Sea production for 
1980, lay between 90 and 100 million tonnes, and of this, 60% was B.N.O.C.
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crude oil. For purposes of comparison, in 1976, BP total sales of crude oil 
totalled 79 million tonnes, and of refined products, 86 million tonnes.
In June 1977, the Britoil Loan was viewed in business circles in terms 
of the status it provided for the Corporation, for the acquisition of such a 
Loan signalled to the international business community, especially the 
Americans, that B.N.O.C. was a viable enterprise, and distinct from such lame 
ducks as British Leyland and British Steel. In short, the Corporation was in 
the Big League of oil companies. Secondly, as the loan was with a primarily 
U.S. consortium, it was in this sense doubly out of Parliamentary control, 
being both a private loan, and an arrangement made with non British
interests. It gave the Corporation a measure of protection against a
Conservative remodelling of its role. Not a total protection of course but 
some safeguard against a programme of radical change, both as to the extent 
of the changes the Conservatives might contemplate, and the rate at which
these might be introduced. Thirdly, by borrowing at 8% the Corporation was
able to repay many of its outstanding commitment to the National oil Account, 
the interest to which was then running at 14.1%. The Corporation knew, that 
when a Conservative Government again took Office, there would be a 
reassessment of the role of State Corporations, and in view of the publicly 
stated attitude of the Conservative Party, it seemed most likely that 
B.N.O.C. would be a prime target for the reduction of its role. The Britoil 
Loan, while being sound commercially, provided some defense against this 
eventuality. Towards the end of Labour's period of Government, Douglas Evans
observed 'B.N.O.C. seems to personify both in Statute and in practice 
all those elements of interventionism which have characterised the post war 
history of Britain under both Conservative and Labour Governments , which we
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are now being obliged to re-examine. The solution may not be so drastic as a 
wholesale abolition of bodies like B.N.O.C., but more probably a willingness 
to fail to fully implement its truly enormous powers, and to restrict its 
activities very largly to Upstream Operations'.
In view of the criticisms made of B.N.O.C. during this period, it may be 
of value to consider how the Corporation judged itself, at the end of 
Labour's period of Office, as a benchmark against which to set the view it 
expressed of itself during the ensuing period of Conservative Government.
The Corporation's 3rd (1978) Report and Accounts,  ^was published on 
3rd April, 1979, and after a factual statement of the work carried out during 
the period covered, pages 6-7 are concerned to justify the special 
role accorded B.N.O.C. by arguing the case for the Corporation on four 
grounds. Firstly, B.N.O.C. provided increasing knowledge and understanding 
of North Sea activities; secondly, B.N.O.C. provided a knowledge of 
technology, thus helping safe and economic development; thirdly, the 
Corporation contributed to the dialogue between the oil industry and the 
Government ; finally, the Corporation advised the Government on the 
development of national oil policy. The Report then set out to clear up what
it claimed, were two common misconceptions about B.N.C.O., namely that it
enjoyed special financial advantages compared with private industry, and 
exercised a high degree of control over North Sea activity, which was
detrimental to the progress of the work.
On the financial charge, the Corporation agreed that unlike the oil 
companies, it did not have to pay PRT (Petroleum Revenue Tax), yet since all 
PRT payments had to be made into the National Oil Account, into which all
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B.N.O.C. receipts had anyway to be paid, what would be the point? The impact 
of making PRT payments, had they been made, was actually shown in the 
Corporation's Accounts, though it is well to remember that if the Corporation 
had been given such a liability, no actual payments would have been due till 
1983. The Corporation pointed out that it had not been involved in what it 
termed the early bonanza (this was an echo of Anthony Wedgewood Benn's 
argument in favour of stiffer terms for the oil industry in the 6th Round, 
because they had benefited from former very favourable conditions), and 
further pointed out that the Corporation had financed a substantial drilling 
programme, at a time when discovery rates were falling. The whole B.N.O.C. 
programme of activity, had required the Corporation to carry massive interest 
charges, on debts incurred over a very few years, and the payment of £115 
million to Burmah Oil, had been for assets valued at well above historic 
costs, at the time of purchase. Despite these financial disadvantages, the 
Corporation was hopeful of achieving a profit in 1979.
On the charge that it exercised a high degree of control over North Sea 
activity, which was detrimental to the progress of the work, the Report 
contented itself with stating the formal position on the regulation of North 
Sea activity, which was that the Corporation was not the regulatory 
authority, and that the duty of securing regulation lay with the Department 
of Energy. While one does not expect a sophisticated response to such a 
charge in an Annual Report, which after all is a fairly straightforward 
document for public relations purposes, this response fell short of what was 
required, in that it totally failed to answer the real charge of the 
Corporation's critics, namely that under Kearton and Benn, the formal lines 
of demarcation between the responsibilities of the Corporation, and those of
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the Department of Energy, had become blurred. The Report went on to point 
out that while the Corporation had a duty to advise the Government, the 
Government was under no obligation to accept this advice. Once again, in 
stating the formal position, no answer was made to the charge of the 
Corporation's critics, that the roles and responsibilities of the Corporation 
and the Department of Energy had become blurred.
4.4 B.N.O.C. under the Conservatives In October, 1978, a report by the U.K. 
Offshore Operators Association observed :
'a mammoth effort will be needed... to achieve substantial production 
levels in the 1990's. This will call for extensive involvement of the 
whole international oil industry. Therefore U.K.0.0.A. strongly 
advocates that the Government, in defining its policies... should 
concentrate on providing the necessary incentives... it suggests the 
controls the Government have built up over the rates of production 
are more than adequate, so that new Government planning effort should be 
switched from controls to incentives.'
In the previous year (1977) a statement of Conservative economic policy 
a p p e a r e d , (44) g^e of the authors of which was David Howell, who took over 
the Department of Energy when the Conservatives came to power in 1979. A 
brief reference was made to a whole range of economic and industrial issues, 
and notwithstanding a vagueness, which is a general characteristic of all 
such policy statements, it remains surprising that no reference was made to 
B.N.O.C. or its role in the North Sea, given the Conservatives' so recently 
fierce opposition to the Corporation's creation. Nevertheless, the general
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philosophy behind this policy statement, reflected in its stress on the need 
to reduce controls, and increase incentives, appeared to be substantially in 
accord with the strategy advocated by the U.K. Offshore Operators 
Association.
Bailey,(45) provides a useful survey of the first 6 months of the 
Conservative Government, in respect of decisions effecting B.N.O.C. and the 
North Sea. After a review of the Corporation's role, David Howell made a 
statement of the Government's intentions on 26th July, 1979. The objective 
was to reduce the powers of B.N.O.C. in the following manner. Preferential 
access to the best North Sea acreage in the allocation of licenses was to be 
removed from B.N.O.C. The Corporation was to lose its right to seats on 
Operating Committees in those cases where it did not hold equity, and was no 
longer to enjoy the right to borrow from the National Oil Account. The role 
of B.N.O.C. as adviser to the Government on North Sea policy was to be ended. 
The effect of these measures would be to remove any unfair advantages 
B.N.O.C. possessed, compared with the Private Sector, to stress the 
Corporation's commercial role, and eliminate its function as the Government's 
North Sea watchdog, where its activities were regarded by the oil companies 
as an unwarranted intrusion into their legitimate concerns.
Having thus made clear the Government's intention to elimate B.N.O.C.'s 
role in the control of North Sea activities, David Howell went on to say that 
the Government proposed to raise £400 million through a sale of B.N.O.C. 
assets, so as to bring private capital into the North Sea. The Corporation 
was the largest trader of North Sea crude oil, and these trading operations 
were bringing in a revenue of £300 million a month. While there was no
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suggestion at this time that the Government planned to interfere in this 
trading role directly, in Sir Geoffrey Howell's earlier June 1979 Budget, the 
Corporation had been made subject to Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT), the terms 
for the application of which had been sharply stiffened. The effect of these 
measures was to highlight and separate the two roles of the Corporation, an 
Upstream Exploration and Production role, and a Downstream Trading role, so 
that Bailey wondered at the time whether the real intention of the Government 
was not to divide B.N.O.C. into two separate organisations to carry out these 
tasks.
On September 14th 1979, David Howell, in a move described by Richard 
Bailey as 'an elegant three point turn' announced that the sale of £400 
million of B.N.O.C. assets, was postponed indefinitely. This raised the 
issue of what caused the Government to change direction, and was this change 
of direction a temporary deviation, after which they would return to their 
former course? Howell explained that the Govenment were now considering the 
introduction of North Sea bonds which would enable the public to share 
directly in North Sea wealth, an intention which Sir Geoffrey Howell was to 
reiterate in 1981. The 1979 decision to put the sale of B.N.O.C. assets on 
ice was only taken after a very long discussion in Cabinet, (46) his
statement David Howell indicated that the Government now proposed to obtain 
the money they required from the forward selling of crude oil, an operation 
in which B.N.O.C. was well skilled as a consequence of its Britoil 
operations. Reference to the need for money, indicated that this was the 
immediate consideration involved in the proposed sale of assets, rather than 
a fundamental desire to introduce more private capital into the North Sea.
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Lord Kearton, who planned to retire in November 1979 as B.N.O.C. 
Chairman, a move he intended to carry through even before the new 
Conservative Government took Office, mounted a campaign to convince the 
Conservative Ministers that a massive sale of assets would be ill judged. He 
based his argument not only on his experience with B.N.O.C., but also as a 
result of his Private Sector experience. It was he who used the argument for
the first time, which was to become the standard defence by a successful
State industry, threatened by the prospect of vertical divestiture and 
privatisation. Just like a private Sector company, a successful State 
enterprise depended for its continuing success upon a stream of profits which 
were generated by its profit making assets, and a Government committed to the
generation of profit making enterprise must surely recognise the truth of
this proposition. A sale of B.N.O.C. assets on the scale intended, would 
undermine the Corporation's profit making base, undermining its hopes of 
becoming fully profitable in 1979, and endangering the basis of the Britoil 
Loan. The Government both wished to reduce taxation, while increasing its 
income and avoiding an increase in their Public Sector Borrowing Requirement, 
and on balance a large scale sale of B.N.O.C. equity, requiring a major 
renegotiation of the Participation Agreements, was incompatible with this 
aim. A judicious sale of equity (by means of small 'farm ins') was 
practical, as the detrimental effects of a large scale sale would be avoided, 
and since B.N.O.C. was experienced in the forward selling of crude oil, some 
additional crude might be sold in this fashion to meet the Government's 
current financial difficulties. Immediate and large scale privatisation was 
not achievable, and such privatisation, to be a valid option, would need to 
be spread over a longer period. Baily suggests these arguments of Kearton's 
led to the 'elegant three point turn, and he finds it surprising that a
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Conservative Government, imbued with the enterprise ethic, did not themselves 
appreciate the stream of profits argument, and had to wait for Kearton to 
point it out to them.
In February, 1981 the Petroleum and Continental Shelf Bill was 
published, and although it subsequently had to be reintroduced, and was not 
enacted till mid 1982, its initial appearance, suggested that the Government 
had returned to their former tack. The Bill contained the following powers. 
B.N.O.C. (in effect the Secretary of State) was empowered to sell its equity, 
to hive off some of its activities (unspecified) into subsidiaries, and to 
offer shares in these subsidiaries to the public. Proceeds from all such 
sales were to go into the Consolidated Fund, and the National Oil Account was 
to be abolished.
According to the The Economist, (47) reasoning behind this fresh 
determination to privatise, could be traced to a fresh look being taken at 
the relationships between the Government and State industry, recently carried 
out by Ron Tibbs of the Central Policy Research Unit. This study 
demonstrated that the forward financial estimates of State industries for 
1981, were already hopelessly innaccurate, even very early in the year, and 
suggested that the Government needed to review means of losing some of the 
resultant liabilities, and cushioning their effects. Arising from this 
study, and concurrently with the publication of the Petroleum and Continental 
Shelf Bill, attempts began to get British Gas to dispose of its successful 
Morecambe Bay gasfield, to sell off the oilfield it had discovered at Wytch 
Bay, Dorset, and to divest itself of its High Street gas appliance business.
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Significantly, towards the end of 1981, (which is the concluding date 
for the present study), David Howell was replaced by Nigel Lawson, who 
announced on 18th October 1981, that the Upstream (Exploration and 
Production) activities of B.N.O.C. would definitely be privatised, less a 
small retained stake, while the offshore operations of British Gas would 
receive similar treatment. Norman Lamont, in answer to a question from David 
Owen, stated that all the privatisation decisions had been taken before David 
Howell left Office, but the fact remains that Nigel Lawson was of a more 
determinedly monetarist and Thatcherite view than his predecessor, which 
suggested to the writer that on this occasion, the change of policy was 
likely to be persisted with, and there was no reason to conclude that the 
Conservatives now accepted that the stream of profits argument applied to 
successful State enterprise, in the same way that Labour accepted the 
contribution of a successful Private Sector to the mixed economy. The need 
to bail out 'lame duck' State enterprise with a minimum of impact upon the 
Treasury, appeared to make the disposal of profitable State enterprises 
attractive in the short term, whatever the longer term results for the 
Exchequer. (Footnote*)
Footnote* A survey made in April 1983, shows how Nigel Lawson
actually proceeded. B.N.O.C.'s trading arm was retained, with access to 51% 
of North Sea crude oil, while B.N.O.C.'s Upstream (Exploration and 
Production) activities were hived off into a new company, Britoil, headed by 
Philip Shelbourne. An underwriting exercise was carried out by the Banks and 
Pension Funds in November, 1982, and 51% of the new company was offered to 
the Public in April 1983, whereupon only a third of the offer was taken up, 
principally by small investors, as a consequence of the depressed condition
N5H410
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of oil shares at that time. When Britoil was established, B.N.O.C. had £252 
million of debts which were transferred to the new company. In addition to 
this, B.N.O.C. owed the Government a further £129 million, which was 
recovered by means of a £132 Million debenture, which sum then added to the 
company's initial balance, to give it a total debt of £384 million. By this 
means, Lawson was able to demonstrate to the House of Commons that there had 
been no cancellation of debt, which would have been a cause for additional 
outrage from the Opposition, given the sensitivity to the denationalization 
issue on their part. Labour committed itself to the renationalization of 
Britoil on terms which would deprive investors of any capital gains. As 
regards the plans to make British Gas sell off their Wytch Farm, Dorset 
oilfield, the local Isle of Purkbeck newspapers, show that in late August 
1983, British Gas were still fighting a rearguard action, by disputing to the 
last the financial terms for this sell off of their assets, on the grounds 
that the oilfield has now achieved a very substantial production. The final 
sale of Wytch Farm was completed in May 1984, to a Consortium of interests, 
by which time plans were well advanced to sell the North Sea oil interests of 
British Gas to the public by floating a new company called Enterprise Oil.
(End of Footnote)
It remains to be considered how the Corporation and the oil industry 
reacted to the change of Government, and the subsequent modifications of 
policy, from 1979 to 1981: The response of the Corporation can be seen from 
the 1979 and 1980 Reports and Accounts. The 1979 Report (47) contains some 
significant remarks by R.E. Utiger, who had succeeded Lord Kearton as 
Chairman:
4-55
'It has been the essence of (B.N.O.C.'s) activities throughout its 
existence that it must aim for the highest degree of efficiency in its 
operations; that it would work in partnership with private sector 
companies; and that, as the national company it would be particularly 
responsive to national policy objectives. The Corporation believes that 
it can carry out a valuable role for the country, under widely different 
political regimes.'
At a later point, in the Highlights, the Report shows how the 
Corporation had proceeded towards the objective of a judicious sale of 
equity:
'The Corporation advertised that it was willing to consider offers from 
companies to 'farm in' 23 of its licensed Blocks. Negotiations on a 
number of these were in progress at the end of the year.'
In the 1980 Report Philip Shelbourne, who had by that time taken
over as Chairman and Chief Executive, stated:
'The Secretary of State made a significant speech in October 1980, 
concerning the future of the Corporation, and these proposals are 
incorporated in the Petroleum and Continental Shelf Bill introduced in 
February, 1981. While pressure on the legislative timetable, makes it 
unlikely that further progress on the Bill will be made in the current 
Parliamentary Session, the Government has confirmed that it remains 
committed to the Bill, and that it intends to reintroduce it in its 
present form, during the next Session.'
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As regards those changes already introduced by the Conservative 
Government, shortly after they came to Office, he observed:
'These undoubtedly had a beneficial effect on our relations with the oil 
industry generally, as it no longer felt that we occupy and unduly 
privileged position.'
Amongst the Highlights listed in the 1980 Report, it is noted that 
several of the Corporation's senior staff are assisting the exploration arm 
of Petronas, the Malaysian National Oil Company, and that Petronas staff are 
training with the Corporation in the U.K. B.N.O.C. was also carrying out 
joint training programmes with the Venezuelan National Oil Company, and was 
actively negotiating for onshore and offshore acreage in Dubai. Since all 
such moves abroad were at the discretion of the Secretary of State, this 
indicates that the Government was encouraging the process of 
multinationalisation, probably as part of a strategy designed to make 
B.N.O.C. more like a Multinational Oil Company. However, most of B.N.O.C.'s 
overseas connections were with other National Oil Companies, and not with the 
Private Sector. Moreover, the changes in hand, to privatise the Upstream 
(Exploration and Production) arm of B.N.O.C., were to ensure that neither the 
privatised Britoil, or the remaining activities of B.N.O.C. in the trading 
area were like MNOCs, since both were the outcome of vertical divestiture, 
while an MNOC tends to be vertically integrated, in all phases of the 
business.
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In the 1981 Report Shelbourne spoke of privatisation in the
following terms:
'The effect...will be largely as set out in my last Statement, namely 
the abolition of the National Oil Account, and the transfer of our 
present Upstream activities of exploring for and getting oil to a new
subsidiary called Britoil. At the earliest appropriate date, 51% of the
ordinary shares of that company will be sold to the public'.
R.E. Utiger's Chairman's statement, retains an element of justification 
for B.N.O.C.'s existence, rather in the style of his predecessor Lord
Kearton, but Philip Shelbourne's is merely factual, noting the proposed
changes.
The response of the oil industry to the changes introduced by the
Conservatives when first they came to Office, and the forward selling of
crude by B.N.O.C. to assist the Government with their immediate financial
problem, thus avoiding the need for a large scale disposal of assets, were
varied. The normal practice with the forward selling of crude oil, is for
the money to change hands at the time the crude oil is delivered, the price
having been determined at the earlier date of contract. However, in late
1979, B.N.O.C. required that U.S. companies purchasing North Sea crude oil
( 52 )
should pay cash at the time of contract. . Some 6 U.S. companies were
required to pay cash 'up front' in this manner.
In the North Sea itself, those U.S. Independents without U.K. refining 
capacity, who had been happy to enter Participation Agreements, in order to
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secure a certain outlet for their crude oil at a time of refinery
overcapacity, by 1980 were complaining that they were not receiving a fair
price for this crude oil from B.N.O.C. A more general dissatisfaction was
expressed by the oil industry, as a result of the delays experienced in
carrying forward the 7th Licencing Round, These delays arose from the time
needed by the Government to carry through legislative measures to reduce the
powers of B.N.O.C., which action was a prerequisite of the 7th Licensing
. (53)Round. Barbara Ellis however, suggested that the 7th Licensing Round
was having the effect of encouraging the oil companies, not just the Majors, 
to return to the North Sea, since the provisions of the Round required that 
the larger companies and B.N.O.C. should become associated with the smaller 
companies in joint licence applications. At the end of our period, the very 
limited evidence available suggested a greater interest in the North Sea by 
the oil industry, in part resulting from the reduced powers of B.N.O.C.
4.5 Summary of Conclusions
Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) operate on the principle of global 
optimisation, which has generally brought many economic benefits for 
cuntries involved in the system, but where the results of global 
optimisation are economically sub optimal for a particular country, this 
provides grounds for the formation of a National Oil Company (NOC). 
However, the grounds for setting up National Oil Companies (NOCs), have 
usually been other than economic, so that when National Oil Companies 
(NOCs) are set up, this creates a potential for a conflict between 
commercial objectives of the professional managers, who take 
entrepreneurial advantage of all the special support given them by
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their Governments, and the social and political objectives of those 
Governments. (Para 4.11)
The 1973 Oil Crisis, demonstrated the increasing power of all the 
producing countries, not just the Arab States, and encouraged a speeding 
up of the process creeping nationalization, through an extension of the 
roles assigned to their National Oil Companies (NOCs). Concurrently, the 
same events demonstrated the powerlessness of the consuming countries, and 
stimulated a growth of National Oil Companies (MOCs) in these countries so 
as to demonstrate something was being done about the energy question to 
their electorates, and in some measure lessen their dependence on the 
Multinational Oil Companies. Thus the perception of the event of 1973, in 
consuming and producing countries alike, stimulated a growth in the number 
and importance of National Oil Companies (NOCs). (Para 4.12)
Experience of the attitude of Sir William Fraser, the Chairman of
A.I.O.C. (later BP) in the Iranian Crisis, caused Labour Ministers, 
whether for or against intervention, to conclude, that the British 
Government could not in a crisis rely on BP to be an effective instrument 
of Government policy, in those cases where there was a conflict of 
interest between the policy objective and the commercial interests of the 
company. The 1973 Oil Crisis demonstrated to the Heath Government, and to 
the Labour Party, the powerlessness of the Government in the face of a 
coalition of MNOCs, so that both Parties judged that the existing legal 
provisions for the control of North Sea oil, had to be supplemented by 
appropriate organisational means. (Para 4.21)
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Labour were committed to the extension of State control over British 
industry, so that the creation of B.N.O.C. was a natural development from 
this commitment, while the Conservatives were trapped within their 
committment to oppose the extension of State control, and were aware of 
the manner in which State industries, once established, acquire the 
ability to delay and resist denationalization. In practice, B.N.O.C. 
was set up, because given the condition of the Oil Company Government 
relationship, full nationalization was impractical, while the proposed 
Conservative regulation was too weak. (Para 4.22)
Oil Company representation on the B.N.O.C. Board was excluded, so as 
to protect the perfect information possessed by the Corporation through 
its membership of all Operating Committees, even those where it held no 
equity. Exclusion of Oil Company representation, ensured that the 
decision making process was uncontaminated by an oil industry viewpoint. 
Treasury and Department of Energy representation on the Board, which went 
beyond the roles normally assigned to the Civil Service, was designed to 
facilitate the close working together of the Corporation and the 
Government in extending control over North Sea opeations. (Para 4.3)
The Labour Government strove to change the North Sea operating 
environment to favour B.N.O.C., and regime changes, together with 
operational decision making were held up till a time favourable to the 
interests of the Corporation. Combined with bureaucratic delays, which 
arose from both the formal regulatory authority, the Department of Energy 
and B.N.O.C., considering all matters in tandem, so that their roles
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became in effect merged, this situation brought a strong reaction from the 
oil industry, against what they saw as unfair advantages given to the 
Corporation, (Para 4.3.)
While both the Corporation and the Government were engaged in 
extending B.N.O.C.'s powers in the North Sea, no conflict of interest 
arose between them. In negotiating the Britoil Loan, the Corporation was 
able to pay off some of its higher interest borrowing from the National 
Oil Account, and by linking the security of the Loan against forward sales 
of its crude oil, it engaged in a defensive strategy, which constrained 
the speed with which a future Conservative Government might engage in 
privatisation. (4.3)
On reaching Office, the Conservatives, given their ideological 
commitment, and conscious of the strong reaction of the oil industry to
B.N.O.C.'s special privileges, moved swiftly to reduce these privileges 
even though this necessitated slowing the implementation of the 7th 
Licensing Round, for which these changes were a necessary prerequisite. 
However, initial plans for privatisation, partially a product of the 
Government's need for finance, were shelved in response to an argument by 
Lord Kearton that the disposal of wealth creating assets would deprive the 
Government of a future stream of profits, while the more immediate 
consequence might be to endanger the Britoil Loan, based as it was on the 
ongoing sales of North Sea crude oil in the U.S.A. The Government's 
financial needs might better be met by an increase in the forward selling 
of this crude oil, an operation in which B.N.O.C. already had considerable 
experience. (Para 4.4.)
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In February 1981, enabling legislation to carry out privatisation was 
introduced, and though it was not completed in that Session, in October 
1981, the new Secretary of State for Energy, Nigel Lawson, a determined 
monetarist, announced plans to press ahead with privatisation, which 
appeared likely to be persisted with, since the immediate requirements for 
Government finance, without placing an extra burden on the Treasury, now 
outweighed any longer term disadvantages, such as those pointed out at an 
earlier date by Lord Kearton. In the event, privatisation measures, 
involving hiving off B.N.O.C.'s exploration and production activities into 
a new company, and their sale to the public, were carried through in 1982. 
(Para 4.4.)
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Chapter 5 Conservative North Sea Policy, 1979-1981, and the Impact of
Economic Policy, as demonstrated through Two Case Studies, the Gas 
Gathering Line Case Study, and the Clyde Field Development Delay 
Case Study.
5.1 Introduction In Chapter 4, the creation of the British National Oil 
Corporation (B.N.O.C.) by the Labour Government in 1975, and the changed role 
assigned the Corporation by their Conservative successors, provided an 
illustration of the progressive divergence of Labour and Conservative North 
Sea policy, along lines determined by the ideological attitudes of the two 
Parties, on the proper means for organising industry. The present Chapter 
will show that the nature of the Conservative Government's North Sea policy 
was also substantially formed by the requirements of its economic policy, an 
economic policy which was highly congruent with Conservative ideological 
attitudes on the proper means for organising industry. This economic policy 
consisted in a re-ordering of those economic priorities which had been the 
norm for both Labour and Conservative Governments alike, from 1945, so as to 
place the control of inflation to the fore amongst economic objectives, in a 
monetarist strategy aimed to cure what the Conservatives perceived to be 
Britain's underlying economic problems.
The new Conservative economic policy introduced in May 1979, was the 
result of a reassessment of recent British economic experience made by the 
Party while in opposition, and the nature of this reassessment, together with 
the assumptions behind the new policy will be set out in Para 5.11. The 
interplay of economic assumptions and ideological attitudes which contributed 
to the foundation of Conservative economic policy, was influential in
I6H40C
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bringing about the Conservative Government's decision to revert to its 
earlier policy of partial North Sea privatisation after 2i years in Office, 
a decision which was considered in Chapter 4. Now, with the basis of 
Conservative economic assumptions set out, it is appropriate to briefly 
reconsider this decision in Para 5.12, so as to highlight the various factors 
involved, since the same economic assumptions (and the underlying ideological 
attitudes), can then be shown to have been important considerations in Case 
Studies of two decisions, the Gas Gathering Line Case Study, covered in Para 
5.2, and the Clyde Field Development Delay Case Study, covered in Para 5.3. 
Thus a picture will be built up showing the extent to which Conservative 
North Sea decisions in the period 1979-1981, were strongly influenced by the 
Government's economic assumptions and ideological attitudes.
5.11 Conservative Economic Policy From 1945 onwards, British Governments had 
four economic objectives: economic growth, full employment, stable prices and 
a surplus on the balance of payments. Through the 1950's and 1960's,
the main indicators by which economic welfare was judged, were economic 
growth and full employment, the former of which was considered to represent 
the full use of economic resources over the long term, and the latter of 
which was held to represent the full use of the same resources in the short 
term. The predominant economic policy objective was the maintenance of full 
employment. The objective of stable prices was accorded a somewhat lower 
priority, since a low but relatively stable level of inflation was regarded 
as a stimulus for economic growth. Under the system of fixed exchange rates 
established in 1944 at Bretton Woods, periods of 'go' or economic growth 
created pressure on the balance of payments (through the increased imports 
needed to meet the demands of expanding production and the buildup of
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consumer demand), which condition led to periods of 'stop' or economic 
constraint, designed to damp down demand and reduce pressure on the balance 
of payments. In 1970, the end of the Bretton Woods System introduced an era 
of more flexible exchange rates, while from the middle 1970's, the build up 
of North Sea crude oil production from the northern part of the U.K. Sector, 
progressively reduced the adverse impact on the balance of payments which 
resulted from crude oil imports. Yet despite these favourable developments, 
there was a substantial increase in inflation from the late I960's onwards, 
to well above the 4-5% annual rate, formerly considered acceptable. These 
higher inflation rates, occurred together with economic stagnation, a 
condition which was termed stagflation.
In looking at this experience, the Conservatives believed they could 
identify an underlying factor linking the whole picture together. They 
believed that current inflation was creating unemployment, and preventing 
economic growth. Because of this, the problems of the economy could no 
longer be handled by the by now traditional Keynesian means of deficit 
financing and Government priming of the economic pump, designed to correct 
failures of demand. Instead, the Conservatives concluded, the problems of 
the U.K. economy resulted from a series of failures of supply, and to meet 
these supply side failures, economic policy should be aimed at achieving two 
objectives. Incentives had somehow to be restored in the economy, and this 
objective could in some measure be achieved through a restructuring of the 
tax system. But the principal burden of economic strategy must rest on 
measures to achieve the second objective, the reduction of inflation. Only 
as inflation was squeezed out of the economy could soundly based economic 
growth take off with any real prospect for sustained employment. This
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Conservative economic policy would promote stable prices to the prime 
economic objective, while economic growth and full employment were demoted 
in the short term, on the grounds that they would follow from the conquering 
of inflation.
Given this view of the British economy, when the Conservatives took 
Office in May 1979, the Government embarked on an economic policy, built 
around three sets of assumptions:
(1) Prices can only rise continuously if the money supply rises, 
and the direction of causation is from increased money supply 
to increased prices.
(2) There exists a natural rate of employment and output, and the 
economy will adjust to this natural level fairly quickly, in 
response to a condition of stable prices.
(3) An increase in the Public Sector Borrowing Requirements (PSBR), 
and hence the national debt, will in the end lead to an increase 
in money supply. There is a fixed quantity of resources available 
for investment in the economy at any one time, and the more of 
these resources used up in the public sector, the less will be 
available in the wealth generating private sector.
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It will be shown how these economic assumptions and their associated 
ideological attitudes influenced Conservative North Sea decisions between 
1979 and 1981. In like fashion a Keynesian view of the economy informed the 
views of the Government's critics in the debate over these decisions. In 
this context it is helpful to set out briefly the Keynesian view of the 
Government's economic assumptions. In summary these are as follows:-
1) While accepting that unless money supply rises there can be no 
rise in prices, Keynesians believe that the view that the 
direction of causation is always from money supply to inflation, 
is hard to sustain given the practical experience that inflation 
creates a demand for money.
2) While accepting that overjtime employment and output will probably 
adjust favourably to a condition of stable prices, Keynesians 
point out that the link in this process is not clear, and consider 
the contention that the adjustment will occur fairly quickly to be 
highly debatable.
3) While most Keynesians consider a degree of control over the money 
supply is highly desirable, they believe the extent to which 
emphasis is placed on this policy instrument to be excessive. 
Neither, they feel, can the degree of control aimed at by the 
Conservatives, be achieved in practice.
Although enough has now been said to highlight the serious doubts which
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exist amongst economists about the validity of the Conservative Government's 
economic programme, the two Case Studies will nevertheless revert to the 
issue, wherever it is central to the contemporary debate on the decision 
under consideration. Of far greater importance in the context of these 
decisions is the manner in which the Government's economic assumptions and 
Conservative ideological attitudes on the proper means for organising 
industry appeared to intereact to bring about the chosen course of action. 
Indeed, now that the economic assumptions behind Conservative economic policy 
have been identified, it becomes clear that these economic assumptions and 
the Party's ideological attitudes on the proper means for organising industry 
cannot simply be regarded as two distinct though highly congruent interacting 
variables, rather they have to be regarded as two somewhat overlapping 
circles in Venn diagram. Of course, all economic assumptions possess an 
ideological content, though in this case it is rather salient. At the same 
time, the idealogical attitudes of the Conservative Party on the proper means 
for organising industry, point in a complementary fashion to its economic 
programme.
As an example of the interaction between economic assumptions and 
ideological attitudes on the proper means for organising industry, consider 
the link between the condition of stable prices and the renewal of economic 
growth. Keynesian economists consider this link uncertain, though they grant 
that renewed growth is likely to occur in the long run. The view that output 
will adjust fairly quickly to a condition of stable prices is sustained for 
Conservatives by a belief in the superiority of private enterprise to public 
enterprise. A particular virtue of private enterprise relates to the latent 
entrepreneurial drives held to exist within British Society. With incentives
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restored in the economy, and with business freed from the debilitating 
effects of inflation, then surely these latent entrepreneurial drives must 
bring about the desired growth.
It is this close mesh of economic assumptions and ideological attitudes 
on the proper means for organising industry which lay behind the Conservative 
decision to revert to their initial policy of partial North Sea privatisation 
after 2i years in Office. With the background provided by this added 
analysis of Conservative motivation, this decision will now be briefly 
reconsidered to highlight the factors involved, as a prelude to the two Case 
Studies.
5.12 The Return to North Sea Privatisation The decision to hire off the 
Upstream (exploration and production) activities of B.N.O.C. into a new 
company called Britoil, 51% of whose shares were to be sold off to the 
public, while leaving the Corporation with its profitable oil trading 
operations, had clearly been taken by the end of 1981, even though the full 
range of measures necessary to implement this decision were not completed 
till the following year. In Chapter 4, this decision was attributed to the 
Government's need for money to meets its current liabilities, and its fears 
of fresh commitments arising from the revelation of weaknesses in Public 
Sector financial forecasts. However, these immediate and obvious reasons for 
the decision did not seem to provide a sufficient reason for setting aside 
the stream of profits argument earlier advanced by Lord Kearton. Before 
considering this decision afresh some additional background is heeded.
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In 1979, when the Conservatives took Office, receipts from Petroleum
Revenue Tax (PRT), the principal tax on North Sea oil production, represented
(2)only 1% of the Government's total tax income, but thereafter, receipts
from PRT rose so sharply that in 1983 it was conservatively estimated the
receipts from PRT would provide £8,000 million or 13.5% of all tax income.
PRT arises from all North Sea oil production, irrespective of whether this is
from Public Sector or Private Sector acreage. It is a characteristic of all
the energy industries that they require massive ongoing levels of investment
to provide for future supplies. Investment in the North Sea to date totals
£30,000 million, and a further £60,000 million will need to be invested to
maintain U.K. oil self sufficiency into the 21st Century. For our purposes,
no detailed description is required of how PRT is constructed, but it should
be observed that it is very difficult to design such a tax, the aim of which
is to skim off economic rent in a single sector of the economy. This problem,
together with the need for ever increasing revenue has caused the Government
to modify the tax frequently since its inception in 1975. Up to March 1981,
these changes consisted of increasing the rate from 45% to 75%, halving the
tax free oil allowance, and reducing the uplift allowance for capital
expenditure, while the March 1981 Budget applied constraints to the uplift
and safeguard provisions. That PRT is not a progressive tax, but falls with
uncertainty on oil fields of varying size and technical difficulty has been
impressively demonstrated by Kemp and his associates at the University of
( 3 )Strathclyde in a series of papers. The Conservative Government's need
for additional revenue led to the introduction of a new tax in the March 1981 
Budget called Special Petroleum Duty (SPD). As a result, by the end of 1981 
there were 5 ways in being for taxing oil and gas, all of which were based on 
separate measures:
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Royalty; Corporation Tax; PRT; SPD; and a new gas levy. The whole system of
oil and gas taxation as briefly described above was arguably a deterrent to
exploration, and at best very complex. In October 1981, in response to a
Government call for suggestions on the issue of oil and gas taxation, both
organisations offshore operators, U.K.0.0.A., representing the larger
Operators, and Brindex representing the smaller Operators but forward their
proposals for improvements in the tax regime. The changes announced by the
Government in 1983, provided real encouragement for North Sea investment,
so that the area is now regarded as amongst the most attractive
in the World for Upstream investment. Of course, any country with a high
proportion of revenue derived from oil will suffer from a sharp fall in oil 
(6)
prices. Weakened prices not only reduce the revenue from crude oil
sales, they reduce the propensity to invest, both in the Private and Public 
Sectors.
As the Government's income from PRT rose, or as it anticipated such a 
rise, so the relative importance of the still large B.N.O.C. income from 
crude oil sales tended to assume a lesser importance in Government thinking. 
Crude oil prices have generally been weak in the late 1970's and early 1980's 
as a response to World depression, with the exception of the large though 
temporary increases induced by the fall of the Shah in 1979 and the onset of 
the Iran Iraq War in September 1980. All crude oil sales are quoted in $U.S. 
Thus the two variables through which crude oil prices impact directly on the 
U.K. economy are the price of North Sea crude oil in $U.S., and the $U.S. 
Sterling Exchange rate. B.N.O.C. is the price setter for North Sea crude 
oil.
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With this background, the partial privatisation decision can be looked 
at in the light of the Government's economic assumptions and ideological 
attitudes.
According to the Government's economic assumptions, there exists at any 
one time only a fixed quantity of resources available for investment. The 
greater the investment in the Public Sector, the less will be available in 
the Private Sector. This is known as the 'crowding out' effect.
Conservatives believe strongly in the superior virtues of the Private 
Sector's investment, considering it to be the primary source of real wealth 
generation. Any increase in Public Sector investment (even if self generated 
by the industry concerned) carries with it the risk that through some 
miscalculation a fresh financial burden may be placed upon the Government, 
possibly leading to an increase in PSBR, and a consequent rise in inflation.
In terms of these assumptions and with a need to invest £60,000 million 
in the North Sea, it would make sense to lessen Public Sector involvement in 
the North Sea and at the same time to improve the attractiveness of the area 
for Private Sector investment. Thus when Nigel Lawson, a determined believer 
in the Government's economic strategy (who was later to become Chancellor) 
took over the Department of Energy from David Howell, these various factors 
were all accorded added weight. When combined with the problems of 
continuing the funding of welfare payments at a time of rising unemployment 
and providing for the heavy needs of the Defence Budget, these considerations 
led to a firm resolve within the Government to return to the earlier policy 
of partial North Sea privatisation of B.N.O.C.'s Upstream (exploration and 
production) activities, as part of a general programme for the disposal of
I6H40B
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saleable Public Sector assets in various parts of the economy. These 
considerations will also be illustrated in the following two Case Studies.
5.2 The Gas Gathering Line Case Study Chapter 3 described how in the late 
I960 s interest in the North Sea switched from the southern gasfields to 
newer oilfields in the north between latitudes 56°N and 62®N. Yet in this 
northern region, there also existed large untapped resources of natural gas, 
and this Case Study is concerned with the decisions of the British Government 
as they effected some of the measures proposed to bring these resources 
ashore and utilise them.
Natural Gas in the northern North Sea is potentially recoverable from 
three sources: gasfields, similar to those in the southern North Sea, though 
not generally of a size to merit full development on their own account; 
associated gas, or gas produced in association with crude oil production, 
which if not brought ashore must be flared, or reinjected in the reservoir, 
either to maintain pressure, or to meet environmental requirments; and gas 
condensate fields. A gas condensate field, in very simple terms, is a 
hydrocarbon reservoir in which under conditions of initial temperature and 
pressure the fluid exists as gas in its entirety. As this fluid in the form 
of gas is extracted, so a drop in pressure occurs, and a liquid condensate is 
formed by a process known as retrograde condensation. Condensate is also 
produced by other means. If a stream of gas is processed, then it is 
possible to extract from it Natural Gas Liquids (NGL's) which form a highly 
P^o^^table chemical feedstock, even given the generally depressed conditions 
of the chemical industry in the early 1980's. The NGL's consist principally 
of any or all of the following: ethane, propane, butane, pentane, hexane and 
heptane. In some cases, higher hydrocarbons such as methane may also be
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present. Gas may also be classified as dry gas, the normal stock in trade of 
British Gas, or wet gas which consists of condensate or NGL's.
Specification gas is the term applied to dry gas after it has been processed 
to meet the requirements necessary for its delivery to British Gas.
A 1980 estimate of the quantity of gas recoverable from the northern 
North Sea via a gas gathering line of 572 miles of 36" pipe (the system on
which the decisions in this Case Study were taken) gave figures for
recoverable gas as follows:
(a) U.K. 1980's gas, known as firm UK gas, 5.3 TCP (Trillion Cubic
though actually subject like all these Ft)
figures to considerable uncertainty.
(b) Future U.K. gas, principally from gas 6.9 TCP (Trillion Cubic
condensate. Ft)
(c) Norwegian gas from the Statfjord 7.7 TCP (Trillion Cubic
Heimdahl and Sleipner fields, then Ft)
viewed as potentially exploitable 
via a U.K. system.
The cost of bringing this gas ashore via the proposed system of 572 
miles of pipe was estimated in April 1980, as likely to be around £2.9 
million. By September 1981, this proposed system had evolved by a 
foreshortening of its northern and southern arms, into a 420 mile system, the 
estimated cost of which however, had by then risen to £2.7 billion. It was 
on this foreshortened Line, that the Conservative Government took its 
September 1981 decision not to provide the necessary financial guarantees 
which would have permitted the scheme to go ahead. This change from a 572
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mile system to a 420 mile system and rose from a downgraded assessment of 
reserves, together with a decision by Norway to exploit her own reserves, 
once it was shown to be technically feasible to lay a pipeline across the 
Norwegian Trough. Thus the Norwegian economy would gain the full value added
of their own gas. The foreshortened scheme would recover some 11 TCP
compared with some 20 TCP under the full scheme.
The interests wishing to exploit these natural gas resources were
several. The U.K. Government had à number of reasons for wishing to see this
gas exploited. Aside from its contribution to the U.K.'s future energy 
requirements, the building of such a system would have useful macroeconomic 
effects on employment and investment. While the U.K. demand for gas had 
increased to 16,876 million therms in 1981-1982, production from the British 
Sector of the North Sea had dropped from its highest level of 14,974 million 
therms in 1977 to 13,176 million therms in 1981, following a sharp decline 
in the production of the southern gasfields developed in the late 1960's, 
from which the country obtained 77% of its requirements. The shortfall was 
made up through imports of Norwegian gas. To counter the effects of 
declining production from the southern gasfields, British Gas saw the 
proposal to bring fresh gas ashore from the northern North Sea, as a means 
for providing an important part of its requirements for the 1980's and 
1990's. -The chemical industry (of which the Multinational Oil Companies 
(MNOCs) form such a significant part) considered the resulting Natural Gas 
Liquids (NGLs) as a most valuable feedstock, while the construction and 
process plant industries viewed the development as a contribution to fighting 
their way out of recession. Behind the consensus, the perceptions of these 
actors were sometimes different and on occasion in conflict.
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To complete the background for this Case Study, consideration has to be 
given to the 3 feasibility studies made for a gas gathering line, each 
prepared at a separate point in time but each of which took account of 2 
other systems, then at an advanced stage of construction, the FLAGS system 
and the Frigg pipelines. The FLAGS (Far North Natural Gas Liquids and 
Associated Gas System), primarily designed to take gas from the 4 platforms 
of Shell/Esso's Brent Field to a plant at St. Fergus on the coast of 
Aberdeenshire, was designed so that the separated NGLs were afterwards to be 
piped to a petrochemical plant at Mossmoran, The Frigg Pipelines were two in 
number, one British and one Norwegian and both were to take gas from the 
Frigg Field, which straddles the U.K./Norway boundary line, to yet another 
processing plant at St. Fergus. By taking certain technical risks the 
capacity of the Frigg pipelines might be extended, while as gas production 
began to decline from the Brent Field, from the middle to late 1980's, extra 
capacity would become available in the FLAGS network.
In 1975, the then Labour Government recognised the value of gas and 
condensate from the northern North Sea, and while they appreciated that a 
single line from each deposit to the shore would be uneconomic, they realised 
that a gas gathering line linking some 20 of these sources together might 
prove viable, as each field accessed would take a share of the cost. 
Accordingly, the Department of Energy commissioned the following report from 
a firm of Newcastle consulting engineers: Williams-Merz. A study of gas 
gathering lines in the North Sea. A report to the Department of Energy, May 
1976. Part 1 of this report covered commercial fields in the northern part 
of the U.K. Sector, while Part 2 was restricted to the larger commercial
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fields. To ensure the effective transport ashore of the gas and condensate 
resources involved, the report recommended the use of 4 pipeline system, the 
Frigg pipelines, the FLAGS system, and two further new pipeline systems. 
However, in commissioning this report, the Department of_Energy called on the 
consultants to produce their work quickly, being afflicted by the 100 days 
mentality then prevalent within the Labour Government. In order to produce 
their report by 13.5.76, the consultants were forced to make a number of 
simplifying assumptions, most significantly, they excluded the impact of 
Norwegian gas from their considerations. On publication, it was recognised 
that though valuable, the report was flawed by the emphasis placed on speed 
of production by the Labour Government.
Realising the limitations of the Williams-Merz Study, Anthony Wedgewood 
Benn at the Department of Energy, concluded that further study of the problem 
of bringing northern North Sea gas ashore was essential. The conclusions the 
Williams-Merz Study had reached about the desirability of four pipeline 
systems, would not secure the desired finance in view of the doubtful 
assumptions on which it was based. In order to carry out a fresh feasibility 
study, a new company was formed, called Gas Gathering Pipelines (North Sea) 
Ltd, which included both Public Sector and Private Sector interests likely 
to benefit from the construction of any new system. On the Private Sector 
side the interests represented were ICI, RTZ and Total, while the Public 
Sector was represented by B.N.O.C. and British Gas. The two Public Sector 
organizations involved formed a new company called British Marine Pipelines 
Ltd., to represent their joint interests in the investigatory group.
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The results of this new set of investigations were finally published as: 
U.K. Department of Energy. Gas gathering line systems in the North Sea. A 
report by Gas Gathering Pipelines (North Sea) Ltd., London, H.M.S.O., May 
1978. (Energy paper 30). This report was highly sensitive to the issue of 
G^floiting deposits of uncertain dimensions and on this basis concluded that 
no new major pipeline systems were needed to supplement the Frigg and FLAGS 
systems, although the authors recognised their conclusions were finely 
balanced, and might need to be altered, should any of the underlying factors 
be subject to change. For example, a significant rise in energy prices might 
the balance in favour of building an additional major gas gathering 
system.
By the Spring of 1979, it was the perception in the Department of 
Energy, that the underlying situation had indeed changed and David Howell, 
the new Conservative Energy Secretary announced to the Commons on 5th July 
1979 that he had asked British Gas and Mobil North Sea Ltd., to carry out a 
design and feasibility study for a new northern North Sea gas gathering 
pipeline system. Their report delivered to the Minister in April 1980, was 
then published as: U.K. Department of Energy. A North Sea gas gathering 
system, London, H.M.S.O., May 1980 (Energy Paper 44). The report concluded 
that in addition the Frigg Pipelines and the FLAGS system, a further gas 
gathering system was justified, and proposed the Scheme (first mentioned at 
the outset of this Case Study) for a 572 mile, 36" pipeline linking together 
a dispersed range of deposits. A line from the Magnus Field (the northern 
leg) was to run south and form a subsea junction with a line running north 
from the Fulmar Field (the southern leg). From the subsea junction, another 
line was to carry the gas westward to a landfall at St. Fergus, were a gas
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separation plant would be built, at which NGLs (Natural Gas Liquids) were to 
be separated, which in turn were to provide the feedstocks, for a new 
petrochemical plant to be built at Nigg Bay.
In June 1981, the Petroleum Economist o b s e r v e d ^ ^ )  that while oil 
reserves estimates had been reduced in the latest issue of the Department of 
Energy's 'Oil and gas resources of the United Kingdom' an annual publication 
published in the same month, the estimates of gas reserves included, were 
somewhat increased, and part of this increase was attributable to new 
condensate discoveries in the northern North Sea. The writer added that the 
Department of Energy's gas reserve estimates, like those for oil, might well 
prove on the conservative side, and considered that the main impetus for the 
development of these resources would be the proposed gas gathering pipeline, 
as a result of which it would be possible to exploit smaller gas fields and 
some of the associated gas produced by oilfields. Why was this scheme for a 
gas gathering line not proceeded with, how was the Government involved, and 
what was the aftermath?
On June 19th, 1980, David Howell announced^^^ that in his view a 
pipeline along the lines advocated in Energy Paper 44, would be in the 
national interest, and stated that he had invited British Gas, BP and Mobil 
to form an Organising Group, which together with a financial advisor would 
investigate how a pipeline organisation could best be structured as a Private 
Utility Company, outside the Public Sector. He further told the Commons that 
he envisaged British Gas taking a 30% share in the equity of this new 
company, a step which in his judgement would have no more than a minimal 
effect on public expenditure. As for the remainder of the equity, this would
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be distributed between companies holding offshore production licences, 
customers who wished to purchase the resulting NGLs (Natural Gas Liquids), 
and the financial institutions. Thus from the outset, it was clear that the 
Government wished to place clear limits on the extent of public involvement. 
If Norwegian gas was to be brought ashore through the system, then Norwegian 
interests would have a share in the equity. The Organising Group would work 
with a target of setting up a pipeline company along the proposed lines by 
the Autumn of 1980.
The members of the Organising Group set up a Joint Venture to carry 
forward the pre construction work. British Gas was to be responsible for 
onshore work, while BP handled any offshore construction and Mobil looked 
after the necessary technical services. The main features of the 
Government's guidelines for this Organising Group were as follows:
(a) The permanent organisation would be a Private Utility Company, 
providing a transmission and processing service, on a cost of 
service basis.
(b) It should afford access to all customers on a fair basis of 
equality of access, so long as capacity was available.
(c) Equity should be held as follows: British Gas 30%, Gas producers 
20%; a further 20% shared among companies in the petrochemical 
industry; Financial institutions 30%.
With these firmer guidelines, the Organising Group was then expanded by 
the addition of a representative of a Merchant bank and an official from the
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Department of Energy. By December 1980, apart from the question of the route 
to be followed, the problems faced had resolved themselves into two 
categories :^
(1) The financial problem of who would fund the Gas Gathering System.
(2) The question of who would obtain the valuable NGLs.
The rival claimants for the NGLs were the 'establishment' companies (BP 
Chemicals, ICI and Shell/Esso) who wanted them piped south to feed the 
Mossmorran complex, and the BP plant at Grangemouth (together with the BP/ICI 
joint ethylene plant at Wilton, on Teesside) and the 'newcomers' (principally 
Dow Chemical Corp), who promised a £400 million ethylene cracker at Nigg Bay, 
Cromarty. In this latter group were Occidental Petroleum, who offered to set 
up a £200 million development at Peterhead, and Highland Hydrocarbons, who 
offered to build an £845 million plant for ethylene production, also at Nigg. 
Hoechst, the West German Chemical Group, similarly offered to make a large 
investment in a plant at Nigg.
In effect there were 7 sellers of gas, and 43 possible purchasers of 
NGLs, which underlines the commercial value of the feedstock at stake. All 
the schemes proposed had different implications for the economy, and it was 
very difficult to evaluate the benefits to be derived from them. Dow claimed 
that their scheme would provide 15,000 additional jobs for the Scottish 
economy, while Highland Hydrocarbons claimed 350 permanent jobs, 2,000 jobs 
in the construction industry, and a massive multiplier effect. The 
'establishment' companies did not offer to create new jobs, but they 
nevertheless had a strong argument, for they claimed that all the new
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proposals for Nigg Bay were impractical in view of the depressed state of the 
market for ethylene, and that in so far as they did go ahead this could only 
lead to a loss of jobs elsewhere. Following the 'establishment' approach 
however, would defend jobs in existing plants. The 'newcomers' pointed out 
that BP suffered from a dual role, being both a member of the Organising 
Group, and a claimant for the NGLs.
To cut through the difficulties associated with evaluating the various 
proposals, David Howell told the Commons on 17th December 1980, that he had 
decided to allow commercial negotiations to decide the issue of who obtained 
the feedstocks. B.N.O.C. was to be made the substantial seller (wholesaler) 
of these feedstocks. Although this was a victory for allowing the market to 
decide the issue, it was nevertheless a defeat for the non interventionists 
within the Cabinet, since it provided a role for B.N.O.C. It could be argued 
that allowing the market to decide the issue might not achieve the best 
possible outcome from the standpoint of the economy, but it was very 
difficult to establish just what this might be given the conflicting claims 
of the chemical industry.
However, the issue of who would obtain the resultant NGLs was 
irrelevant, unless finance could be found to build and operate the system.
In a further statement on behalf of the Government, made on 17th December 
1980, Hamish Gray, then the Minister of State, said that a company to run the 
new pipeline would be set up by March 1981, "umpteen banking groups and other 
financial institutions" were interested in financing the line.
Originally, it had been intended to set up the necessary company to run the 
new line by December 1980, but by March 1981, the date for setting up the
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company named by Hamish Gray, the Organising Group, who had by then spent £8 
million on preliminary work, had already informed the Secretary of State, 
that in view of the high risks involved, financing and operating a company 
within his guidelines was not possible.
The difficulties which made a company established within the Secretary 
of State's guidelines impractical were two fold. Firstly, British Gas were 
only willing to pay a relatively low price for the dry gas landed, compared 
with prices on the international market, so that the operating companies 
considered the scheme non viable in commercial terms without an improved 
offer from the only permitted purchaser of British Sector gas(BGC).
Secondly, it was now becoming clear that the Norwegian now believed they had 
a technical solution available for the problem of laying a gas pipeline
across the Norwegian Trough. Thus the availability of Norwegian gas to the
system was in considerable doubt, as the Norwegians might well prefer to land 
their gas in their own country, and capture all the resultant economic 
benefits.
Given the above difficulties, the Organising Group, now believed that if
the scheme was to get underway, an interim company would need to be set up,
supplied with bridging finance, and start construction of the system, by 
placing contracts with BP and British Gas, the managers of the Project. By 
March 1981''  ^ a group of 6 banks, led by the Bank of Scotland, were
estimating a £700 million funding to enable work to be started on the £2,000 
million Project. This money would bridge the time till sale and purchase 
contracts for the gas had been signed and the financial prospects were rather 
clearer. The group of 6 banks required a guarantee that all the gas set out
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in the Feasibility Study would flow into the system, and no new pipelines 
would be built to access the gas in question.
By May 1981, however, the Norwegian Government had backed a plan of the 
Statfjord Group(Mobil and Statoil) for two new gas gathering lines in the 
North Sea. Wet gas was to be landed at Karsto, north of Stavanger, and dry 
gas after the separation of NGLs gas to be piped back into the Sleipner 
field. Both the Sleipner and Heimdahl fields would then be linked to the 
Ekofisk complex, and their gas piped south to Emden in West Germany. Thus 
the input to the proposed system of Norwegian gas was definitely removed. In 
the meantime, it had been decided that further evaluation of the reserves of 
the Fulmar field was required, since this field might well justify its own 
pipeline to shore. As a result of this consideration, it was decide to 
terminate the southern leg of the proposed system further north at the Lomond 
field. Similarly, it was decided that the northern leg (to the Magnus, 
Murchison and Thistle fields) would now best be handled by a separate line 
into the FLAGS system. Thus for a restricted system accessing less gas the 
financial institutions were being asked to find more funding. As indicated 
earlier, the estimated costs of a 420 mile system were now in excess of 
estimates established earlier for a 572 mile system.
Cost estimates given at various times were: £1.1 billion (June 1980); £2 
billion (late 1980 March 1981); £2,340 million plus £404 million for onshore 
facilities (May 1981 for restricted scheme). From these figures, it appears
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that elements of a Concorde style escalation of costs existed within the 
Project, This was a condition to which a Government committed heavily to the 
control of PSBR might be highly sensitive, especially when it was combined 
with doubts concerning commercial viability, expressed by the oil industry, 
even when these related to the industry's constant complaint over the low 
price to be paid for the gas brought ashore. The Organising Group, however, 
continued to express its full confidence in the viability of the Scheme. By 
contrast, the banks became increasingly wary of the scheme's viability. As 
these uncertainties grew, so the price to be paid for the gas by British Gas 
became a crucial factor. Without an adequate guarantee on price, the oil 
industry was not ready to invest in the necessary facilities. The Banks were 
ready to provide the necessary £2.7 billion but only if that loan was
as a result of firm contracts being agreed between gas producers 
and British Gas. Since the oil companies were holding out for a better price 
than British Gas were ready to offer, only one such contract was ever signed. 
The Banks, lacking the security necessary for such a large loan, then 
approached the Government for financial guarantees.
The Treasury objected strongly to this proposal that the Government 
should provide financial guarantees for a loan from the Banks, on two 
grounds. Firstly, there was the fear of an impact on PSBR, and secondly, the 
dangers inherent with an open ended commitment, by which the Government 
might be trapped in a British Leyland type commitment, from which they could 
only extricate themselves at a very large cost. Certainly, a gas gathering 
line was no lame duck", but it did involve risks, and Ministers were highly 
sensitive to those risks, given the experience of BL and Concorde. The 
Banks, then suggested that British Gas might be able to raise sufficient 
money on the financial market to get the scheme started, after which other
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investors might be prepared to tag on to the scheme, once it was shown to be 
viable. However, the Treasury took the view, that since ultimately the 
Government stood behind British Gas, these proposals were no more than a 
disguised form of the direct guarantees plan. At this point, interest swung 
back to the original possibility of the oil companies providing the necessary 
finance. This, once again, they were not prepared to do, unless they first 
obtained satisfaction, on the price they were to receive for the gas they 
were to bring ashore. British Gas was paying them between 6p and 16p a therm 
for gas at that time, and selling it at 28p to the domestic consumer. The 
oil companies were only ready to finance the project for 26p a therm plus tax 
concessions.
If the oil companies were each to separately build a North Sea pipeline, 
then they would be permitted to offset the costs against their separate 
liabilities to pay PRT. However, a pipeline company would have to be formed 
to build a gas gathering system, to which several companies would have to 
make contributions, and such contributions could not be set against the 
participants' separate PRT liabilities. The Majors wanted the right, which 
would be presented as no less than equitable, to offset their individual 
expenditures on a collective enterprise against their individual tax 
liabilities. Though an equitable proposal, those tax liabilities were 
scheduled to provide the Conservative Government with an increasing element 
of its total tax revenue in the years ahead, and for this reason the 
companies' proposition was unlikely to be acceptable. Indeed, so anxious was 
the Government to increase its revenues from the North Sea still further, 
that in March 1981 the Budget had introduced a new Special Petroleum Duty 
(SPD) to meet this requirement. The companies however, were motivated by
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their long experience of the low price paid for British Sector gas, and an 
awareness of the leverage they might exercise over the Government as a result 
of the estimated £25 billion revenue which the proposed gas gathering system 
might be expected to yield over its lifetime. Moreover, as the companies 
pointed out, if they built a series of separately funded alternative networks 
instead of the proposed integrated scheme, they would anyhow deprive the 
Goverment of considerable revenue as a result of tax offsets. In practice, 
PRT provision of facilities with shared use (e.g. pipelines) were finally 
relaxed, effective 1/7/82.
The companies took the view, based on long experience of dealing with 
both the British and Norwegian Governments, that these Governments regarded 
the North Sea as a tap, which would be turned on readily whenever revenue was 
required, or an investment had to be made, without detriment to long term 
energy provision. While this approach might be somewhat credible for a 
country such as Norway with a long term energy surplus, the companies wished 
to forcibly demonstrate that this was not the case with the U.K. The 
Government appears to have had some sympathy with the companies' long 
standing complaint over the level of gas prices, but was not prepared to 
concede the principle of tax changes at that time. Furthermore, in order to 
meet the companies' wish to offset their separate expenditures on a 
collective enterprise against their individual tax liabilities in the gas 
gathering line situation, the provision would have had to be somewhat 
generalised. Once the principal of offsetting expenditures on collective 
enterprises against PRT had been accepted, many more projects would tend to 
acquire a collective status. In this connection, it is necessary to recall 
the manner in which the oil industry quite properly took advantage of the
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more liberal tax regime prior to 1975.
The critical Cabinet Meetings prior to the refusal of guarantees by the 
Government took place on the 10th and 11th September, 1981. On 10th 
September, 1981, Dr. Jeremy Bray (Labour), MP for Motherwell wrote to The 
Times on the issue in a somewhat mocking fashion. He suggested that
difficulties over funding the Gas Gathering Line arose from two quarters.
Firstly, there was a lack of clarity on the part of the Government,
concerning the respective roles of public and private capital. Private 
capital would prefer a scheme which merely milked off the obvious profit, 
while public capital ought to aim for a maximisation of total profit and 
total supplies. This argument, was the traditional case for the long term 
benefits to the community which derived from public enterprise. However, the 
second point went beyond what The Times on 2nd September, 1981 had described 
as the Treasury's 'obsession with the concept of Public Sector Borrowing
Requirement'. It was the view of The Times that Private Sector borrowing
would not be contrary to the Government's strategy, but Public Sector would 
be, in view of its impact on PSBR. However, Dr. Bray pointed out, evidence 
to the Commons Treasury and Civil Service, Mr. Ryrie, the Second
Permanent Secretary of the Treasury had stated "an increase in investment, 
whether public or private, must be accompanied by a reduction in other 
expenditure.... the effects of different ways of financing the investment are 
of secondary importance." Since this statement implied a radical departure 
from what he had always regarded as the Government's strategy. Dr. Bray asked 
Ryrie on 15th June 1981 (p.60 of the Report)" so Private Sector borrowing has 
an identical impact to Public Sector borrowing?" In reply, Ryrie answered,
"I think they are very similar in their effects, yes." On 13th July,
5-27
Mr. Brittan, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, had confirmed that this was 
indeed the case. In Dr. Bray's view, as a result of these statements, it was 
clear that the Government were uncertain as to whether they were operating on 
money supply or money national income.
John Flemming, Chief Economic Adviser to the Bank of England, had stated 
on 13th July, 1981 (p.226 of the Report) that "it could be argued that the 
nominal income target was itself a form of incomes policy." Thus Dr. Bray 
concluded, if one does not wish to influence either incomes or prices in a 
direct sort of way, then any investment, be it public or private, must be 
compensated for with cuts elsewhere, be they in the Public or Private 
Sectors. It was this dead end, and the dilemma it presented, which in 
Dr. Bray's view, was really demonstrated by the Government's difficulties 
over the funding of the gas gathering line system. According to
A.P. Thirwall, the Government's economic policy was an amalgam of
monetarist ideas, and the old classical theory of employment, which still 
persisted within the Treasury. This old classical theory of employment, 
holds that there is a fixed quantum of resources, and the use of part of this 
fixed quantum through Government investment, excludes its use by the private 
entrepreneur. Professor J. Williamson, in a Memorandum to the Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee in July 1980 was critical of the monetarist
dimension of the Government's economic policy, stating the to treat (as in 
his judgement the Government was doing) inflation unadjusted PSBR, nominal 
value, cyclically unadjusted (as a target)) as a constraint upon economic 
policy, let alone as a objective of that policy, was economic barbarism.
The Government, however, were probably more concerned over immediate and
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practical difficulties, rather than the theoretical difficulties raised by 
Dr. Bray and others. If they refused financial guarantees, and the companies 
felt justified in going ahead with their own projects, then revenue would be 
lost through PRT offsets, but the responsibility and the risks of the whole 
enterprise would belong to the oil industry, relieving the Government of a 
potential long term commitment. If the oil industry did decide, not 
withstanding the gas price issue, to proceed with various additional gas 
gathering measures on their own account, the overall result might prove sub 
optional for the economy as a whole, compared with the proposal on which they 
were being asked to provide financial guarantees, nevertheless those measure 
would still provide considerable macroeconomic benefits. By turning down the 
request for financial guarantees (or 'leaving it on the table') all risk 
would be avoided, and a public demonstration given of the Government's 
adherence to the control PSBR. By comparison with this demonstration, 
sophisticated criticisms of Government policy in the columns of The Times, 
and elsewhere, would soon be forgotten.
However, in addition to these considerations, it was generally believed 
by most of the Cabinet, that the provision of financial guarantees for the 
gas gathering system, which carried the risk of a potential long term 
involvement with the project, might draw the Government into activities, 
which Conservative ideology and strategy would place well outside its proper 
functions. In this connection, it should be recalled, that by September 
1981, the Government were committed to divesting B.N.O.C. of part of its 
Upstream (exploration and production) activities in favour of the Private 
Sector. Provision of financial guarantees for a gas gathering system would 
thus have been at variance with the general thrust of Government policy.
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In the month prior to that series of Cabinet Meetings, when the decision 
was taken to leave the question or providing financial guarantees for a gas 
gathering system 'on the table' a number of Ministerial Meetings took place, 
at which was decided to ask John Liverman (a former Civil Servant at the 
Department of Energy, who had also been a director of B.N.O.C.) to collate 
the views of all possible participants in the scheme. It was as a result of 
the Liverman report, that the majority view within the Cabinet, which was 
opposed to the provision of financial guarantees, became reinforced. It 
appeared that the financial institutions and the oil industry were not 
prepared to risk their own money in the scheme, and the fear was, that this 
reflected general doubts on the commercial viability of the scheme, rather 
than a specific dispute over of the price to be paid for the gas.
Thus in summary, the factors militating against the provision of 
financial guarantees, in the minds of the majority of the Cabinet Ministers, 
were as follows:
1. A determination to hold the line PSBR, and not to lose credibility 
with commited Conservative supporters in the country.
2. A deeper conviction that the provision of financial guarantees for 
a gas gathering line was wrong in terms of Conservative ideology 
and economic strategy.
3. Doubts over the viability of the scheme arising from the withdrawn 
of Norwegian gas, and the unwillingness of the oil companies and 
financial institutions to risk their own capital.
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4. Fear of an open ended commitment.
The minority support within the Cabinet for providing the necessary 
guarantees, was based on the following considerations:
1. To make certain of the full macroeconomic benefits, even though 
these were somewhat indeterminate at the time of the decision.
2. To ensure, as rapidly as possible, the saving of energy currently 
being lost in the shape of flared gas.
3. They believed the financial return on capital invested would be
good. Sir Martin Ryle had indicated this could be 4 x PWR
reactors.
4. In energy terms (again according to Sir Martin Ryle) the gas
gathering line would be 12 times more effective than investment in
nuclear energy.
When the decision was taken not to provide financial guarantees for the 
gas gathering system, the minority view in the Cabinet favouring their 
provision, was led by David Howell, the Secretary of State for Energy. His 
Minister of State was Hamish Gray, who in the immediate aftermath of the 
decision, indicated that he expected British Gas to raise its prices to the 
oil companies to provide them with a stimulus to go ahead with their own 
schemes, although he ruled out the prospect of any PRT concessions to achieve 
this end. In the Cabinet reshuffle which followed shortly on the decision
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not to provide financial guarantees, David Howell was replaced by Nigel 
Lawson, who on 19th October reaffirmed the Government's intention to carry 
forward a partial privatisation of B.N.O.C.'s Upstream (exploration and 
production) activities, at the same time retaining British Gas's position as 
the only seller of gas to domestic consumers. Thus the price paid by the 
Corporation to the oil companies providing its gas, would remain an important 
determinant of the viability of any scheme to bring it ashore.
The twin events of September and October, 1981, namely the refusal of 
financial guarantees for the gas gathering system, and the clear statement of 
intent to carry forward a partial privatisation of B.N.O.C.'s Upstream 
(exploration and production) activities, formed a watershed in the handling 
of North Sea policy. This watershed marked a definite eclipse of the 
influence within the Cabinet of that part of the Conservative Party which 
still favoured a greater degree of intervention in North Sea strategy, and 
the dominance of those elements, both within the Party at large, and the 
Cabinet in particular, seeking to limit and if possible reduce the extent of 
the State's involvement.
In the following year, the Petroleum Economist reported in June, that 
the Brent Field was to begin supplying associated gas through the FLAGS 
system, and would soon be meeting 12% of U.K. gas demand. The western 
extension of FLAGS would allow gas from the Ninian, North Cormorant and South 
Cormorant, and later N.W, Hutton, fields to feed into the system, while the 
northern leg, due to come into operation in the following year, would take 
gas from the Magnus and Thistle Fields, and the U.K. part of the Murchison 
Field. In April 1982, the companies participating in the Magnus, Murchison
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and Thistle Fields, signed contracts with British Gas, which were reputed to 
involve the Corporation in agreeing to pay the companies around 19p a therm, 
a significant improvement on their past experience.
5.3 The Clyde Field Development Delay Case Study On 23rd July, 1980,
David Howell, the Secretary of State of Energy, announced to the Commons
that he intended to delay the development of certain North Sea fields 
discovered after 1975 so as 'to prolong high levels of U.K. Continental Shelf 
production to the end of the Century'. The first two such fields to be 
considered were the Clyde Field, and the Phillips T Block. At the same time, 
the Secretary of State made it clear that no decisions had been made on any 
pre 1975 fields after 1982, the period to the end of which was covered in the 
Varley Guidelines. On 18th December, 1980, David Howell announced (21) 
that the delay to be applied to the Clyde Field's development would be of two 
years duration, and that as a consequence it might be expected to come on 
stream (i.e. into production) in 1988. The background to the decision to 
delay the development of the Clyde field, and the choice of two years as the
period of that delay, are the subject of this Case Study.
The estimated cost of development of the Clyde Field at the time the 
decision was taken, was £500 million. Ownership of the field was split 
between B.N.O.C., the field's Operator, and Shell/Esso. The impact of
B.N.O.C.'s expenditure would fall on the PSBR. It was conventional wisdom up 
to the time of the delay decision, that the U.K. should not become a net
exporter of crude oil in the 1980's, but should hold production down, so as
to extend the use of the resource over the longest possible period. In the 
early 1980's, Britain achieved a condition of crude oil self sufficiency.
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which it was expected would fluctuate around a small net input or export 
throughout the decade. Such was the formal basis for depletion 
control through delayed field development. It was believed the middle 1980's 
would see a sharp peaking then a sharp fall off in North Sea crude oil 
production.
However, it is necessary to consider how this condition of crude oil 
self sufficiency has actually been reached. It has been achieved through a 
combination of production which has consistently fallen below target, with a 
fall off in demand as a result of recession, and a high sensitivity to 
increased prices by the users of oil products. Crude oil prices in the 
1980's have generally been depressed, compared with the generally higher 
levels of the 1970's, the exception being the sharp rise briefly experienced 
at the onset of the Iran—Iraq War (1980), which together with an earlier 
temporary sharp rise (1979), occasioned by the Fall of the Shah, constituted 
the Second Oil Shock. As a result of these factors, it was later appreciated 
that the sharp peaking and falling off of North Sea crude oil production 
anticipated for the middle 1980's was unlikely to occur, but instead would be 
replaced by a flattened production curve, extending the use of the resource 
over a longer period, without the need for formal depletion controls.
From the standpoint of an oil company, once a significant oil discovery 
has been made, it is generally in the best interest of the company to move as 
rapidly as possible through development to the production phase, so as to 
recoup investment. Even so, it may take several years to complete the 
development phase, and begin to obtain a return on the investment involved.
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The means available to the U.K. Government to secure depletion control 
are several, and are not restricted to development delays. They are as 
follows:
a) Production Cutbacks Powers exist to introduce formal cutbacks in 
production, i.e. production cuts in producing fields, under the 
Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act, 1975, and the Energy Act, 1976.
A restraint on the application of these cutbacks are the Varley 
Guidelines, which consist of assurances (without the force of 
legislation), given by Eric Varley, that production from pre 1975 
discoveries would be safeguarded from such cuts till 1982 or four years 
from the beginning of production, whichever was the later. Thus from 
1982, the Government was free from all constraints in determining the 
rate of lifting from all fields producing in 1981, with the exception of 
the following four fields, where the constraint would end on the date 
given in parenthesis: South Cormorant (1983); Murchison (1984): U.K.
Statfjord (1983); Tartan (1985).
Since production estimates and reserve estimates contain many 
uncertainties, formal production controls represent a flexible policy 
instrument from the Government standpoint. They can be employed, or 
relaxed, according to requirements arising from changing reserve data, 
and variations in national energy needs, but open ended cutbacks of this 
type, unlike the Varley Guidelines, will tend to appear in a random 
fashion, from the standpoint of oil company planning, and their use if 
persisted with, would tend to discourage exploration.
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H) Development Delays From the standpoint of the investor, the
development delay (the method considered in this Case) is the best 
option. The basic oil company calculations on viability are not 
interferred with by a development delay. Unfortunately, development 
delay implies a stop go policy, with serious consequences for 
construction industry planning, and adverse effects upon the 
infrastructure of North Sea supporting services. Moreover, such 
development delays must have a bad impact on the general momentum of 
North Sea exploration and development, which has to be maintained in 
order to bring the smaller North Sea fields into production. It is 
these fields which will be required in the late 1980's and 1990's so as 
to maintain production when currently producing fields are in decline. 
Because of the very long lead time between a decision to develop an 
oilfield, and production startup, which may be 5 years, and since 
production startup has to be followed by an extensive production buildup 
phase, delays in 1980 could not be expected to have much impact on the 
hump in production then expected to occur in the middle 1980's. In 
short, the development delay applied in this Case was a very blunt 
instrument, which might not even hit the target.
c ) Royalty Banking If the Government chose to defer taking any crude oil
due to it as a royalty, then revenue would be lost, but a production 
cutback would be achieved without too serious an impact on oil company 
planning. A variant upon this approach would require B.N.O.C. to
leave its own equity crude in the ground, but to do this would be most 
unfair to the Corporation, given that it is now required to act like any 
other oil company.
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d) Exploration Delays In view of the need to constantly increase the
knowledge of oil reserves so as to plan for the future, this would be a 
highly irresponsible approach to depletion control.
While not a formal method of depletion control, delays on the 
development of marginal fields can be achieved by the impact of unfavourable 
oil taxation conditions thus inhibiting development effort. It is for this 
reason that North Sea Governments cannot regard the North Sea as a fiscal tap 
to be turned on or off at will, since their fiscal measures may have an 
®^Fsct on the rate of exploration and development, and hence on long term 
energy requirements.
In June 1981, the Petroleum Economist (23) reported (6 months after 
David Howell announced the Clyde field development delay) that of the 16 U.K. 
oilfields then in production, 7 were either flowing at their peak or already 
in decline, while three further fields were expected to peak in 1981, and a 
further 5 were expected to reach their production peak in 1982. Of fields in 
the development stage, they were 8 in number, with the following estimated 
production startup dates: North Cormorant, Fulmar, N.W. Hutton (1982);
Brae, Magnus and Maureen (1983); Beryl B and Hutton (1984). A further 9 
significant prospects were then at the appraisal stage which precedes 
development. BP announced to the Houston Exploration Conference in 1981, 
that it was aware of 75 fields in the North Sea, capable of being developed 
in the following 20 years. Thus, there was a generally favourable company 
view of the North Sea future, clouded only by problem of raising the large 
investment finance necessary from reduced profit margins, a factor which
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influenced their need for an improvement of the North Sea tax regime in their 
favour.
On the basis of this data considered against the background of 2 
scenarios for the 1980's in the North Sea, a two year development delay for 
the purposes of conservation did not make sense. If, as the earlier 
conventional wisdom foresaw, there was to be a North Sea production hump in 
the middle 1980's, followed by a sharp decline, then it would make more sense 
for conservation purposes to push the use of the resource still further into 
the future with a 5 year development delay. Assuming 5 years for development 
and a substantial period for production buildup, this would push utilisation 
of the resource into the 1990's. However, if the Government assumed the 
alternative scenario of a flattened production curve through the 1980's, then 
this would itself take care of conservation, making a development delay 
pointless, and bringing with it a downturn in the offshore supplies and 
construction business. A 5 year delay would have suited the Treasury, 
lessening further the impact on PSBR.
In July 1980, when David Howell made his statement of intent to apply a 
development delay to the Clyde field, there was a feeling this delay might 
prove open ended. In other words no formal delay would be announced, so no 
definite period would need to be attached to it. Then, in the latter part of 
1980 certain technical problems occurred in the development of the Tartan 
field (linked with the Clyde field in David Howell's July 1980 statement), 
and although these difficulties were soon resolved, it appeared at the time 
that those difficulties would permit the development of the Clyde field to 
proceed without delay. B.N.O.C., as the Operator, and it partner Shell/Esso,
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naturally wished to proceed without delay to recoup their costs to date, so 
that the 2 year delay applied by the Department of Energy appears to have
been a compromise between this Corporation/Company view, and that of the
Treasury, concerned over the possible adverse effect on PSBR, with the added 
virtue from the Government standpoint, that any such adverse effects would be 
delayed till after the likely date of a future General Election (1983).
However, given the plans to partially privatise B.N.O.C.'s Upstream 
(exploration and production) activities, reaffirmed by Nigel Lawson in 
October 1981, a further explanation of the 2 year development delay on the 
Clyde field is reasonable. This would be a sufficient period to enable 
B.N.O.C.'s Upstream activities to be partially privatised thus reducing the 
probable impact of the £500 million investment on the PSBR. In practice, 
this proved to be the case, for in August, 1982, Britoil the company formed
to takeover B.N.O.C's Upstream activities, 51% of which were sold to the
public, made an application for development of the Clyde field, so that by 
the end of the year the field was listed in the Brown book (^4) igg], as 
•under development (i.e well before the end of the formal development delay), 
which was very necessary in 1982, since the same publication shows a decline 
in development effort, which was having an adverse effect on the offshore 
construction and supplies industries.
However, the choice of a formal delay period of 2 years, had to be made 
on the basis of the maximum time it was likely to take to secure partial 
privatisation of B.N.O.C.'s Upstream activities.
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The financial reports for the Major oil companies, Shell, Exxon,
Gulf, Mobil, Socal, Texaco, BP, for the year 1980, showed a 10% increase in 
net income compared with 1979, though BP net income had fallen 6%, and that of 
Shell had fallen even more sharply by 20%. The rate of return on capital 
invested for all the Majors had fallen from 24% (1979) to 21.9% (1980). It is 
of course very difficult to compare net income and rate of return on capital 
invested as between these companies because of the impact of exchange rate 
fluctuations, and variations in accounting methods. With this proviso, the 
rate of return on capital invested for Shell fell from 32.8 (1979) to 20% 
(1980), while that for BP fell from 38.5 (1979) to 27.1% (1980). All the 
other Majors suffered smaller falls in the rate of return on capital invested 
between 1979 and 1980, and the overall pattern was very significant in an 
industry where 82% of net income is subsequently turned into capital 
investment. Where increases in net income were recorded in 1980, much of the 
effect was reduced by a 40% increase globally in the taxes paid to 
Governments.
From the standpoint of the British Government in late 1980, the financial 
condition of the oil industry meant they could not be sure there would be an 
anxious queue of purchasers waiting to benefit from their proposed sale of 
B.N.O.C.'s equity. The institutional investors and the oil companies would 
seek to get the price down to an acceptable level, while the oil companies 
would press for compensating tax advantages, having regard to the review of 
North Sea taxation in train at the end of 1981, which Para 5.12 demonstrated 
produced a most attractive tax regime from the oil company standpoint by the 
end of 1983. It was probable that the sale of B.N.O.C's equity could not be 
completed till 1982, or maybe even later, and this assessment fitted well with 
a 2 year development delay on the Clyde field. Development could proceed once
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the Government had divested itself of a substantial part of B.N.O.C., thus 
lessening the impact of any harmful effects on PSBR.
The Clyde field development delay of two years would appear therefore to 
have been dovetailed into a range of policy considerations: the achievement
of a compromise between B.N.O.C. and the Treasury; the probable timing of the 
general election; but most important, the likely date for the achievement of 
partial privatisation of B.N.O.C. when the impact of the necessary investment 
on PSBR would be lessened. It was convenient however, to present the decision 
to the public as a measure designed to achieve conservation.
5.4 Summary of Conclusions
PRT as a proportion of total tax revenue, rose from 1% (1979) to reach an 
estimated 13% (1983). The prospect and actuality of this increasing stream of 
revenue reduced the relative importance of the 'stream of profits' argument 
with which Lord Kearton had deterred the Conservatives from partial 
privatisation when they first took Office, by pointing out how this would 
reduce B.N.O.C.'s income from crude oil sales. The Conservatives economic 
assumptions, which placed the control of inflation to the fore amongst 
economic objectives, became the predominant influence causing the Government 
to revert to its earlier policy of partial privatisation, by hiving off 
B.N.O.C.'s Upstream (exploration and production) interests into a new company 
called Britoil, and selling off 51% of the equity, while retaining the 
B.N.O.C. sales arm. These economic assumptions included the view that there 
was a fixed quantity of resources available for investment at any one time, so 
that the use of these resources in the Public Sector crowded out their use in 
the Private Sector, which Conservatives believed to be superior to the Public 
Sector as a source of wealth generation. Further, the Conservatives believed
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that Public Sector investment was likely to increase PSBR, which would lead to 
an increase in money supply in turn resulting in inflation. The Conservatives 
knew that £60,000 million of investment was needed in the North Sea to 
maintain Britain's oil self sufficiency the 21st Century. These factors 
combined to convince the Government of the need to place limits on the role of 
the Public Sector in the North Sea, while encouraging the Private Sector 
through a liberalisation of the tax regime in the oil industry's favour.
(Para 5.12)
An investigation by an Organising Group of the prospects for funding a 
gas gathering line through a private utility company with limited public 
involvement, found that financing along these lines, as favoured by the 
Government, was not practical. The oil companies would not fund the project 
without concessions both on gas price, and the provisions of PRT, which they 
wanted altered so as to allow them to offset their separate expenditures on a 
collective enterprise against their individual tax liabilities, which last the 
Government would not concede for fear of a loss of revenue arising from more 
projects acquiring collective status. The Banks would not finance the scheme 
without financial guarantees either from the Government or British Gas, behind 
which of course, the Government ultimately stood. The Government had doubts 
over the viability of the scheme, arising both from the withdrawal of 
Norwegian input and the unwillingness of the oil companies and financial 
institutions themselves to take the risks involved. Government financial 
guarantees might lead to an ongoing Concorde like commitment with a serious 
impact on PSBR. Further, Government financial guarantees for a gas gathering 
system would increase State involvement in the North Sea, just when the 
general thrust of Government policy was to reduce that involvement. The twin 
events of September and October 1981, involving the rejection of Government 
financial guarantees for a gas gathering system, and the reversion to the
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earlier policy of partial privatisation of B.N.O.C. were a watershed, marking 
the decline of the influence of the interventionists with the Cabinet and the 
Conservative Party, and the dominance of those elements seating to reduce and 
limit the State's involvement in the North Sea. (Para 5.2)
In terms of 2 possible scenarios of future North Sea production a 2 year 
development delay for the Clyde field did not make sense as a conservation 
measure. It represented a compromise between the requirements of Shell/Esso 
and B.N.O.C. who wished to avoid any delay, and the Treasury who favoured a 5 
year delay to lessen still further any impact on PSBR in the near future. It 
put off such adverse effects till after the likely date of a future General 
Election, but more important it represented the period of time needed to 
ensure the completion of measures for the partial privatisation of B.N.O.C., 
which would in turn lessen State involvement in the North Sea and reduce the 
potential impact of the development investment on PSBR (Para 5.3)
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Final Conclusions The character of the 1934 onshore regime, and the 
circumstances surrounding its creation fit the model derived from Hossain.
The National Government, for economic and (primarily) defence considerations 
resolved the twin problems of ownership and access which had till then 
prevented an oil search. Their aim was to stimulate such a search in an 
unproved oil province. Oil and gas was taken into Crown ownership, and 
Government licencees granted access to sites, subject to safeguards for 
landowners. Licence terms were generous to the companies, and probably 
designed with their covert assistance. Territory was assigned for many years 
with no provision for the renegotiation of terms during the period of the 
licence. The Administrative Allocation Licensing System gave the Government 
discretion in the allocation of licences, but saved the companies the costs 
associated with auction bidding. The balance of advantage in the Oil Company 
Government relationship definitely lay with the companies.
The offshore regime of 1964, was based on foundations laid in 1964. The aim 
was to explore for and then exploit southern North Sea gas, a project 
involving high risk and massive investment, and to employ a policy of rapid 
development, which both the Conservative and Labour Parties considered would 
provide a needed stimulus for the flagging U.K. economy. The limited 
offshore expertise then available, was substantially under the control of the 
Majors, which meant that the majority of it was in U.S. hands. In these 
circumstances, and in line with the Hossain model, the regime was shaped, 
principally by generous fiscal measures, to attract company commitment. The 
company hand in the Oil Company Government relationship was strong, A 
comparison with the Norwegian policy of slow development demonstrates how the 
strength of the company hand was reinforced by the rapid development policy.
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Since the development period for the southern gas fields was relatively 
short, and both the companies and the Government wanted rapid development, 
this encouraged the use of established U.S. oilfield equipment suppliers, and 
led to only limited and unsuccessful efforts to stimulate an indigeneous 
offshore supplies industry. As a countervailing feature, the Gas Council was 
the only, or monopsony purchaser of gas except for non fuel purposes, which 
as Stern(l)points out, also had the effect of making it the substantial 
seller of gas. Under these conditions, gas was purchased from the companies 
at well below international market prices, for which they were compensated 
through extraction rates somewhat in excess of those required by the gas 
industry.
In 1964, as in 1934, and in line with the Hossain model, certain ownership 
of the resources to be exploited, was a prerequisite for securing investment. 
The decline of the Free Seas regime, and the process of enclosure initiated 
by the Truman Proclamation(1945), which was well advanced by the middle 
Sixties, operated against the setting up of a Regional regime. Britain, 
Norway and Denmark, together possessed the major share of North Sea 
coastline, but were not members of the E.E.C. Thus, those members of the Six 
with limited North Sea coastline, or who were either landlocked or energy 
disadvantaged (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg) could not exercise leverage 
on them in favour of a Regional regime, by offering tradeoffs in other 
Community policy areas. An international regime for the North Sea, based 
upon its division into National Sectors, was created. Two UNCLOS 
principles(1958) were available to negotiators, were countries judged their 
adoption mutually useful. Though the resources to be exploited were believed 
to be considerable, there was no knowledge of their actual location, which
6-3
speeded the negotiating process. Britain accepted Norway's view of the 
geology of the Norwegian Trough thus avoiding a dispute which would 
discourage investment. This led to the straight application of the Median 
Line principle, which gave Britain 50% of the North Sea, since she was the 
only State on the western side of the North Sea, and the Equidistance 
principle did not apply. Cross boundary arrangements, including unitization 
of fields straddling the boundary between Norway and Britain, were resolved 
by a system of balanced and mutually exclusive responsibilities.
From 1969 onwards, interest shifted from the southern gas fields, to newer
oilfields in the north of the British Sector. Given the rapid development 
policy, the longer lead time to bring such fields into production, and the 
truly massive investment required, and again in line with Hossain, the 
existing regime with its generous fiscal measures was retained intact. As 
awareness of the scale of the enterprise in the north of the British Sector 
grew, so to did demands for a revision of the regime, to produce an income
for Britain similar to that obtained by other oil producing states.
Lord Balogh was a prime mover in the call for change, as a result of which, 
the Public Accounts Committee, 1972/1973, called for radical fiscal 
alterations, just before the oil crisis of 1973, with a view to altering the 
tax system which they described as being 'porous as a sieve'. However, again 
in line with Hossain, regime changes only occurred in 1975, when changes in 
the world oil industry and the state of development of the northern oilfields 
had sufficiently matured, to permit these changes to take place without 
hazarding the rapid development policy.
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When the Labour Government introduced regime change in 1975, the measures 
applied were generally acceptable to the Conservative Party, who while in 
Government had prepared their own, not dissimilar plans. The fiscal system 
was completely changed through the introduction of PRT (Petroleum Revenue 
Tax). However, while both Parties, now considered there was a need for 
greater control over North Sea oil, in view of the heightened perception of 
the importance of the security of supply issued following 1973, and their 
experiences of dealing with BP and Shell, at that time, and on earlier 
occasions, the Conservatives opposed the setting up of B.N.O.C. as an agent 
for this purpose. With significant resources now under development or in 
production, and with the position of the Majors weakened elsewhere, thus 
increasing their commitment to the politically stable North Sea, policy need 
no longer be constrained within former limits. In 1975, therefore, the first 
breach in the bipartisan policy for the North Sea occurred, and thereafter 
the North Sea policy of both parties progressively diverged on ideological 
lines. The model derived from Hossain has no relevance to this development.
Under Labour, B.N.O.C. and the Department of Energy, worked in concert to 
strengthen the hand of the new Corporation. B.N.O.C.'s membership of all 
Operating Committees, gave it access to information and a total picture of 
North Sea activities, which was not available to private sector companies. 
Work was held up till B.N.O.C. was ready to take advantage of opportunities. 
The B.N.O.C. Board was constructed to exclude the company point of view and 
influence. To secure a B.N.O.C. interest in existing leases, by 'free' 
negotiation, the Administrative Allocation Licensing System was used to 
discriminate against those companies which failed to reach agreement on the 
issue.
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When the Conservative Party came to power in May 1979, B.N.O.C. was removed 
from membership of Operating Committee where it held no equity, which removed 
a particular irritant that the oil companies felt to be unfair. The 
Conservatives in Opposition, had developed an economic policy, which placed 
the control of inflation to the fore amongst economic objectives. For them, 
private sector enterprise was superior to public sector enterprise, being the 
source of those entrepreneurial drives which they considered wealth creating. 
Control of Government expenditure, and reduction of PSBR (Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement) were measures to squeeze inflation out of the economy, 
and thus set free those entrepreneurial drives they considered to be latent 
in society. Initial plans for privatisation of part of the State's offshore 
interests, in line with this philosophy, were delayed by Lord Kearton's 
stream of profits argument, as well as by the persistance within the 
Conservative Party of important interests who did not agree with the new 
economic policy. With the growth of revenue from PRT, Kearton's arguments 
held less strength. The two Case Studies, relating to the refusal of 
Government guarantees for the gas gathering line proposal, and the Clyde 
field development delay, show how both these decisions arose from the 
Government's economic strategy, and a fresh determination to privatise, which 
became clear towards the end of 1981, with the eclipse of those elements 
within the Conservative Party opposed to the policy based upon the 
concentration of all efforts on the elimination of inflation. In this sense 
1981 was a watershed year.
In 1981, measures were already in train to liberalise the tax system in 
favour of the oil companies, although the most recent changes did not 
materialise till the first half of 1983. However, while such measures
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doubtless proceed from the Conservative philosophy which favours private 
enterprise, it is reasonable to conclude that they may also derive to a large 
extent from a realisation of the vast additional effort, requiring a further 
£60,000 million of expenditure, if the smaller North Sea fields are to be 
developed, without which British oil self sufficieny cannot be extended to 
the next century. In this sense, it is possible to finally conclude that the 
Hossain model is still relative to the situation, and is now entering into a 
second round of application, in response to this fresh challenge.
REFERENCE
Stern, Jonathan. Gas's contribution to U.K. self sufficiency. London,
Heinemann Educational Books for British Institute Joint 
Energy Policy Programme, 1984 (Energy Paper No.10).
7-1
List of Works Consulted (^denotes consulted not cited)
Al-Chalabi, Fadil J. OPEC and the international oil industry. Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1980.
Atkinson, Fred and Hall, Stephen. Oil and the British economy. London,
Croom Helm, 1983.
Bailey, Richard. B.N.O.C.'s new phase. Natwest Quarterly Review, November,
1979, pp.2-11.
Bailey, Richard. What future for B.N.O.C.? Natwest Quarterly, Review,
November, 1977, pp.17-27.
The Banker. Britain's new oil corporation. May 1977, pp.85-89.
Beaton, Kendall. Enterprise in oil: the history of Shell in the United
States. New York, Appleton-Century Crofts, 1957.
Bray, Jeremy. Gas pipeline plan. Letter to The Times, 10/9/81.
British National Oil Corporation. BNOC Report and accounts, 3rd-6th,
1978-1981.
Brown, Andrew C. Britain's hard luck oil company. Fortune, 18/4/83,
pp.54-59.
Brown, E.D. Rockall and the national jurisdiction of the U.K. Marine policy,
July 1978, p.191.
Business week. Britain: greater control over North Sea oil. 5/4/76,
pp.41-46.
Business week. British Gas deal that has everyone up in arms. 30/4/84,p.25.
Buxton, Neil K. The role of the 'new' industries in Britain during the
1930's; a reinterpretation. Edinburgh, Heriot Watt 
University, Department of Economics, 1974 (Working 
paper 1974/75, no. 2).
P9H40L
7-2
Cameron, Peter, Petroleum licensing: a comparative study. London,
Financial Times, 1984.
Cameron, Sue. Decision on North Sea gas near. Financial Times, 18/12/80.
Cameron, Sue. Why Mrs. Thatcher's patience ran out. Financial Times,
12/9/81.
Castles, F.G., Murray, D.J., Pollitt, C.J., Potter, C.D, eds.. Decisions,
organisations and society. Harmondsworth, Middx., 
Penguin Books, 1976.
Clauson, A.W. Third world debt and global recovery. 1983 Jodidi Lecture at
the Centre for International Affairs, Boston, Mass., 
24/2/83.
Conservative Party. The right approach to the economy. 1977.
Cooper, Duff. Old men forget. London, Hart Davies, 1955.
Corti, Gerry and Frazer, Frank. The nation's oil: a story of control.
London, Graham & Trotman, 1983.
Craig, E.H. Cunningham. The Petroleum (Production) Bill. Petroleum times,
April 7th, 1934, pp.363-364.
Crossman, Richard. The diaries of a Cabinet Minister, volume 3, Lord
President of the Council and Leader of the Commons. 
London, Hamish Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1977.
Lord Curzon. Speech at the British Government dinner to the (Wartime)
Petroleum Board. 24/11/18.
Dafter, Ray and Davidson, Ian. North Sea oil and gas and British foreign
policy. London, R.I.I.A., 1980. (Chatham House papers 
no. 10).
Dam, Kenneth W. Oil resources. Who gets what? Chicago, Chicago University
Press, 1980.
7-3
Dam, Kenneth W. The pricing of North Sea gas in Great Journal of
law and Economics, 1970, pp.11;13-14.
Deaglio, Mario. Private enterprise and public emulation; a study of Italian
experience with IRI. London, lEA, 1966.
Denman, C.R. Markets under the sea; a study of potential of private
property rights in the seabed. London, lEA, 1984.
Downs, Anthony. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston, Hass., Little Brown, 1967.
Economist. Publicise or privatise don't ditherise. 13/6/81, pp.25-26.
Economist Intelligence Unit. The North Sea and British Industry: the new
opportunities: an abbreviated version of a report 
commissioned by Shell U.K. Ltd., 1984.
Ellis, Barbara. Oilman in bowler hats. Forbes, 21/8/80, pp.54-55.
Evans, Douglas. Western energy policy. London, Macmillan Press Ltd.,
1978.
Ezra, Sir Derek. Coal and energy: the need to exploit the world's most
abundant fossil fuel. London, Benn, 1980.
Forbes. With friends like these. 26/11/79, p.39.
Forester, Jay W. Industrial dynamics. Cambridge, Mass., MIT press, 1964.
Frankel, Paul. Mattel; oil and power politics. New York, Praeger, 1966.
Fulda, Michael.* Oil and international relations. New York, A m o  Press,
1976 (Reprinted Washington University thesis).
Grayson, Leslie. National oil companies. Chichester, Wiley, 1981.
Grieves, Forest L. Transnationalism in world politics. New York, Pergamon
press, 1979.
7-4
Grisel, Etienne. The lateral boundaries of the Continental Shelf and the
jurisdiction of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases. American Journal of international law, 
vol. 64, pp.562-593.
Hartshorn, J.E. Oil companies and governments: an account of the
international oil industry in its political 
environment. 2nd ed« London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 
1967.
Hoare Govett. Oil facts: offshore Europe 1980. Tables of historic
figures of oil and gas production in the North Sea, 
analysed by field.
Hodges, M. Multinational corporations and government: a case study of the
United Kingdom's experience, 1964-1970. Farnborough, 
Saxon House, 1974.
Horigan, James E. Legal and regulatory aspects of fieldwide unitization of
petroleum reservoirs extending across the 
jurisdictional boundaries of bordering states in the 
North Sea. Society of Petroleum Engineers paper 4329, 
1973.
Hossain, Kamal. Law and policy in petroleum development: changing relations
between transnationals and governments. London,
Frances Pinter, 1979.
Huxley, John. Britain's onshore oil industry. London, Macmillan, 1983.
Huxley, John. Development of North Sea field delayed two years. The Times,
19/12/80.
Industry week. Tempers flare over British oil. Vol.198, Part 6, pp.96-97.
7-5
Institute of Petroleum. The petroleum industry in the U.K. London, the
Institute, 1966.
IMEG (International Management and Engineering Group) report. May 1972.
International petroleum encyclopaedia, 1966-*
Jenkin, Michael. British industry in the North Sea; state intervention in a
developing industrial sector. London, Macmillan, 1981.
Jones, Geoffrey. The state and the emergence of the British oil industry.
London, Macmillan, 1981.
Kemp, Alexander and Rose, David. Dangers of reliance on oil revenues.
Petroleum Economist, March 1982, pp.81-83.
Kemp, Alexander and Crichton, David. The impact of the system of petroleum
taxation in the U.K. University of Strathclyde, Fraser 
of Allander Institute, 1980. (Fraser of Allander 
Research monograph no. 8).
Kemp, Alexander and Rose, David. Tax changes give new incentives. Petroleum
economist. May, 1983, pp.163-165.
Keohane, Robert 0. and Nye, Joseph S. Power and interdependence: world
politics in transition. Boston, Mass., Little Brown, 
1977.
Keohane, Robert 0. and Nye, Joseph S. eds. Transnational relations and
world politics. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1972.
Kohl, Wilfrid.* After the second oil crisis: energy policies in Europe.
Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath, 1982.
Kohl, Wildrid.* International Institutions for energy management. British
Institutes Joint Energy Policy Programme. London,
Policy Studies Institute, 1983. (Energy paper no. 7)
7-6
Klitz, Kenneth J. North Sea resource requirements for development of the
U.K. sector. Oxford, Pergamon press, 1980.
Krapels, Edward N. Controlling oil; British policy and the British National
Oil Corporation. Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Printing 
Office, 1977.
Krapels, Edward No. Oil crisis management: strategic stockpiling for
international security. Baltimore & London,
Johns Hopkins University Press 1980.
Lee, Fred. Statement to the House of Commons, 4/2/65, explaining that with
'his advice and assistance* BP and the Gas Council had 
agreed a price of 5p a therm.
Lenczowski, George.* Oil and the state in the Middle East. Ithaca, N.Y.
Cornell University Press, 1960.
Levy,Walter, J. Oil, strategy and politics. Boulder, Colorado, Westview
Press, 1982.
Lucas, Nigel. Energy, the U.K. and the European Community. London, PSI and
R.I.I.A. 1982.
Lufti, Ashraf.* OPEC oil. Beirut, The Middle East Research and Publishing
Centre, 1982.
Me Gonigle, Michael R. and Zacher, Mark W. *Pollution, politics and
international law: tankers at sea. Berkley, Calif., 
University of California Press, 1979.
Mackay, D.A. and Mackay, G.A. The political economy of the North Sea.
London, Martin Robertson, 1975.
Macmillan, Ian C. Strategy formulation. St. Paul, Minnesota, West Publishing
Co., 1978.
7-7
Marquand, David. Ramsay MacDonald. London, Jonathan Cape, 1977.
Mason, C.M. ed. The effective management of resources; the international
politics of the North Sea. London Frances Pinter, 1977
Meadows, D.H. The limits to growth: a report to the Club of Rome's project
on the predicament of mankind. New York, University 
Books, March 1972.
Meyer, R.F. The future supply of nature made petroleum and gas. Oxford,
Pergamon Press, 1977.
Mowat, C.L. Britain between the wars, 1981-1940. London, Methuen, 1955.
Netherlands—West Germany. Treaty concerning arrangements for cooperation in
the ems estuary. The Hague, 6th April, I960, and 
supplementary agreement, 14th May 1962.
Niskanen, W.A. Bureaucrat-servant or master? London, TEA, 1967.
Noreng, Oystein. The oil industry and government strategy in the North Sea.
London, Croom Helm, 1980.
Ocean industry. A close look at Britain, the E.E.C. and North Sea oil: an
interview with Austin W. Pearce. February, 1977, 
pp.57-61.
Odell, Peter R. British oil policy: a radical alternative. London, Kogan
Page, 1980.
Odell, Peter and Rosing, Kenneth. The future of oil: a simulation study of
the inter-relationships of resources, reserves and use, 
1980-2080. London. Kogan Page, 1980.
Offshore. BNOC control worries offshore operators. 20/6/78, pp.98-108.
Offshore safety... Report of the Committee presented to Parliament, March
1980.
7—8
Oil Daily, Tough Shetland Island leader takes fishing mood to B.N.O.C.
No.6205, 8/1076, p.9.
Onorato, W.L. Apportionment of an international common petroleum deposit.
International and comparative law quarterly, vol.17, 
1968, p.85.
Onorato, W.L. Apportionment of an international common petroleum deposit.
International and comparative law quarterly, vol.26, 
1977, pp.324-337.
Open University. Oil the crisis *73. D203/14(R). Text of Broadcast.
Pearce, Joan, ed. The third oil shock; the effects of lower prices. London,
Boston and Henley, Routledge, Kegan Paul for the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1983.
Pearton, Maurice. Oil and the Roumanian State. London, OUP, 1971.
Peebles, Malcolm W. The evolution of the natural gas industry. London,
Macmillan, 1980.
Penrose, E.T. The large international firm in the developing countries:
the international petroleum industry. London, Allen & 
Unwin, 1968.
Petroleum economist, 1975 - (Petroleum press service from 1934)
Petroleum economist. The need for new oil. Boost for gas. June 1981,
pp.247-252.
Petroleum economist. U.K. North Sea: funding of gas gathering pipeline.
March 1981, p.120.
Petroleum press service, 1934-1974.




Petroleum times. Britain's Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934; new
legislation surveyed in Petroleum Department's Annual 
report; regulations and model clauses. 12th October, 
1935, pp.395-397
Petroleum times. Description of North Sea magnetometer survey. November
15th, 1963, pp.592-593.
Petroleum times. Editorial: British oil drilling. September 21st, 1935,
pp.311-312.
Petroleum times. Editorial: Committee of Imperial Defence Reviw of Armed
forces needs. 13th July, 1935, pp.43-44.
Petroleum times. Ethyl petrols for aviation purposes. 27th January, 1934,
p.97
Petroleum times. Herbert Green & Co. Advantages of home refining to Great
Britain. 31st August, 1935, p.219.
Petroleum times. Italy's new petroleum legislation: state control of
importation, refining and distribution. 20th January, 
1934, p.71.
Plasschaert, S. Transfer pricing and multinational corporations.
Farnborough, Saxon House for ECSIM, 1979.
Richardson, H.W. The economic significance of the depression Britain.
Journal of contemporary history, vol. 4, 1969, 
pp.66-69.
Robinson, Colin and Morgan, John. Economic consequences of controlling the
depletion of North Sea oil and gas. London, Trade 
Policy Research, Centre, 1976.
Robinson, Colin. Oil depletion policy in the Unit Kingdom. Three Banks
Review, September, 1982.
7-10
Ryle, Sir Martin. The mathematics of North Sea gas. Letter to The Times,
17/9/81.
Sampson, Anthony. The seven sisters. London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1975
Shackleton, M. Britain and oil: a case study. Milton Keynes, The Open
University, 1977.
Shell briefing service. The oil majors in 1980. No. 5, 1981.
Shell U.K. Ltd. The North Sea: a springboard for British industry. 1982
Sherman, John and Richardson, P. An experiment to evaluate methods for
estimating fossil fuel resources. Presented at the 
Third International Symposium on Forecasting, 
Philadelphia, 1982.
Shwadran, Benjamin.* The Middle East, oil, and the great powers. New York,
Praeger, 1955.
Singh, Jyoti Shankar.* A new international economic order: towards a fair
distribution of the world's resources. New York, 
Praeger, 1977.
Smith, John. Statement by the Parliamentary Secretary of State of Energy in
the House of Commons, April, 1975. Hansard, vol. 891, 
No.115, cols. 602-603.
Smith, P.G.A. The Shell that hit Germany hardest. London, Shell Marketing
Ltd., 1919.
Stern, Jonathan. Gas's contribution to U.K. self sufficiency. London,
Heinemann Education Books for British Institutes 'Joint 
Energy Policy Programme, 1984. (Energy paper No. 10).
Steven, Robert. U.K. red tape stalls progress. April, 1980, pp.140-146.
Stobaugh, Robert. The oil companies in crisis. Daedalus, p.189.
7-11
Strachey, John. End of Empire. London, Victor Gollancz, 1959.
Strange, Susan.* International economic relations of the western world.
2v. London, Oxford University press for the R.I.I.A.,
1976.
Strange, Susan and Tooze, Roger, eds. The international politics of surplus
capacity; competion and market shares. London, Allen 
& Unwin, 1981.
Thirwall, A.R. Keynesian employment theory is not defunct. Three Banks
Review, September, 1981, pp.14-29.
Thomson, David. England in the twentieth century. 2nd ed. By
Geoffrey Warner. Harmondsworth, Middx, Penguin Books,
1981.
The Times. The bitter battle for North Sea gas. 18/12/80.
The Times. Pipeline shelved for North Sea gas. 11/9/81.
Treverton, Gregory ed. Energy and security. Farnborough, Hants., Gower
Press for the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, 1980.
Turner, Louis. Oil companies in the international system. 3rd ed. London,
George Allen & Unwin for the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1983.
Turner, Louis. U.K. interests and the International Energy Agency. London,
Policy Studies Institute and the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1982. (Energy paper No. 4)
U.K. Department of Energy. Development of the oil and gas resources of the
United Kingdom, 1974-
7-12
U.K. Department of Energy. Gas gathering line systems in the North Sea: a
report by Gas Gathering Pipelines (North Sea) Ltd., 
London, H.M.S.O., May 1978. (DOE energy paper 30).
U.K. Department of Energy. A North Sea gas gathering system. London,
H.M.S.O., May 1980, (DOE energy paper 44).
U.K. Department of Energy. A study of gas gathering lines in the North Sea:
a report to the Department of Energy by Williams-Merz, 
Newcastle, consulting engineers. May 1976.
U.K. Department of Trade and Industry. Production and reserves of oil and
gas on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf. London, 
H.M.S.O., 1973.
U.K Government. United Kingdom offshore oil and gas policy. London,
H.M.S.O., 1974. Cmnd 5969.
U.K. Legisi ation. Continental Shelf Act, 1964
Oil Taxation Act, 1975 
Petroleum (Production) Act, 1918 
Petroleum (Production) Act, 1934
U.K. Parliament. North Sea oil and gas: a report to Parliament, 1973
U.K. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates. Hansard, vol.891, cols.486-487;
492-493; 498; 504; 559; April 29-30, 1975.
Hansard, vol. 891, cols. 1305-1306; 1308-1310, 5th May,
1975.
U.K. Parliament. House of Commons, Debates, Hansard, vol. 986/987,
cols.596-597, 20th-26th une, 1980.
Hansard, vol. 988, 18th-24th July, 1980.
7-13
U.K. Parliament. House of Commons. Public Accounts Committee. Session
1972/1973. First report... North Sea oil and gas. 
London, H.M.S.O., 1973.
U.K. Parliament. House of Commons. Select Committee on Energy, Session
1980/1981. Minutes of evidence. North Sea depletion 
policy. Wednesday 8th July 1981, Shell U.K. Ltd., Esso 
Ltd., London, H.M.SO.O., 1981.
U.K. Parliament. Select Committee on the Nationalised Industries.
Exploitation of North Sea gas. London, H.M.S.O., 1968. 
U.K. Parliament. House of Commons. Treasury and Civil Service Committee.
Report , no. 11, July 1981.
U.K. Treaties. United Kingdom- Norway. Agreement between the U.K. of Great
Britain and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway 
relating to the transmission of gas by pipelines from 
the Ekofisk field and neighbouring areas to the U.K.
2nd May, 1973.
United Kingdom-Norway. Agreement between the U.K. of 
Great Britain and the Government of the Kingdom of 
Norway relating to the exploitation of the Frigg Field 
reservoir and the transmission of gas there from the 
United Kingdom. 10th May. 1976.
U.K.0.0.A. (The U.K. Offshore Oeprators Association). Exploration and
development of the U.K. continental shelf oil. 1978. 
(Energy Commission paper 17).
U.N. Centre for Natural Resources, Energy and Transport. State petroleum
enterprises in developing countries. Oxford, Pergamon 
press, 1980.
7-14
U.N. Conference on the law of the Sea. Geneva, 1958 6 Official records, 48. 
U.S. Senate. Multinational oil corporations and U.S. foreign policy.
Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing office,
1975. (part of the Church report).
University of Sussex. Science Policy Research Unit. Government policy for the
offshore supplies industry; Britain compared with 
Norway and France, by Lesley Cook and John Surrey. 
Falmer, Brighton, University of Sussex, October, 1983. 
(SPRU Occasional paper series no. 21).
Varley, Eric. Statement to the Select Committee on Nationalised Industry.
Exploitation of North Sea oil and gas. First report, 
1974-1975.
Williamson, J. Memorandum on monetary policy to the U.K. House of Commons.
Treasury and Civil Service Committee (July 1980). 
Wilson, Robert. A bidding method of perfect competition. Stanford
University, Institute of Mathematical Studies in the 
Social Sciences, 1975.
Woodliffe, J.C. International unitization of an offshore gas field.
International and comparative law quarterly, 
vol. 26, 1977, pp. 338-353.
Young, Oran. Resource management at the international level; the case of
the North Pacific. London, Frances Pinter, 1977.
Young, Richard. Offshore claims and problems in the North Sea, vol.59, 1965
pp. 505-522.
